Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USUNNEWYORK1179
2007-12-17 23:17:00
SECRET
USUN New York
Cable title:  

IRAQI OBJECTIONS TO MNF-I UNSCR TEXT DELAY

Tags:  PREL UNSC IZ 
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VZCZCXYZ0014
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #1179/01 3512317
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 172317Z DEC 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3357
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0651
S E C R E T USUN NEW YORK 001179 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FROM AMB KHALILZAD FOR SECRETARY RICE AND AMB CROCKER
STATE PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY FOR SECRETARY RICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2012
TAGS: PREL UNSC IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI OBJECTIONS TO MNF-I UNSCR TEXT DELAY
SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

REF: A. STATE 167364

B. USUN 1167

C. USUN 1159

D. USUN 1147

E. BAGHDAD 3940

F. 12/17 RIES/PHEE PHONE CALL

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary and Comment
--------------------

S E C R E T USUN NEW YORK 001179

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FROM AMB KHALILZAD FOR SECRETARY RICE AND AMB CROCKER
STATE PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY FOR SECRETARY RICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2012
TAGS: PREL UNSC IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI OBJECTIONS TO MNF-I UNSCR TEXT DELAY
SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

REF: A. STATE 167364

B. USUN 1167

C. USUN 1159

D. USUN 1147

E. BAGHDAD 3940

F. 12/17 RIES/PHEE PHONE CALL

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (S) During the course of December 17, Amb Khalilzad sought
to confirm GOI support for the MNF-I text circulated to the
Security Council Friday, December 14 (ref A). The draft
resolution currently enjoys consensus support from the
Security Council. Citing various justifications, both Iraqi
PR Bayati and NSA Rubai'e advised Amb Khalilzad that PM
Maliki opposed the text. Bayati and Rubai'e did not yield
when Amb Khalilzad raised Maliki's prior commitment to
Secretary Gates, Deputy Secretary Negroponte, and S/I

SIPDIS
Satterfield that the GOI would not/not challenge the text of
the UNSCR. They also discounted the December 6 POTUS letter
to Maliki.


2. (S) Amb Khalilzad has identified two options for next
steps. Notwithstanding GOI views, USUN could put the
existing text "in blue" Tuesday morning, December 18, and
secure its adoption that afternoon, or by the following
morning. Alternatively, USG officials in Embassy Baghdad
could resolve the matter with the GOI December 18. Amb
Khalilzad and UKUN caution that failure to adopt the MNF-I
resolution prior to the Security Council debate on Kosovo --
scheduled for Wednesday, December 19 -- risks Russian
retaliation. Additionally, the Security Council must act by
Friday, December 21, to avoid expiration of the mandate.
Absent instructions to the contrary, Amb Khalilzad proposes
to put the existing text into blue at OOB EST Tuesday,
December 18, and seek a vote that afternoon, or by the
following morning.

Confusing Messages
--------------


3. (C) Iraqi PR Bayati told Amb Khalilzad December 18 that
PM Maliki objected to language in PP18 that would affirm that
ISF should act in accordance with relevant principles of
international law. Leapfrogging over Bayati, National
Security Advisor Rubai'e subsequently phoned Amb Khalilzad
and said that Maliki would drop his objection to the language
on ISF legal obligations if the USG agreed to transfer
command and control of Iraqi Special Forces, and reflected
that decision with new language in PP2. Because of the
confusion in GOI messages, USUN did not/not table the
resolution text as planned December 17, although there is
consensus support among the Security Council for the existing

text. The Security Council must act by Friday, December 21,
to avoid expiration of the mandate. It is USUN's judgment
that the Security Council will not support changes to PP18
that suggest that ISF are not/not subject to international
law. USUN has no guidance on the question of the timing of
command and control of Iraqi Special Forces.

First Issue: PP18
--------------


4. (S) Per ref A, PP18 reads as follows: "Affirming the
importance of all parties, including foreign forces,
promoting the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq
to act in accordance with international law, including
relevant obligations under international humanitarian law,
human rights law and refugee law, and to cooperate with the
relevant international organizations, welcoming their
commitments in this regard, and underscoring that all
parties, including foreign forces, should take all feasible
steps to ensure the protection of affected civilians."
Bayati said Maliki told him personally December 17 that he
will not accept the phrase "all parties, including foreign
forces," but insists on shortening the phrase to "foreign
forces." The impact of this edit would be to suggest that
ISF are not/not subject to relevant international law, which
USUN judges would be an unacceptable position to the other
members of the Security Council, including Russia and France.
Additionally, the term "parties" can be read to suggest that
security contractors are also subject to relevant
international law, a matter of concern to several Council
delegations.


5. (S) Separately, Amb Marcie Ries spoke to Rubai'e December


17 and explained to him that the language in PP18 would
not/not subject ISF to the European Convention on Human
Rights, as he suggested, because Iraq is not a signatory to
that convention. She further explained that the USG had
similar concerns about clarifying the language on obligations
under international human rights law and that the proposed
language in PP18 had been designed to protect both the USG
and the GOI on this point.

Second Issue: PP2
--------------


6. (S) Following Bayati's contact with Amb Khalilzad (and
Amb Ries' contact with Rubai'e),Rubai'e phoned Amb Khalilzad
directly and described a different position. Rubai'e,
claiming to be speaking on behalf of Maliki, said the Iraqis
could accept the proposed language in PP18 if the USG agreed
to transfer command and control of Iraqi Special Forces and
reflected that change in PP2.


7. (S) PP2 currently reads: "Welcoming continued progress
in training, equipping and capacity-building of Iraqi
security forces, including the Iraqi Army and the internal
security forces, and the assumption of command and control by
Iraqi Ground Forces Command over all Iraqi Army divisions,
and the transfer of security responsibility in Najaf, Maysan,
Muthanna, Dhia Qar, Dahuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniyah, Karbala and
Basra provinces, and also welcoming efforts to complete that
process during 2008."

Next Steps in Security Council
--------------


8. (S) USUN believes it would be possible to put the
existing text in blue Tuesday morning, December 18, and
secure its adoption within 24 hours. Additional
postponements made necessary by negotiation in Baghdad, or
changes to the existing text, increase the risk of losing
Security Council support for the resolution. Several Council
members, including France and Russia, have grumbled privately
regarding Iraq's continued involvement in the late stages of
the negotiation. If the Security Council has not voted on
the MNF-I resolution prior to the Security Council debate on
Kosovo scheduled for Wednesday, December 19, USUN and UKUN
judge there is a real risk of Russian retaliation. Other
scheduling complications include the fact that the UN is
closed on December 20 for eid, and the Security Council is
scheduled to recess for the month on December 21. The
current MNF mandate expires December 31, 2007.

Non-Controversial Change
--------------


9. (S) Separately, the Russian mission requested that the
term "non-intervention" in PP4 be changed to
"non-interference," noting that in Arabic a single term
(tadakhul) is used interchangeably. Iraqi PR Bayati told
USUN that the GOI has no objection to this change in the
English version.






Khalilzad

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