UNGA 62: DEALING WITH WESTERN EUROPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001218 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2107 TAGS: PHUM PREL UNGA US XG XH XT ZB SUBJECT: UNGA 62: DEALING WITH WESTERN EUROPE Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JEFF DELAURENTIS FOR REASON 1.4 (B&D) Summary and Introduction: ¶1. (U) Robert Smolik served as the Senior Area Adviser for Western Europe during the main session of the 62nd UN General Assembly. The following is his summary of the UNGA as it pertained to the region. ¶2. (C) Throughout this 62d UN General Assembly our EU partners have not always proven effective, collective allies on critical issues. They coordinate closely with us on human rights resolutions (while continuing to press us to participate in the Human Rights Council). They mute their differences with us over such issues as the death penalty and climate change. A somewhat overwhelmed Portuguese EU presidency gave us scope to differentiate national positions. Distinct perspectives also came from Switzerland and others like Liechtenstein, whose experienced and active UN ambassadors give them influence disproportionate to their populations. ¶3. (C) On the downside, the wealthy EU nations did not stand with us on UN budget discipline (septel),nor have they modified traditional positions on UN declarations about Cuba and Palestine. As "new Europeans" like Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia integrate more closely with the EU, our margin of tactical maneuver with them narrows. The bottom line is that the EU provides our core support within WEOG, as we face often overwhelming opposition from other UN regional groupings. End Summary. ¶4. (C) U.S. relations with Western European nations during the 62d UNGA centered on human rights, with many ramifications. We worked together efficiently and effectively on the practical business of passing resolutions condemning abuses by Belarus, Burma, DPRK, and Iran. EU partners (collectively and nationally) and the smaller voting members (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, and Switzerland) shared responsibility with us in securing votes from African and GRULAC delegations where they enjoy special influence. This EU collaboration was critical in the close vote condemning Iran, as acknowledged by Canada, the resolution's sponsor. Nevertheless, no meeting between EU permanent representatives and the Western Europe area advisor ended without a pitch or plea for the U.S. to engage on human rights with the UN in Geneva. ;¶5. (C) The Western Europeans were also cooperative, if not at first actively supportive, on our anti-rape resolution. Despite early indications that the EU's resolution against the death penalty would implicitly criticize the U.S., its final passage instead drew fire from Egypt and Singapore, among others. Most revealing was the contrast in comments following passage in third committee of the anti-rape and death penalty resolutions. Many delegations spoke openly of European "insensitivity" while South Africa and others praised our conduct of the anti-rape negotiations. The Holy See observer worked quietly but effectively behind the scenes on many of these human rights issues. ¶6. (C) Much of the U.S.-EU dynamic was conditioned by Portugal's EU presidency delegation, which at times seemed understaffed and/or overwhelmed. This may have worked to our advantage in that several of the "newer Europeans" felt less constrained in voicing their national positions. This played out both bilaterally and one hopes on certain issues within EU caucus. This dynamic also played positively with the smaller voting Europeans (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino) and with Switzerland. Several of these permanent representatives have long tenure at the UN, and consequently exert disproportionate influence, both during informal EU discussions and with other groupings. Examples of this: - one in our favor and the other not, are: (1)San Marino's principled open criticism of no-action motions and (2) Liechtenstein's efforts to dilute UN financial sanctions. Here, too, the Holy See observer was a presence behind the scenes. ¶7. (C) EU opposition to U.S. objectives played out again this year over resolutions regarding Cuba and Palestine. Despite Israel's sponsoring its first ever technical resolution, which passed, and U.S. agreement to join consensus on one of the Palestine resolutions, the pattern of condemning Israel continued at UNGA 62. However, one of the Palestine resolutions (L. 14) passed by only a narrow margin and so prospects for reversal may improve in future years (also see Paris 4743 in support of this possibility). ¶8. (C) On many of these issues, the "newer EU" permanent representatives privately expressed perspectives different USUN NEW Y 00001218 002 OF 002 from the public EU common position. The Czech Republic was strongest on human rights, criticizing the Human Rights Council's performance. Its loss to Croatia for a seat on the Security Council will probably concentrate and channel its energies into future UNGAs. Hungary was willing to push the envelope on other human rights issues and worked very collaboratively with us in trying to persuade other delegations. Slovakia is clearly seeking a broader role at the UN, especially in peace-building, and should be more active in the GA, once its Security Council term is over. Poland, however, perhaps due to the personality of its permanent representative, toed the EU line. ¶9. (C) Nevertheless, the small Western European nations, which do not seek EU membership, remain another, if modest hope to influence the EU bloc. They can also carry our message to other smaller delegations. San Marino and Switzerland have on occasion differentiated themselves from the EU on certain UN procedural and institutional issues. Cultivating them further, along with Liechtenstein, and even Luxembourg within the EU, could help influence EU common positions. ¶10. (C) Budget issues were still in play as of December 21. So far, neither the large, wealthy nor the smaller Western European nations have joined with us to oppose an unreasonably large budget increase. Whether this is attributable to their policy objectives, or as likely to a strong euro, their irresponsible attitude in fifth committee has run counter to our usual partnership. ¶11. (C) The U.S. and the EU agree on many key UNGA 62 issues. At future GAs our joint efforts to influence other delegations, particularly those where EU states have special influence, will be critical. Therefore working the Western Europe account long-term and conceptually will continue to be an excellent investment to leverage our influence. Khalilzad