Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USUNNEWYORK1117
2007-12-05 00:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

GAMBARI BRIEFS KHALILZAD ON BURMA

Tags:  PREL PHUM UNSC BM 
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VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #1117/01 3390022
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 050022Z DEC 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3257
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 0574
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1765
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0806
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 0220
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001117 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM
SUBJECT: GAMBARI BRIEFS KHALILZAD ON BURMA

REF: SECSTATE 162809

Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001117 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2017 TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM SUBJECT: GAMBARI BRIEFS KHALILZAD ON BURMA REF: SECSTATE 162809 Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During Ambassador Khalilzad's meeting with UN Special Advisor on Burma Ibrahim Gambari December 4, Gambari identified two "sticking points" that were slowing the dialogue: the regime's resistance to Aung Sun Suu Kyi's request to address the subject of the draft constitution and her desire to include ethnic groups (in addition to the regime and herself). He also said that the regime was backsliding on its commitment to allow him to assist in a constitutional review process. Although USUN understands the regime will not permit Gambari's return to Burma until January, when speaking with Amb Khalilzad he said he planned to return to Burma in early January and explained that the Burmese Prime Minister had not said "no" to December but stated that January is more likely. Given the importance of the Chinese role, Gambari intends to travel to Beijing for consultations prior to his return to Burma. While in New York, Gambari said that he had received an "unprecedented" invitation to brief the General Assembly in December, and is also willing to brief the Security Council. He also noted that Secretary-General Ban planned to lean on East Asian countries to support Gambari "in concrete terms" and send the "right messages" to the Burmese regime during Ban's upcoming travel in the region. Ban plans to convene the first meeting of a Group of Friends on Burma shortly after his return to New York (scheduled for December 19),he added. On opposition to his briefing the East Asian and ASEAN summits, Gambari said the Burmese Prime Minister had come prepared to engage but had received a change of instructions by phone. This, along with his other consultations, suggests to Gambari that there is dissension among the generals that needs to be exploited. He asked for any USG information on this point. On staffing, Gambari said he is seeking to embed one officer in the UN Country Team in Rangoon to act as his liaison. Beyond that, he said, the team could "grow as needed." END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) In a meeting with UN Special Advisor to Burma Gambari on December 4, Amb Khalilzad conveyed reftel points and pressed Gambari for his assessment of the current situation in Burma and next steps. Gambari said there were two main "sticking points" that had prevented movement on the �
0A;dialogue, and commented that he was not surprised the dialogue was moving slowly. First, he said that Aung Sun Suu Kyi (ASSK) wanted to discuss the draft constitution while the Burmese were ready to complete a draft. The second, he said, related to ASSK's request to include the ethnic groups, as well as ASSK and the regime (or a "tripartite dialogue.") Gambari said that the generals are reluctant to grant this request. Gambari pointed out that ASSK had met with her liaison officer three times and a fourth meeting had been scheduled but not held because, according to the regime, ASSK was not well. (In a jest, Gambari wondered whether she was not well "physically or politically.") Gambari also said that the regime was backsliding on its commitment to allow him to facilitate a review of Burma's draft constitution. ¶3. (C) With respect to next steps, Gambari said that he had not been denied entry to Burma in December, but had been told that a trip in early January was more likely. (Separately, USUN learned that the Burmese mission has informed Gambari that he could not return to Burma until January.) Gambari, identifying China as the key to the Burmese regime, said that he plans to consult in Beijing en route to Burma. In the interim, Gambari said he would respond to an "unprecedented" invitation to brief the General Assembly. (Note: Gambari's mandate as SYG envoy was established by UNGA resolution. End Note.) He responded positively to Amb Khalilzad's inquiry as to his willingness to brief the Security Council. He reported that the Secretary-General intended to convene a meeting of a Group of Friends on Burma soon after he returned from travel in the region (Ban is scheduled to return to New York December 19). When pressed by Amb Khalilzad, Gambari defined the purpose of the group as a forum to "help implement the good offices mandate and share intelligence." In addition to P-3, China, Japan, India, and Singapore, he proposed the inclusion of Norway and Australia but did not mention the inclusion of the EU Chair, Thailand, Indonesia or Vietnam. ¶4. (C) Following the ASEAN summit, Gambari said he traveled to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to cultivate these capitals as "conduits" to Burma. While he considered the three countries the "weakest links" in ASEAN, in Gambari's view they could share valuable developmental experience with Burma. Among the three, he said Vietnam was the most supportive of his mission, and expressed his hope that Vietnam would express that support in the Security Council when Vietnam takes its place on the Council in January. ¶5. (C) Gambari raised the opposition to his briefing the recent ASEAN and East Asian Summits. He said the Burmese Prime Minister had come prepared to support Gambari's briefing and to engage him, but had received an instruction by phone to block. In the context of his other consultations, Gambari believes this incident suggests the generals are divided, a situation that needs to be exploited. Given the rebuff in Singapore, Gambari has asked SYG Ban during his upcoming travel to the region to lean on countries to support his envoy "in concrete terms" and send the "right messages" to the Burmese regime. Burma essentially told ASEAN to "bug off," he said, and it is imperative for SYG Ban to let ASEAN know that it is "not off the hook." ¶6. (C) Explaining that his envoy position is not accompanied by dedicated staff, Gambari said that the UN's Department of Political Affairs (DPA) has provided him with one full-time officer (Erwan Pouchous) and one part-time officer (Mari Yamashita). The Department of Information had recently provided him with a second part-time officer. He said his plan is to embed DPA officer Erwan Pouchous in the UN's country team in Rangoon to serve as his liaison. Gambari suggested there was no need for a full-fledged team at this point, but that the team could "grow as needed from there." ¶7. (C) After the expanded meeting, Gambari requested to speak to Amb Khalilzad one on one. He said that he understood there was disagreement on the role of the UN at very high levels within the Burmese military regime. He requested U.S. assistance in identifying "who was who" to better engage the junta. In addition, suggested Gambari, it appears that some members of the regime want to engage the United States in order to distance themselves from China. (Comment: USUN requests any information on this issues to provide Gambari in order to improve his effectiveness. End Comment.) ¶8. (C) COMMENT: As is typical, Gambari presented his assessment in a positive light, suggesting a mixed picture of the situation. On the dialogue, he suggested there was delay, due in part to ASSK's alleged illness, rather than a decision by the generals to oppose. On his return trip, he suggested he is comfortable with a trip in January, rather than recall the regime's earlier promise to permit Gambari to return to Burma "again and again and again." He did admit the refusal to allow him to meet members of the constitution drafting committee represented a reversal of the regime's previous agreement to consult with the UN on a constitutional review process. Nor did he have a strong grasp of the pros and cons of a Group of Friends, but was pleased by SYG Ban's support for his mission. On the other hand, he believes the purported division among the generals creates possible opportunities, and is hopeful of enlisting Chinese support. Given his temperament, we will need to engage again with him before he briefs the General Assembly and the Security Council. Separately, Amb Khalilzad will raise with SYG Ban the need for forceful public statements, including when he is the region. Khalilzad

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