USUN VIEWS ON SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001225 SIPDIS SIPDIS FROM AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD FOR SECSTATE RICE, APNSA HADLEY, SECDEF GATES, AND VPOTUS CHENEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2017 TAGS: PREL KUNR UNSC JA BR IN GE SUBJECT: USUN VIEWS ON SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM REF: A. STATE 169809 ¶B. USUN 1183 Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay M. Khalilzad, per 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and comment. With inter-governmental negotiations on Security Council reform set to begin in 2008, a serious debate has begun on Council expansion. We are closer than we have been in several decades to the prospect that a formal proposal for expansion could be put to a vote. We do not know yet if any proposal could secure the needed two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, although this is possible. In any scenario, the position of the African bloc will be critical. Therefore, we believe it is time to seriously consider our response. We have four options: (1) avoid engagement and rely on our veto in the ratification phase to preserve our interests; (2) delay engagement until African states begin to declare support for realistic proposals; (3) start to engage the key players with a view to shaping where they throw their votes; and (4) proactively articulate an American position and mobilize a coalition to support it. We recommend that we begin to engage now to understand better the political terrain; to test reactions to certain principles, possible redlines, and other structural reforms we would seek as part of a comprehensive reform of the UN; and then to determine which option to pursue. End summary and comment. The Political Landscape on UNSC Reform -------------- ¶2. (C) Changes in the global distribution of power since 1965, when the membership of the Council was last adjusted, underlie the political impetus for Security Council expansion. Some states are perennial critics of the Council, although this is typically ideological in nature. The real danger is that, as the membership of the Council has not been updated to reflect geopolitical realities, new rising powers as well as their friends and allies might come to view the Council,s role as illegitimate. This, in turn, could undermine the willingness of countries to abide by its resolutions. ¶3. (C) The U.S. position is that we favor permanent membership for Japan, that other nations should be considered as well, and that changes in the Council should be part of a comprehensive package of structural reforms. All significant proposals for Council reform, however, go beyond the position of favoring Japan alone for permanent membership. Based on the President's speech to the UNGA and bilateral engagement with G-4 members, we are already viewed within the P-5 as more forward-leaning than Russia and China. The British and French are publicly wedded to the G-4 approach, partly to deflect attention from questions about over-representation of Europe among the permanent members. ¶4. (C) According to the UNGA resolution adopted in September 2007, member states are set to begin inter-governmental negotiations on Council reform before September 2008. These negotiations could provide a vehicle for the G-4 model (permanent seats for Japan, Germany, India, Brazil, and two African countries, as well as four additional non-permanent seats) to be brought to a vote. Because the G-4 proposal was not put to a vote in 2005 when it was first tabled, it is difficult to know exactly how much support it would have commanded. We do not, however, believe that it enjoyed the support of the required two-thirds majority (128 countries) of member states. But in the coming months, the G-4 will revise their proposal and could force many previously undecided countries as well as African Union members to show their cards and reveal how close to 128 votes Council expansion has now come. ¶5. (C) We believe expansion of the Council, along the lines of the models currently discussed, will dilute U.S. influence in the body. USUN currently starts most discussions about important Council statements or resolutions with at least six votes (U.S., UK, France, and the three European delegations) and must secure three more to reach the required nine votes -- barring a P-5 veto -- for adoption. To take just the G-4 countries plus the yet-unidentified African state(s) that would join them in permanent membership, we are confident we could reliably count on Japan's support, and to a lesser degree, on Germany's. However, on the most important issues of the day -- sanctions, human rights, the Middle East, etc. -- Brazil, India, and most African states are currently far less sympathetic to our views than our European allies. ¶6. (C) Due to the arithmetic of the UNGA, the African states will be critical in determining whether any Charter amendment reaches the two-thirds majority. Based on public speeches and our own estimates, we assess that the G-4 model or some variant thereof currently enjoys the support of roughly 70-95 member states. The Uniting for Consensus (UFC) proposal (no additional permanent seats, but 10 additional non-permanent seats) enjoys support of no more than roughly 20-25 member states. The African Union (AU) model (largely the same as the G-4 model but with veto rights for all new permanent