SE AHTISAARI AND AMBASSADOR WOLFF STRATEGIZE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000122 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIK YI SUBJECT: SE AHTISAARI AND AMBASSADOR WOLFF STRATEGIZE ON KOSOVO Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro Wolff, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a February 8 meeting Special Envoy Ahtisaari and Acting Permrep Wolff discussed the way ahead on the Kosovo status process including taking Ahtisaari's package to the Security Council and work that will follow. Wolff explained that the Russians were continuing to play for time in New York. The African Security Council members were still divided and Ambassador Wolff and Wisner would hold a lunch with all three of them soon to allay their concerns. Ahtisaari stated that he did not think China would be a problem. Ambassador Wolff also said P-3 permreps had met recently with U/SYG for Legal Affairs Michel and U/SYG for Political Affairs Gambari and made it clear that Ahtisaari's package should not be fiddled with. Michel was problematic and would require more attention but Gambari seemed to understand the message. Ambassador Wolff stated that we should aim to wrap up Kosovo work by April; otherwise it could be delayed until the G-8. End Summary. AMBASSADOR WOLFF BRIEFS AHTISAARI ON USUN WORK ON KOSOVO -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In a February 8 meeting Special Envoy Ahtisaari and Acting Permrep Wolff discussed the way ahead on the Kosovo status process including taking Ahtisaari's package to the Security Council and work that will follow. As the meeting opened, Ambassador Wolff relayed to Ahtisaari recent developments in New York stating that at a Security Council lunch the previous week, Russian FM Lavrov had come out swinging on Kosovo saying there could only be an agreed approach with no deadlines and no tolerance for Kosovar blackmail, but he had ended on a softer note likening Kosovo independence to NATO expansion that Russia had not liked but had lived with. Ahtisaari said Lavrov had called U/SYG Nambiar and asked that the Secretariat not distribute drafts to the Security Council despite Ahtisaari having wanted it released. He noted he had already distributed it to the EU, the Contact Group and NATO and Pristina intended to release it to the press. ¶3. (C) Wolff warned that we should watch out for the Africans: Ghana as the AU chair was robust and had strong concerns about territorial integrity; Congo seemed persuaded that self-determination was more important; South Africa seemed to be in the middle. He said that he and Ambassador Wisner planned to have lunch with all three African permreps soon to impress on them that Kosovo bore no similarity to the African experience and that concerns about territorial intergity in Africa were groundless because the more important issue was larger EU integration. ¶4. (C) Wolff also explained that the P-3 had seen U/SYG for Legal Affairs Michel and U/SYG for Political Affairs Gambari and made it clear that Ahtisaari's package should not be fiddled with. Wolff said that if SYG Ban attaches a cover letter to Ahtisaari's package it should contain an unequivocal endorsement. He explained that DPA seemed to understand the message and the P-3 would see Guehenno soon. Ahtisaari noted that he thought U/SYG Guehenno would be fully on board. Wolff stated that Michel had concerns both with being consulted and more long-term issues regarding the UN's relationship with an independent Kosovo. CHINA -------------- ¶5. (C) Ahtisaari noted that he had met Chinese Permrep Wang the day before and also seen the Chinese Ambassador in Vienna and had asked them both to at least abstain in a Security Council vote. He noted that he had good relations with China cultivated because while he was President of Finland he had maintained a strict one-China policy and expected there would be no problems with the Chinese. Ahtisaari said Wang had told him however that the Europeans needed to get their house in order as some had complained to him and offered differing views. Ahtisaari said he expected to come to the Security Council by the end of March. RUSSIANS IN NEW YORK URGE SIGNIFICANT DELAY -------------- ¶6. (C) Wolff explained that Russian DPR Shcherbak had pulled him aside at a dinner several days before and argued that beginning work in the Security Council in March was too soon and three or four months would be needed to give the Europeans, who were the key, time to sell the outcome to Belgrade. Shcherbak had also alleged that the model should be Montenegro's split from Serbia and that Belgrade was prepared to negotiate longer and then bless independence at the end. Wolff noted that when pressed on whether he had actually heard this information from the Serbians, Shcherbak had merely stated "we know." Ambassador Wolff noted that he would meet with Serbian Permrep Jevremovic soon. Wolff also noted that the Russian game was dangerous because it set the Europeans up for blame. Wolff continued that we needed unity and an unequivocal endorsement from the Europeans. Ahtisaari Chief of Staff Kai Sauer stated that the Germans had volunteered to help in outreach with other Europeans. ENDGAME IN COUNCIL -------------- ¶7. (C) Ambassador Wolff stated that we should aim to wrap up Kosovo work in April. If we lapse into May, then it would likely be delayed until the G-8 Summit in June. Ahtisaari asked Wolff whether we were comfortable with South Africa handling it during its presidency. Wolff responded that there was limited damage that a Security Council president could do and, indeed, one that was biased would typically have to work harder to seem neutral. In response to question from Deputy Political Counselor on whether Ahtisaari was sharing his final recommendations with UN officials to review, Ahtisaari responded that he had not made up his mind yet and was consulting with Ambassador Wisner and even considering making his recommendations directly to the Security Council so that they would be completely tamper-proof. WOLFF