UN SPECIAL ENVOY OUTLINES NEXT STEPS ON DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001120 SIPDIS SIPDIS IO AND AF FOR FRONT OFFICE; PLEASE PASS TO SE NATSIOS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SU MOPS SUBJECT: UN SPECIAL ENVOY OUTLINES NEXT STEPS ON DARFUR Classified By: Ambassador Jackie Wolcott for Reasons 1.4 B/D. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: U.S. Special Envoy for the Sudan Andrew Natsios told UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson November 26 that the UN-AU, rather than the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS),must take the lead in promoting a convergence of the Darfur rebel positions. Natsios warned that hard-line SPLM elements want to use the Darfur rebel groups to leverage their position against the Khartoum government. Eliasson agreed that the UN-AU Special Envoys must take the lead and reported that he will be returning to the region to follow up on the next phase of the Darfur peace process. Eliasson said he is pushing the UN Secretariat to move forward with appointing a chief mediator and offered AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Ambassador Said Djinnit and UNDP Development Policy Director Carlos Lopez as appropriate candidates. END SUMMARY. -------------- Natsios: Juba Playing Dangerous Game with Rebels -------------- ¶2. (C) SE Natsios told Eliasson November 26 that the U.S. had warned GOSS President Salva Kiir that he must be careful not to provoke National Congress Party (NCP) leadership into taking military action against the South. Specifically, Natsios said the U.S. was concerned that GOSS led efforts to unify Darfur rebel factions were aimed at unifying all the Sudanese opposition elements under SPLM leadership, rather than lay the groundwork for a viable Darfur peace process. The prospect of a united opposition working with the SPLM is the "NCP's worst nightmare." Any suspicions that such a political dynamics was underway would only make the NCP regime less cooperative, which ultimately would undermine the peace process in Darfur. ¶3. (C) Eliasson concurred that the SPLM efforts to unify the Darfur rebel factions risked provoking "Bashir's paranoia." He added that he had received some indications that SPLM elements were working to turn Darfur rebel convergence into a "political football" between the North and South. Other than moving forward with the UN-AU efforts to bring the rebels together, Eliasson said he did not have "any good ideas" about how to convince the SPLM to back away from using the Darfur rebels to maximize their leverage against Khartoum. -------------- Eliasson's Three Step Plan -------------- ¶4. (C) Eliasson said his primary goal during the next phase of discussion would be promoting rebel cohesion. Eliasson said he planned to move forward in three phases. First, the UN-AU Special Envoys would host meetings with regional governments December 4 and 5 in Sharm al-Sheikh, Egypt, to secure their support for another round of talks. Second, the Special Envoys would travel to Darfur to push the key leaders of the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA),United Resistance Front (URF) and SLA/Unity factions to commit to another round of talks. Third, once a "critical mass" of rebel factions was committed, the UN-AU Envoys would organize an "Arusha style" meeting, i.e. a UN-AU hosted meeting of the key rebel groups, to unify the rebel positions and elect a negotiating team. ¶5. (C) To move forward with this strategy, Eliasson added that the Secretariat needed to move forward with appointing a UN-AU chief mediator to handle day-to-day interactions with the rebel groups and the GOS. Eliasson said he had asked the Secretariat to move forward on selecting a candidate, adding SIPDIS that he thought African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security Ambassador Said Djinnit and UNDP Development Policy Director Carlos Lopez were appropriate candidates. ¶6. (U) SE Natsios' staff cleared this message. Khalilzad