members) counts about 40-50 adherents. Out of a total of 192 member states, these figures leave about 40 states without a clear position on UNSC reform. Assuming these 40 states either split their support between the rival camps or abstain from voting, it is clear that the G-4 proposal or its successor will need the support of a sizable number of African states to reach the 128-vote threshold. Principles for Acceptable Council Expansion -------------- ¶7. (C) Regardless of how we play the situation tactically, our position should be based on a set of principles that define the parameters for acceptable Council expansion, including a group of structural UN reforms that would be acceptable trade-offs for our support for Council expansion: -- TAILORING COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP TO ADDRESS CRITICAL STRATEGIC CHALLENGES: We should not think about Council expansion just in the abstract, but also as a way to fashion the Council to address the contemporary era's fundamental challenges, including instability and threats arising from the Middle East, the management of the rise of China, and proliferation. This would imply that countries to be added should align with our interests and views of these problems. -- PRESERVING U.S. INFLUENCE: We should base our approach to Council expansion along the following lines in order to prevent significant erosion of our current level of influence: ¶1. SMALLEST POSSIBLE EXPANSION: A dilemma of Council reform is that it is inevitably "additive" in nature because declining powers and regional blocs can prevent any diminution of their representation on the Council. A modest expansion of two or three permanent members would best suit our interests, but the dynamics of securing the two-thirds majority for a particular proposal would create pressure to move to a significant expansion of five to seven new members. As it is, negotiating documents that require unanimity among fifteen members is already a long and difficult enough process. We are also cognizant that this may not be the last call to expand the Council over the life of the United Nations. ¶2. NO EXTENSION OF VETO: Addition of new permanent members with veto rights would increase the risk to U.S. interests from Council expansion exponentially. We should quietly allow discontent with P-5 veto prerogatives to ensure the veto is not extended to new members while joining Russia and China in stoutly defending existing P-5 vetoes. Although G-4 countries privately concede the veto, most AU states remain united behind the demand in the AU "Ezulwini Consensus" for two permanent seats for Africa with veto rights. Cracks began to appear in the AU position, however, when ten African states joined India in September 2007 in tabling resolution L69 -- which did not make any stipulations regarding the right of veto. USUN understands that an AU summit is planned for late January 2008, at which African supporters of L69 (South Africa and Nigeria most prominently) will seek greater flexibility in the AU position. ¶3. MAINTAINING OUR ARITHMETIC ADVANTAGE IN UNSC VOTING: According to the UN Charter, in order for the Council to adopt a resolution, nine of its fifteen members must vote in favor without any P-5 vetoes. As described earlier, USUN currently starts most important debates with six typically sympathetic countries (P-3 plus European delegations) and must secure three more to reach the nine-vote threshold. If the Council were expanded to 20 members but the minimum votes for adoption of UNSC resolutions were set at 11, USUN would start most debates with eight votes -- assuming Japan and Germany were among the new permanent members -- and still only have to seek three more for adoption. Adjusting voting thresholds in an expanded Council could be an important vehicle to preserve our current arithmetic advantage in the UNSC. ¶4. ENSURING PREDICTABILITY IN THE SELECTION OF NEW MEMBERS: While an amendment to the UN Charter to expand the Security Council would have to specify the names of the new permanent members, most UNSC proposals envision as a first step a framework resolution to set forth a mechanism to elect the new permanent members. To maximize predictability, we should structure the framework agreement to require that candidate members receive broad support from the UNGA membership as a whole, not within regional blocs, and to limit the rounds of balloting on each seat. -- LINKAGE TO CRITICAL STRUCTURAL REFORMS: Any change in the Council should only be made in exchange for significant structural reforms to revitalize the institution as a whole. The list below is illustrative of the trade-offs we should pursue. It should be noted that all of these would be highly controversial at the UN and that many would threaten the current base of support for the G-4 or other UNSC expansion proposals. Many of these reforms might also dissuade African states from supporting a "package" of UNSC expansion tied to structural UN reform. ¶1. SHIFT TO VOLUNTARY FUNDING: This reform would have the most dramatic impact on General Assembly decision-making, the U.S. financial contribution to the UN, and support for greater transparency and accountability within the UN system. Its viability as a reform tied to UNSC expansion depends on the willingness of aspirants for permanent Council seats to increase their contributions and/or pledge to cover any shortfall from a decrease in contributions by other