UN SPECIAL ENVOY OUTLINES NEXT STEPS ON DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001120

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IO AND AF FOR FRONT OFFICE; PLEASE PASS TO SE NATSIOS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SU MOPS
SUBJECT: UN SPECIAL ENVOY OUTLINES NEXT STEPS ON DARFUR


Classified By: Ambassador Jackie Wolcott for Reasons 1.4 B/D.


1. (C) SUMMARY: U.S. Special Envoy for the Sudan Andrew
Natsios told UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson November 26 that
the UN-AU, rather than the Government of Southern Sudan
(GOSS),must take the lead in promoting a convergence of the
Darfur rebel positions. Natsios warned that hard-line SPLM
elements want to use the Darfur rebel groups to leverage
their position against the Khartoum government. Eliasson
agreed that the UN-AU Special Envoys must take the lead and
reported that he will be returning to the region to follow up
on the next phase of the Darfur peace process. Eliasson said
he is pushing the UN Secretariat to move forward with
appointing a chief mediator and offered AU Commissioner for
Peace and Security Ambassador Said Djinnit and UNDP
Development Policy Director Carlos Lopez as appropriate
candidates. END SUMMARY.

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Natsios: Juba Playing
Dangerous Game with Rebels
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2. (C) SE Natsios told Eliasson November 26 that the U.S. had
warned GOSS President Salva Kiir that he must be careful not
to provoke National Congress Party (NCP) leadership into
taking military action against the South. Specifically,
Natsios said the U.S. was concerned that GOSS led efforts to
unify Darfur rebel factions were aimed at unifying all the
Sudanese opposition elements under SPLM leadership, rather
than lay the groundwork for a viable Darfur peace process.
The prospect of a united opposition working with the SPLM is
the "NCP's worst nightmare." Any suspicions that such a
political dynamics was underway would only make the NCP
regime less cooperative, which ultimately would undermine the
peace process in Darfur.


3. (C) Eliasson concurred that the SPLM efforts to unify the
Darfur rebel factions risked provoking "Bashir's paranoia."
He added that he had received some indications that SPLM
elements were working to turn Darfur rebel convergence into a
"political football" between the North and South. Other than
moving forward with the UN-AU efforts to bring the rebels
together, Eliasson said he did not have "any good ideas"
about how to convince the SPLM to back away from using the
Darfur rebels to maximize their leverage against Khartoum.

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Eliasson's Three Step Plan
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4. (C) Eliasson said his primary goal during the next phase
of discussion would be promoting rebel cohesion. Eliasson
said he planned to move forward in three phases. First, the
UN-AU Special Envoys would host meetings with regional
governments December 4 and 5 in Sharm al-Sheikh, Egypt, to
secure their support for another round of talks. Second, the
Special Envoys would travel to Darfur to push the key leaders
of the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA),United Resistance
Front (URF) and SLA/Unity factions to commit to another round
of talks. Third, once a "critical mass" of rebel factions
was committed, the UN-AU Envoys would organize an "Arusha
style" meeting, i.e. a UN-AU hosted meeting of the key rebel
groups, to unify the rebel positions and elect a negotiating
team.


5. (C) To move forward with this strategy, Eliasson added
that the Secretariat needed to move forward with appointing a
UN-AU chief mediator to handle day-to-day interactions with
the rebel groups and the GOS. Eliasson said he had asked the
Secretariat to move forward on selecting a candidate, adding

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that he thought African Union Commissioner for Peace and
Security Ambassador Said Djinnit and UNDP Development Policy
Director Carlos Lopez were appropriate candidates.


6. (U) SE Natsios' staff cleared this message.

Khalilzad