Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USUNNEWYORK1179
2007-12-17 23:17:00
SECRET
USUN New York
Cable title:  

IRAQI OBJECTIONS TO MNF-I UNSCR TEXT DELAY

Tags:  PREL UNSC IZ 
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VZCZCXYZ0014
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #1179/01 3512317
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 172317Z DEC 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3357
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0651
S E C R E T USUN NEW YORK 001179 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FROM AMB KHALILZAD FOR SECRETARY RICE AND AMB CROCKER
STATE PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY FOR SECRETARY RICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2012
TAGS: PREL UNSC IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI OBJECTIONS TO MNF-I UNSCR TEXT DELAY
SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

REF: A. STATE 167364

B. USUN 1167

C. USUN 1159

D. USUN 1147

E. BAGHDAD 3940

F. 12/17 RIES/PHEE PHONE CALL

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary and Comment
--------------------

S E C R E T USUN NEW YORK 001179 SIPDIS SIPDIS FROM AMB KHALILZAD FOR SECRETARY RICE AND AMB CROCKER STATE PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY FOR SECRETARY RICE E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2012 TAGS: PREL UNSC IZ SUBJECT: IRAQI OBJECTIONS TO MNF-I UNSCR TEXT DELAY SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION REF: A. STATE 167364 ¶B. USUN 1167 ¶C. USUN 1159 ¶D. USUN 1147 ¶E. BAGHDAD 3940 ¶F. 12/17 RIES/PHEE PHONE CALL Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (S) During the course of December 17, Amb Khalilzad sought to confirm GOI support for the MNF-I text circulated to the Security Council Friday, December 14 (ref A). The draft resolution currently enjoys consensus support from the Security Council. Citing various justifications, both Iraqi PR Bayati and NSA Rubai'e advised Amb Khalilzad that PM Maliki opposed the text. Bayati and Rubai'e did not yield when Amb Khalilzad raised Maliki's prior commitment to Secretary Gates, Deputy Secretary Negroponte, and S/I SIPDIS Satterfield that the GOI would not/not challenge the text of the UNSCR. They also discounted the December 6 POTUS letter to Maliki. ¶2. (S) Amb Khalilzad has identified two options for next steps. Notwithstanding GOI views, USUN could put the existing text "in blue" Tuesday morning, December 18, and secure its adoption that afternoon, or by the following morning. Alternatively, USG officials in Embassy Baghdad could resolve the matter with the GOI December 18. Amb Khalilzad and UKUN caution that failure to adopt the MNF-I resolution prior to the Security Council debate on Kosovo -- scheduled for Wednesday, December 19 -- risks Russian retaliation. Additionally, the Security Council must act by Friday, December 21, to avoid expiration of the mandate. Absent instructions to the contrary, Amb Khalilzad proposes to put the existing text into blue at OOB EST Tuesday, December 18, and seek a vote that afternoon, or by the following morning. Confusing Messages -------------- ¶3. (C) Iraqi PR Bayati told Amb Khalilzad December 18 that PM Maliki objected to language in PP18 that would affirm that ISF should act in accordance with relevant principles of international law. Leapfrogging over Bayati, National Security Advisor Rubai'e subsequently phoned Amb Khalilzad and said that Maliki would drop his objection to the language on ISF legal obligations if the USG
agreed to transfer command and control of Iraqi Special Forces, and reflected that decision with new language in PP2. Because of the confusion in GOI messages, USUN did not/not table the resolution text as planned December 17, although there is consensus support among the Security Council for the existing text. The Security Council must act by Friday, December 21, to avoid expiration of the mandate. It is USUN's judgment that the Security Council will not support changes to PP18 that suggest that ISF are not/not subject to international law. USUN has no guidance on the question of the timing of command and control of Iraqi Special Forces. First Issue: PP18 -------------- ¶4. (S) Per ref A, PP18 reads as follows: "Affirming the importance of all parties, including foreign forces, promoting the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq to act in accordance with international law, including relevant obligations under international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law, and to cooperate with the relevant international organizations, welcoming their commitments in this regard, and underscoring that all parties, including foreign forces, should take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of affected civilians." Bayati said Maliki told him personally December 17 that he will not accept the phrase "all parties, including foreign forces," but insists on shortening the phrase to "foreign forces." The impact of this edit would be to suggest that ISF are not/not subject to relevant international law, which USUN judges would be an unacceptable position to the other members of the Security Council, including Russia and France. Additionally, the term "parties" can be read to suggest that security contractors are also subject to relevant international law, a matter of concern to several Council delegations. ¶5. (S) Separately, Amb Marcie Ries spoke to Rubai'e December 17 and explained to him that the language in PP18 would not/not subject ISF to the European Convention on Human Rights, as he suggested, because Iraq is not a signatory to that convention. She further explained that the USG had similar concerns about clarifying the language on obligations under international human rights law and that the proposed language in PP18 had been designed to protect both the USG and the GOI on this point. Second Issue: PP2 -------------- ¶6. (S) Following Bayati's contact with Amb Khalilzad (and Amb Ries' contact with Rubai'e),Rubai'e phoned Amb Khalilzad directly and described a different position. Rubai'e, claiming to be speaking on behalf of Maliki, said the Iraqis could accept the proposed language in PP18 if the USG agreed to transfer command and control of Iraqi Special Forces and reflected that change in PP2. ¶7. (S) PP2 currently reads: "Welcoming continued progress in training, equipping and capacity-building of Iraqi security forces, including the Iraqi Army and the internal security forces, and the assumption of command and control by Iraqi Ground Forces Command over all Iraqi Army divisions, and the transfer of security responsibility in Najaf, Maysan, Muthanna, Dhia Qar, Dahuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniyah, Karbala and Basra provinces, and also welcoming efforts to complete that process during 2008." Next Steps in Security Council -------------- ¶8. (S) USUN believes it would be possible to put the existing text in blue Tuesday morning, December 18, and secure its adoption within 24 hours. Additional postponements made necessary by negotiation in Baghdad, or changes to the existing text, increase the risk of losing Security Council support for the resolution. Several Council members, including France and Russia, have grumbled privately regarding Iraq's continued involvement in the late stages of the negotiation. If the Security Council has not voted on the MNF-I resolution prior to the Security Council debate on Kosovo scheduled for Wednesday, December 19, USUN and UKUN judge there is a real risk of Russian retaliation. Other scheduling complications include the fact that the UN is closed on December 20 for eid, and the Security Council is scheduled to recess for the month on December 21. The current MNF mandate expires December 31, 2007. Non-Controversial Change -------------- ¶9. (S) Separately, the Russian mission requested that the term "non-intervention" in PP4 be changed to "non-interference," noting that in Arabic a single term (tadakhul) is used interchangeably. Iraqi PR Bayati told USUN that the GOI has no objection to this change in the English version. Khalilzad

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