UN: DARFUR POLITICAL AND SECURITY TRACKS STALLED

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001086 SIPDIS SIPDIS IO AND AF FOR FRONT OFFICE; PLEASE PASS TO SE NATSIOS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL UNSC KPAL SU MOPS SUBJECT: UN: DARFUR POLITICAL AND SECURITY TRACKS STALLED REF: LEVINSON-IO EMAILS 11/27/07 ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: In back-to-back briefings to the Security Council at a November 27 open debate, Special Envoy Jan Eliasson and DPKO U/SYG Jean Marie Guehenno told Council members that both the political and security tracks of the Darfur peace process are stalled. Eliasson told the Council he needs more time to bring about a convergence of the rebel positions. Guehenno rebuked the Government of the Sudan's (GOS) ongoing obstructions of UNAMID deployment and reported that the Sudanese are now attempting to add unacceptable provisions to the UNAMID status of forces agreement (SOFA). Guehenno said that if the UN is unable to find troop contributing countries (TCCs) to meet UNAMID shortfalls of helicopters and transportation units by the transfer of authority on December 31, the Security Council would have to consider "sub-optimal" solutions to address the unanticipated weakness of the peacekeeping force. Sudanese PermRep Abdalmahmood Mohamad called on the Security Council to sanction rebel groups and said that the remaining issues surrounding UNAMID deployment could be resolved through the Tripartite Commission (UN, AU and the GOS). He also admonished Guehenno for raising deployment issues in a public meeting. AMB Khalilzad stated that progress in resolving the Darfur crisis required sustained commitment and action the GOS, TCCs, rebels, the UN, and the AU. END SUMMARY. -------------- SE Eliasson Asks for More Time For Rebel Convergence -------------- ¶2. (U) SE Eliasson's November 27 briefing emphasized that the October 27 discussions in Sirte, Libya, were the beginning of an ongoing peace process (reftel). Eliasson admitted he was disappointed by the decision of many of the Darfur rebel groups not to participate in the Libya talks. Likewise, Sudan's refusal to facilitate travel for 12 of the 25 civil society representatives had made the discussion less inclusive. ¶3. (U) Eliasson said that the lack of preparedness and cohesion among the rebel groups was the primary obstacle to progress on the political track. The Security Council must allow a "reasonable amount of time" for the rebel movements to prepare for another round of talks. Eliasson said he was returning to the region in the first week of December for talks with regional governments and rebel representatives for discussions on the way forward. -------------- Guehenno Rebukes GOS, Warns of UNAMID Weakness -------------- ¶4. (U) Following SE Eliasson's briefing, DPKO U/SYG Guehenno rebuked of the GOS for obstructing UNAMID deployment. Guehenno outlined the full range of Sudanese obstructions: refusal to agree on force composition, failure to facilitate land and water rights, delays in issuing visas to UN personnel, seizure of shipments of UN equipment, and hindered clearances for UN aircraft. ¶5. (U) Guehenno added that the GOS is now objecting to the UNAMID draft status of forces of agreement (SOFA) and pushing to negotiate "unacceptable changes" to the draft text. The GOS is insisting that the SOFA include provisions that give the Sudanese the right to suspend UNAMID communications and disallow any UNAMID movement on "national security" grounds. Guehenno made clear that UN DPKO had no intention to accept these changes and viewed this as another Sudanese attempt to delay deployment or weaken UNAMID. ¶6. (U) Guehenno warned that if the international community could not find the remaining helicopters and transport assets by the December 31 Transfer of Authority (TOA) then DPKO would have to bring the issue back to the Council for consideration of other modalities, such as increasing the force size, expanding the number of infantry units, or limiting the area of operations. Guehenno said any of these options would delay UNAMID deployment and risked another "Haskanita type of event." -------------- Sudanese PermRep Blames UN, TCCs, and Rebels -------------- USUN NEW Y 00001086 002 OF 002 ¶7. (U) Sudanese PermRep Abdul Mahmood Muhamad responded with criticism of the UN, TCCs and the Darfur rebel groups. Muhamad accused DPKO of attempting to pin the UN's failure to deploy an effective peacekeeping force on the GOS. A more effective venue for resolving the remaining concerns about the UN-AU TCC list would be the Tripartite Mechanism, rather than a public forum such as the Security Council. Likewise, the Sudanese were "disappointed" that the international community had not pledged the right military assets. In regard to the peace process, Muhamad commented that only the GOS had fully committed to the peace process and the cessation of hostilities. For that reason, the Security Council should move quickly on sanctioning the rebel groups that remain "intent on preventing peace." -------------- Council Discussion Follows Darfur Divisions -------------- ¶8. (U) In subsequent Security Council debate, AMB Khalilzad stated the U.S. position that progress on the political, security and humanitarian tracks required sustained commitment and action by the GOS, TCCs, rebels, the UN, and AU (reftel). Sudan's continued refusal to finalize the UN-AU TCC list is unacceptable and without basis, since the proposed force is overwhelmingly African. AMB Khalilzad added that cohesive rebel engagement in the peace process is an essential condition for the peace process to move forward. The Security Council should not shy from being tough with groups that stay outside of the political dialogue. France, UK, Belgium, Italy and Slovakia concurred that the GOS must stop delaying UNAMID deployment. ¶9. (U) China and Qatar echoed the Sudanese position that the remaining deployment issues were primarily technical and could be resolved through the Tripartite Commission. Chinese PermRep Wang said that the Council should consider sanctioning any rebel groups that obstruct the peace process. Qatari PermRep al-Nassir delivered a more strident message, arguing that the Security Council must should follow up on the threat to rebel rejectionist groups implied by the October 24 Presidential Statement, which stated the Council's willingness to take action against groups that disrupt the peace process. Khalilzad