P-5 DISCUSS SUDAN, BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001065 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2017 TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BU SU SUBJECT: P-5 DISCUSS SUDAN, BURMA Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, Permanent Representative, for Reasons 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. SUMMARY: The P-5 PermReps met on November 21 to discuss Sudan and Burma. On Sudan, the P-3 PermReps advocated for additional pressure on the Sudanese to accept the UNAMID force composition. Ambassador Khalilzad said the challenge was determining how to press and/or incentivize the Sudanese authorities to cooperate. To that end, he proposed the Council convert its scheduled consultations with Special Envoy for Darfur Eliasson and U/SYG for Peacekeeping Operations Guehenno on November 27 into a public meeting, so that members could exert additional pressure on Khartoum. He also urged that the P-5 deliver complementary statements on what Sudan needed to do. UK PermRep Sawers agreed to approach the SC President (Indonesia) to arrange the change in format. On Burma, the P-3 PermReps pressed for continued pressure on the Burmese and disputed Chinese PermRep Wang's more positive assessment of the situation on the ground. Ambassador Khalilzad told Wang that China had a delicate and essential role to play to ensure Burma did not return to the status quo ante. He said that the Chinese were overemphasizing engagement, that pressure had to continue and that Gambari needed people on the ground as soon as possible. He proposed that, when Gambari returned from the region in early December, Gambari convene the core group of countries he had proposed several weeks ago, which China and Russia had blocked, to exchange views on next steps. The rest of the P-5 agreed. END SUMMARY. SUDAN -------------- ¶2. (C) P-5 Coordinator for November-January UK PermRep Sawers opened by noting a "continuing set of worries" over Sudan -- frustration with the lack of progress in UNAMID implementation, in particular Bashir's unwillingness to accept the force composition, and renewed concern on the status of the CPA. Sawers said the situation was hard to read as UN Under Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations Guehenno was getting a more positive line on the military side regarding deployments for UNAMID than the Secretary General was getting from the political authorities. Ambassador Khalilzad said the situation was more negative than positive, with no movement by Sudanese authorities on the fundamental issues, including land rights and air use. �A;We are not getting any decisions on the things on the ground they control. The Secretary General believes "we're stuck," he said. The challenge remained how to press and/or incentivize Sudanese authorities to do more. An immediate step, Khalilzad suggested, was for the P-5 to propose to Council President Natalegawa (Indonesia) that the Council's November 27 (behind closed doors) consultations with Special Envoy Jan Eliasson and U/SYG Guehenno be converted to a public meeting so that members could state their case publicly to the GOS. On the political process, he suggested that the SYG's newly-arrived Special Representative for Sudan Ashraf Qazi be engaged to see what see what he could do ¶3. (C) French PermRep Ripert agreed that the situation was negative, that the Sudanese did not want to comply, and expressed concern that the credibility of the Security Council was at stake. The notion of the Sudanese cherry picking which countries could participate in the hybrid force was "outrageous." He declared that the Security Council should not rule out sanctions if the Sudanese refused to cooperate. We need to give them a deadline and move to tougher measures if they do not meet it, he said. ¶4. (C) Chinese PermRep Wang said that compared to last year the situation was moving in a positive direction. Regarding the political process, GOS authorities were behaving "better than the others." He agreed with Ambassador Khalilzad that the GOS had not responded "as we would have liked" on UNAMID deployment issues, but also noted that members had not come forward with all the assets (i.e. helicopters) required. He insisted that the Council needed to rely on the Tripartite mechanism to work with the Sudanese. He suggested that the P-5 engage Khartoum bilaterally to persuade them to show flexibility on the force composition (i.e. accepting the Nordic contingent) and other issues. Talking about sanctions at this stage was premature, he said. ¶5. (C) Russian PermRep Churkin reiterated that Eliasson would be coming to New York next week and that this would be an opportunity to send a signal both on the political talks and the deployment issues. Ambassador Khalilzad repeated his call to make Eliasson's briefing a public meeting of the Council USUN NEW Y 00001065 002 OF 002 so that "we can send the right message." He urged that the P-5 show solidarity with complementary messages on what Khartoum needed to do. Everyone around the table accepted the idea of an open meeting and UK Permrep Sawers, as P-5 coordinator, agreed to approach the Indonesians on the format change. Sawers also suggested a Security Council mission to the Sudan in the first three months of the year, to keep the spotlight on Darfur. BURMA -------------- ¶6. (C) The P-3 PermReps expressed concern that Special Adviser Ibrahim Gambari had been invited and then not allowed to brief the East Asian Summit. Ambassador Khalilzad said flatly that Gambari was not treated well and that this was not a good message. He noted that UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar Pinheiro had returned from Burma convinced that the authorities were interested in the status quo ante and nothing more. Pinheiro saw no interest in either reconciliation or democratization. ¶7. (C) Wang said China had a different assessment. Gambari had been invited by the chair of ASEAN to address the East Asian Summit but "Myanmar disagreed, and others thought it would be risky for him speak." Despite this, Beijing saw "some good movement." The road map was now "at the third stage" and the authorities were implementing "some of Gambari's proposals." He said Gambari was likely to return to Burma in December. The P-3 PermReps disagreed, noting individually that they could not endorse the regime's roadmap which was being implemented without other relevant groups. The authorities were going through the motions, nothing more. The regime and Aung San Suu Kyi needed to begin their formal dialogue and the UN needed to be there. Continued pressure -- public and private -- was required to move the process forward. ¶8. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad said that the Chinese were overemphasizing engagement, that pressure had to continue and that Gambari needed people on the ground as soon as possible. We also need to engage the core group Gambari requested of us, he said. The Ambassador reminded Wang and Churkin that they had blocked the first meeting several weeks ago. Wang denied blocking the meeting, noting that he had asked Gambari "to ask Myanmar if they had any objections and they did." Churkin said Russia's concern had been that there was already an UNGA mandate, ASEAN involvement and a stream of reports to the Security Council. What was the value of yet another group to deal with the issue. ¶9. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad pressed Wang further, telling him that China had a delicate and essential role to play. You need to signal pressure and not allow a return to the status quo ante, he said. Wang responded that Beijing had sent a special envoy to Burma/Myanmar. The first step was to restore stability and then press for national reconciliation, democratization and an improvement in the living standards of the people. French Permrep Ripert said that was fine but we needed to go from "signs to movement." Wang responded that the imposition of unilateral sanctions was not helping the situation. Khalilzad said sanctions were being imposed because the regime had not responded with concrete steps. Sawers agreed that Gambari should pull together the core group to exchange views when he returned to New York. No one disagreed. Khalilzad