UN/SUDAN SANCTIONS: CHINA, RUSSIA, INDONESIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001058 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2017 TAGS: PREL UNSC ETTC SU PGOV SUBJECT: UN/SUDAN SANCTIONS: CHINA, RUSSIA, INDONESIA REJECT STRENGTHENING ARMS EMBARGO, QATAR SEEKS REBEL SANCTIONS REF: USUN 1004 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JACKIE WOLCOTT, FOR REASONS: 1.4(B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Sudan Sanctions Committee met on October 9, October 30, and November 7 to discuss the recommendations on improving the sanctions regime contained in the Panel of Experts' September report, which included an embargo on the sale of aircraft to the GOS and targeted sanctions on aviation companies, rebels, and GOS officials impeding the peace process and violating human rights. The Panel also sought to formalize information sharing between itself and UNAMID. China, Russia, and Indonesia opposed all of the substantive recommendations, though China did agree to consider Qatar's suggestion that the Committee sanction JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim and SLM leader Abdelwahid el-Nur for their failure to attend the peace talks in Sirte, Libya. End Summary. BACKGROUND ¶2. (C) Pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005),UN Security Council sanctions in Sudan consist of an arms embargo on Darfur, a ban on offensive flights over Darfur, and targeted sanctions on individuals found to be violating the embargo, overflight ban, or human rights, or otherwise impeding the peace process. The Sudan Sanctions Committee met on October 9, October 30, and November 7 to discuss the recommendations contained in the Panel of Experts' (the Committee's eyes and ears on the ground) September report, which examined the sanctions regime over the past year. The report details repeated violations of the arms embargo and human rights by all parties to the conflict and continued offensive flights over Darfur by the Government of Sudan (GOS),including by aircraft painted white to resemble UN aircraft. The Panel named rebel and GOS individuals for possible targeted sanctions--an international travel ban and assets freeze--for their roles in these violations. The Panel also proposed a number of new measures for the Council's consideration, including an embargo on the sale of aircraft and jet fuel to the GOS, and targeted sanctions on civil aviation companies transporting arms and other military materiel to Darfur for GOS use. ¶3. (C) Conforming to predictable positions, China and Russia opposed all of the Panel's substantive proposals, and Qatar and Indonesia attempted to block even the most basic recommendations pertaining to the Committee's daily work, such as sending follow-up letters to states that have not responded to the Panel's requests for information. As the Committee is not empowered to adopt new sanctions measures--only the Council can do this--Italian PermRep and Committee Chairman Marcello Spatafora will simply report the discussion on the recommendations to the Council in the coming weeks. NEW EMBARGO MEASURES ¶4. (C) Among the Panel's more innovative recommendations was banning the sale of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and spare parts to the GOS. Russia stated that given the lack of infrastructure in Sudan, air travel was key to responding to emergencies, implying that this would limit the GOS,s ability to do so. Indonesia also voiced objection, and China stated it was still seeking instructions. The Panel also recommended banning the sale of aviation fuel for GOS aircraft operating in Darfur, which Belgium and USUN supported. While not opposing the recommendation outright, China, Qatar, Russia and Indonesia sought clarification on how states would distinguish jet fuel destined for aircraft operating specifically in Darfur. France responded that preventing the provision of jet fuel to GOS in Darfur was already covered by the embargo. NEW TARGETED SANCTIONS ¶5. (C) The Panel also suggested sanctions on several civil aviation companies--Ababeel Aviation, AZZA transport, Badr Airlines, Juba Air Cargo, Trans Attico, and United Arabian Airlines--for transporting arms and other materiel into USUN NEW Y 00001058 002 OF 003 Darfur for GOS use. China opposed this recommendation, as did Qatar, arguing that it would weaken the GOS's ability to implement resolution 1769 (2007),but did not offer any further explanation of its rationale. ¶6. (C) The Panel recommended targeted sanctions on the following individuals for violations of resolution 1951 and impeding the peace process: Khalil Ibrahim Mohammed and Adam Bahkit for their violations of the arms embargo; Doussa Deby for his support of non-State armed groups in or operating from Eastern Chad; and SAF Western Region Commander Major General Mohamed al-Tahir al-Ahrif and Sudanese air force commander, Lieutenant General Mohammed Abdel Qadir, as responsible for offensive military overflights in Darfur. Russia noted that, procedurally, the Committee needed a designation request from a Member State to consider any designation action. ¶7. (C) However, Qatar expressed tentative interest in sanctioning Khalil Ibrahim Mohamed and Abdelwadid el-Nur (who was not named by the Panel) for their failure to attend the peace talks in Sirte, Libya, which China said it would consider (reftel). In the event the Committee could not agree to move forward on sanctions, Ghana suggested as an interim step that the Panel approach some of these individuals to alert them that their actions could result in targeted sanctions. USUN privately expressed concern to Ghana that such an action carried the risk of asset flight and Washington would be unlikely to support it. STRENGTHENING THE ARMS EMBARGO ¶8. (C) As in past reports, the Panel urged the Council to require states that supply military materiel to Sudan to obtain end-user certification from the GOS indicating the primary location of use of the materiel. Ghana argued that at a minimum the Council should prevent the parties from bolstering their capacity to wage war, which a compulsory end-user regime would do. The UK, Belgium, and Slovakia expressed interest in keeping the proposal on the Committee's agenda, but China objected to any further discussion. (Note: The French told USUN privately that they did not support the recommendation because it referred only to the "primary location" of the supplies and the GOS would undoubtedly divert arms to secondary locations. End note.) UNAMID RECOMMENDATIONS ¶9. (C) Finally, the Panel proposed several recommendations related to UNAMID, including that UNAMID and the Panel exchange information about violations of the arms embargo. The UK expressed its agreement in principle, but stressed that the Committee should not recommend this before UNAMID had the capability to engage with the Panel, which Indonesia echoed. The Panel also suggested that UNAMID deploy forces along the Sudanese side of the Chad-Sudan border to monitor the cross-border movements of non-state actors and military materiel, but Congo cautioned that any such deployment could provoke a Chad-UNAMID confrontation. France also expressed reservations, arguing that this would divert focus from the activities of the parties in Darfur. China would not agree to any recommendations related to UNAMID, arguing that they were premature given that the force was not fully deployed. USUN responded that the recommendations should be kept on the Committee's agenda for review once UNAMID was fully operational. (Comment: The discussion about UNAMID-Panel cooperation was ultimately academic, as resolution 1779 (2007) mandates that the Panel coordinate its activities with UNAMID. End comment.) COMMENT ¶10. (C) Though the Committee did not agree to endorse any of the Panel's substantive recommendations to the Council, the Council may consider these recommendations at any time on the initiative of a Council member. We should not read too much into positions taken in the Committee adverse to ours as consensus rules allow members a cost-free veto on any issue--no votes are taken and deliberations are not public. Elevating an issue for Council discussion or vote makes USUN NEW Y 00001058 003 OF 003 adverse positions more difficult to sustain. We should keep this avenue in mind if there is interest in enacting any of the recommendations, which offer valuable suggestions on how the Council could increase pressure on Sudan in the future. End comment. Khalilzad