states. African states, whose support would be crucial to successful UNSC expansion, would be particularly concerned about a drop in UN funding for development projects. ¶2. WEIGHTED VOTING: Weighted voting could be based strictly on the assessment rate for contributions, a double majority voting system, or a bicameral UNGA in which representation in the second chamber is based on financial contributions and concurrence between the two chambers is necessary for all budgetary decisions. Weighted voting is likely to be one of the most unpopular structural reforms for countries that do not attain permanent seats on the UNSC, including African states, because their influence in the UNGA and Fifth Committee would also be circumscribed. ¶3. REDUCTION IN U.S. CONTRIBUTION: The U.S. financial contribution to the UN would decline with either a floor or a cap on UNSC permanent member contributions. If the floor were set at 5 percent of contributions (China currently pays 2.6 percent, Russia 1.2 percent, Brazil 0.87 percent, and India 0.45 percent),and the G-4 countries plus an African state were to become permanent members, the U.S. contribution for non-peacekeeping assessments would decline to roughly 18 percent. The same floor/cap could be used to lower U.S. assessments to finance peacekeeping operations. Such proposals would probably be most palatable to African and other developing countries, but they would have to overcome Russian and probably Chinese opposition. ¶4. IMPROVING OVERSIGHT: Some of the proposals to improve UN oversight include enshrining a "sunset clause" in the UN Charter, according to which all UNGA mandates would terminate after five years unless renewed by a two-thirds vote. Other ways to ensure transparency and accountability include guaranteeing Office of Independent Oversight Services (OIOS) independence in the UN Charter and/or ensuring access to all internal UN audits by all member states. ¶5. POLITICAL REFORMS: States under UNSC sanctions could be barred from running for seats on any UN body. This reform was proposed unsuccessfully in the run-up to the creation of the new Human Rights Council, as a considerable number of states complained of UNSC encroachment on the rights and prerogatives of other UN bodies. U.S. Options -------------- ¶8. (C) With these principles in mind, we believe that the United States has four options to respond to the new round of activism on Council expansion: -- OPTION 1: Avoid engagement on Council expansion and rely on our veto in the ratification phase to preserve our interests. Amendments to the UN Charter require the ratification of two-thirds of UNGA and must include the P-5. The United States could therefore remain disengaged from the process and determine its position in the ratification phase. The risk is that an expansion that threatens our interests could pass in the UNGA, that we would be isolated in rejecting ratification, and that this, in turn, would undermine the legitimacy of future Council actions. -- OPTION 2: Delay engagement until African states begin to declare support for realistic proposals. When we get strategic warning that parts of this bloc are beginning to declare their intentions, we would engage with key players to shape the outcome, including potentially organizing a coalition to block proposals contrary to our interests. The risk is that by waiting we will allow momentum to develop behind unfavorable proposals and come to the game too late to intervene successfully. -- OPTION 3: Engage the key players and undecided countries with a view to shaping where they throw their votes. By articulating to these states the kind of expansion we could support, the United States could try to moderate their demands and mobilize their support behind our views. The risk is that such engagement could accelerate the momentum behind Council expansion in ways that we could not ultimately control. -- OPTION 4: Proactively articulate an American position on Council expansion and mobilize a coalition to support it. Because of our vital interest in the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Council, the United States would engage the G-4 or some subset of the group to set forth its own proposal for Council expansion as part of a comprehensive package of structural reforms for the UN. This would certainly accelerate the process of considering Council expansion, with the attendant risks, but we would be postured to shape a coalition in favor and against particular models. Recommendation -------------- ¶9. (C) We recommend that we move forward in four steps. First, in order to collect sufficient information for a well-informed decision, USUN will in the next few months enter into discussions with other member states, with an eye to monitoring how close the G-4 or other models are to reaching the two-thirds majority, and carefully and selectively testing reactions to our principles in ways that do not accelerate movement toward Council expansion. Second, we should assess and refine the principles described above for acceptable Council expansion. Third, we should decide which specific structural reforms we should seek in exchange for our support to expand the Council, as any Security Council expansion has to be part of a comprehensive package of reform of the UN as a whole. Fourth, we should decide which of the above-noted procedural options, or others that might later emerge, would best serve our interests. Khalilzad