LEBANON: BRAMMERTZ DEPARTS UNIIIC WITHOUT THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001116

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER UNSC SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: BRAMMERTZ DEPARTS UNIIIC WITHOUT THE
GOODS ON SYRIA


Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay M. Khalilzad, per 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. During a bilateral meeting with Amb Khalilzad
on December 3, departing head of the UN International
Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) Serge Brammertz
revealed that while he hoped to identify the "physical
perpetrators" of the Hariri assassination "within a few
months," it would be "much more difficult" to jump from that
point to determining those responsible for ordering the
assassination. He admitted that he is "not capable of
preparing indictments" today but professed more optimism
about the state of the investigation now than six months ago.
Turning to the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia (ICTY),where he will become Prosecutor on January
1, 2008, Brammertz said he recognized the need for speed and
efficiency in connection with the completion strategy for the
Tribunal, but argued that agreement is needed on a
"mechanism" to try fugitives from the court if they are
apprehended after the ICTY closes its doors. End Summary.

UNIIIC May Get Perpetrators,
But Organizers Are Still Far Off
--------------


2. (C) Asked by Amb Khalilzad whether UNIIIC can build a case
against the "persons of interest" it recently identified,
Brammertz replied that although he is now "more optimistic"
than he was six months ago about where the investigation
might lead, he is "not capable of preparing indictments"
today. He said UNIIIC's telecom analysis had produced "very
promising leads," which he hoped would allow the Commission
to identify those "physically responsible" for Hariri's
murder, but cautioned that it would be "much more difficult"
to get from that point to the people who ordered the
assassination. Predicting that UNIIIC will never find an
"order to kill Hariri," Brammertz argued that testimony from
insider witnesses would be necessary to connect the dots in
the chain of command. In that regard, Brammertz said he
hoped once a witness protection program is in place, insiders
might come forward with important information the UNIIIC
still lacks. That said, he noted the importance of
recognizing "who had a political motive" to assassinate
Hariri. Recalling his recent request to EMBASSY Beirut for
U.S. experts to expedite UNIIIC's telecom analysis, Brammertz
expressed hope that with additional capacity, the Commission
would be able to identify the physical perpetrators "within a
few months."


3. (C) Brammertz defended his decision not to identify the
"persons of interest" now lest they disappear or trace the
Commission's work back to the witnesses who helped identify
them. Based on UNIIIC's telecom analysis, he assessed that
the network that helped to assassinate Hariri is still
capable of carrying out other attacks in Lebanon. He
estimated that this network comprises between 30 to 40
people. Recalling the September 2007 assassination of MP
Antoine Ghanem, Brammertz noted that it took only 20 minutes
after Ghanem visited a friend's home for his attackers to
send a car bomb to kill the parliamentarian. Given that it
can take up to several hours to drive a car from one of the
Palestinian camps to parts of downtown Beirut, Brammertz
concluded that Ghanem's assassins had surveillance in place
on Ghanem and had prepared multiple car bombs in different
parts of the city to ensure they could murder Ghanem wherever
he traveled that day. Noting that the UNIIIC has been able
to identify some of the members of the network based on SIM
card usage on the day of Hariri's assassination, Brammertz
said the Commission is now trying to determine the others
with whom else those persons were in contact.

ICTY: Recognize Need for Efficiency and Speed
--------------


4. (C) After congratulating Brammertz on his appointment as
Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) effective January 1, 2008, Amb Khalilzad
urged him to ensure the efficiency of the Prosecutor,s
office, consistent with the completion strategy for the ICTY.
Amb Khalilzad also stressed the need to ensure that Bosnian
Serb fugitives Ratko Mladic and Radovan Kadadzic are
arrested. Brammertz expressed a preference that Bosnian Serb
fugitives Mladic and Karadzic be captured before the ICTY is
closed down, saying that the perceived success or failure of
the ICTY depends on whether the two fugitives are arrested.
Even so, he acknowledged that ICTY would have to complete its
work whether or not the fugitives are apprehended. He argued
that agreement is needed on a "mechanism" to bring the
fugitives to justice if the ICTY does not exist if/when they
are arrested. Brammertz bemoaned the decision by ICTY judges
to reduce the scope of ICTY indictments to speed up the

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judicial process, saying that as a prosecutor he did not
think that approach represented the best solution and
stressing the need to maintain the quality of the ICTY,s
processes.


5. (C) Turning to ICTY Deputy Prosecutor (Amcit) David
Tolbert, Brammertz asked that the U.S. convey his deep
respect and support for Tolbert's work. Acknowledging that
Tolbert was disappointed that he was passed over for
promotion to Prosecutor, Brammertz said he would nevertheless
meet with Tolbert later on December 3 to try to convince him
to remain at the ICTY. (Note: On December 4, Tolbert told
USUN Legal Adviser that he had met with Brammertz on December
3 and told Brammertz he would not stay. Tolbert plans to
leave the ICTY before February 2008, and there is a
possibility that Tolbert will be offered a position that
might be established in connection with the Cambodia
Tribunal. End Note.) Brammertz also noted he would meet
S/WCI Williamson in The Hague during the week of December 10
(even before he meets with his successor, Carla del Ponte)
and could discuss issues relating to the ICTY in more detail
at that time.
Khalilzad