DPKO U/SYG GUEHENNO BLAMES SLOW DARFUR PROGRESS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000134 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO SUBJECT: DPKO U/SYG GUEHENNO BLAMES SLOW DARFUR PROGRESS ON AU Classified By: AMBASSADOR JACKIE W. SANDERS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Assistant-Secretary Silverberg met with United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Under-Secretary-General (SYG) Guehenno on February 8 to discuss Department concerns on Darfur progress, including candidates for Special Representative and Force Commander for the hybrid operation and contracting for equipment and facilities for personnel deployed under the Light Support Package (LSP). Guehenno complained that the African Union (AU) was "dragging its feet" and preventing progress on many of these issues, and he solicited U.S. help in encouraging the AU to cooperate better with the UN. Guehenno clarified the UN position on funding arrangements under the Heavy Support Package (HSP) and assured that DPKO's Office of Mission Support (OMS) would contact the Department on this point. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) Participants in this meeting were A/S Silverberg; DPKO U/SYG Guehenno; Ambassador Sanders; OMS Officer Max Curley; DPKO Darfur Planning Team Officer Lara Sitea; and Poloff (notetaker). AU SUSPICIOUS ABOUT SRSG, FC APPOINTMENTS -------------- ¶3. (C) One major topic of discussion between A/S Silverberg and U/SYG Guehenno concerned the candidates for Special Representative of the SYG (SRSG),Deputy SRSG and Force Commander (FC) of the eventual UN-AU hybrid operation in Darfur. Guehenno highlighted the need to manage AU sensitivities surrounding the appointment of the FC, pointing out that AU Commission Chair Konare in particular harbored many "hidden agenda suspicions" on the part of the international community regarding the new FC. Guehenno mentioned as two possibilities LT GEN Babacar Gaye of Senegal, who is the current FC of the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC),and LT GEN ML Agwai, Chief of the Nigerian Armed Service until May 2006. Guehenno was quick to say that he had not yet vetted either name through SYG Ban or discussed them with AU Peace and Security Commissioner Djinnit. In response to a question from A/S Silverberg, Guehenno remarked that high-level intervention with Nigerian President Obasanjo was necessary to convince present AMIS FC Aprezi of the need to rapidly deploy. ¶4. (C) Guehenno acknowledged that the new SRSG would be the "more problematic" appointment and that the position would also have authority over the humanitarian community in Darfur. He dismissed the name put forward by Konare - former Burkinabe FM Leandre Bassole, Director of Political Affairs in the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea - as "laughable" and "a waste of our time." In response to A/S Silverberg's complaint that the UN lacked "adult supervision" in Sudan, Guehenno praised Henry Anyidoho, retired MAJ GEN in the Ghanaian Armed Forces with vast peacekeeping experience, including the UN Emergency Force at the Sinai, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, and the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda. Guehenno said Anyidoho would be a likely candidate for D/SRSG, which would be designed to coordinate with the SRSG for the UN Mission in Sudan in the south. Guehenno believed that Anyidoho was uniquely positioned to approach African peacekeepers in a way that Western peacekeepers were not and would accordingly be extremely beneficial to the hybrid operation. However, Guehenno considered that Anyidoho lacked the requisite political experience necessary for him to serve as SRSG. Guehenno was open to U.S. suggestions for any of these offices, and A/S Silverberg assured of U.S. assistance with potential candidates identified by the UN who might be in need of encouragement to take the job. ¶5. (C) A/S Silverberg inquired about the status of the proposed coordination meeting between the UN, AU, potential donors and troop contributors to discuss the three-phase approach and the concept of the hybrid force, a meeting originally envisioned to follow the 29-30 AU Summit in Addis Ababa. Guehenno said the AU was "dragging its feet" on responding to this proposal, despite repeated calls he had made to Djinnit (NOTE: Guehenno added that Djinnit was planning to leave his position at the AU in mid-2007; the post is a very political one and a successor, traditionally an Algerian, has not yet been identified. END NOTE). Guehenno expressed exasperation with the AU's stalling on this meeting, especially since the focus of the session "was in the AU's best interest." USUN NEW Y 00000134 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) In response to A/S Silverberg's suggestion of a phased approach to implementation of the HSP, Guehenno said the UN was torn between not wanting to appear "frozen" in anticipation of Bashir's expected response and "appeasing" the AU, which had insisted on such a letter. Guehenno quipped that deploying HSP assets without Bashir's concurrence to the package would be akin to "having two toothless toes in the water." Again, Guehenno solicited assistance in moving this process along, adding that once Sudan ascribed to the HSP, it was "stuck" and obligated to commit to the hybrid. NEED FOR NEW UN CAMPS IN EL FASHER -------------- ¶7. (C) Another main topic discussed was that of contracting for equipment and facilities for UN personnel deployed under the Light Support Package (LSP). DPKO deemed that the PA&E-constructed AMIS compound in El Fasher was not compliant with its OMS security standards and was thus inadequate to house incoming UN LSP staff. The UN agreed to waive these standards in using the compound for office space but not for accommodations. In a subsequent conversation with Poloff, OMS explained that at the moment, one OMS-compliant guesthouse in El Fasher (run by the UN Mission in the Sudan) houses 27 of the 48 military officers deployed under the LSP, as well as 25 of the 30 police officers, and occupancy in this location has been maximized. According to OMS rep Max Curley, if the remaining 21 military officers, 5 police officers and 15 international civilians are to be deployed to Darfur under the LSP, a new OMS-compliant camp must be constructed to house them, as well as to serve as a "bold hold" in the event that violence there necessitates a consolidation of personnel. ¶8. (C) Impediments to this construction centered around resistance from the wali (governor) of North Darfur in securing land near the PA&E compound and conducting water surveys there; DPKO has been seeking all the help it can get to change the wali's mind. Guehenno lamented that the AU could be playing a more persuasive role with the wali but was failing to do so. Once these commitments are secured, construction could begin on a compound that meets UN security standards. Curley reminded that time was of the essence on creating lodging for the remaining LSP personnel, as a full contingent was necessary to lay the groundwork in Darfur for the arrival of HSP assets. The cost for constructing these new camps was estimated at $40 million, in addition to continuing financial support for existing camps. ¶9. (C) DPKO specified that equipment and facilities supporting UN personnel could be financed under the UN scale of assessments only under the hybrid operation; everything that needed to be built for AMIS personnel under the HSP, including four new camps to house the additional two battalions requested by the AU, would not come from the UN budget. In this case reimbursement to Member States for such construction would come when the hybrid arrangement was fully functional. Guehenno assured that DPKO's OMS would contact the Department to further discuss this point. ¶10. (C) A/S Silverberg concluded the meeting by informing Guehenno that Congress had favorably responded to a Department request to increase FY07 funding beyond the original amount in the continuing resolution. ¶11. (C) This message has been cleared by A/S Silverberg. WOLFF