UPDATE ON DARFUR PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT NOVEMBER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001027 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017 TAGS: AF PGOV PREL SU UNC UN KPKO SUBJECT: UPDATE ON DARFUR PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT NOVEMBER 15TH REF: A. USUN 980 ¶B. USUN 999 ¶C. USUN 1001 ¶D. KHARTOUM 1762 Classified By: Ambassador J. Wolcott for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Key Points: --US DPKO Under Secretary General Guehenno met with Sudanese Major General Maghzoub on November 11th in Addis Ababa in an effort to find a way forward with UNAMID deployments. Guehenno briefed the Security Council on November 14 on the details of his meetings. --Deployment update: The HSP deployment is underway with the arrival of equipment for the Chinese engineering unit. Other HSP units are taking preparatory steps. For UNAMID, the second High Ranking Officer Technical Assessment Team (HROTAT) schedule has been released. Also, DPKO provided information about GOS hindrances to UN deployments. --TCC update: The USG Guehenno-Maghzoub meeting failed to obtain GoS concurrence on the UNAMID TCC list. --Command and Personnel: US Contractor update. Also, AU Chairperson Konare reportedly remains adamant that UNAMID troops wear green berets. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) In the briefing to the SC USG Guehenno related what was discussed in Addis Ababa with Sudanese General Maghzoub. Guehenno said he offered some adjustments in the current UNAMID deployment schedule in order to help President Bashir save face and accept the list of TCCs, which included deploying the Egyptian, Ethiopian and Thai units immediately. Sudan General Maghzoub initially agreed and forwarded a short paper detailing the discussions to Khartoum for approval. However, the following day Maghzoub forwarded a revised copy to DPKO which included only the agreement to expedite the deployment of African TCC's, thereby walking back the agreement to accept other non-African TCCs. Moreover, President Bashir delivered a speech the same day denouncing the Nordic engineering company as being full of "American and Israeli spies." Guehenno expressed frustration with the disconnect between reasonable military officials and Khartoum policy makers within the GNU. ¶3. (C) Deployment updates derived from DPKO's force generation update : --- HSP --- --China's engineer unit is currently deploying and will have its advance party, equipment and personnel in Nyala in mid- December. --Egypt's signal, engineer, medical and composite transport company conclude Pre-Deployment Visits (PDV's) this week with advance parties due into Darfur by February 2008, and main body deployments occurring in March. --Pakistan, providing an engineering unit, a Level III hospital and aerial reconnaissance, has its PDV's scheduled from 26-28 November, and its advance parties arriving in February/March 2008, and main body deployments scheduled for March/April 2008. --Nigeria is providing a Level II hospital that has already undergone a PDV and is planned to deploy in January 2008. --Bangladesh's logistic unit has a PDV scheduled for 21-23 November and its advance party arriving in December, followed by the main body in January 2008. -------------- UNAMID -------------- The second High Ranking Officer Technical Assessment Team (HROTAT) visit schedule has been established (COMMENT: To reiterate, the HROTAT's mission is to identify gaps in TCC capabilities prior to the potential deployment for UNAMID. While it remains the TCC's responsibility to satisfy the USUN NEW Y 00001027 002 OF 002 requirements and close the gaps, the combined presence of the UN HROTAT, donor nations, and the host nation provides an opportunity to collectively identify problems and expedite solutions. END COMMENT): Bujumbura, Burundi from 18-20 November Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania from 20-23 November Lilongwe, Malawi from 23-25 November Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 25-27 November African TCC's have been askedto escort the HROTAT throughout UN visits to each country and the TCC's MilAds have been invited to include potential donors/partners (such as the US, UK and France) in the visits. ¶4. (C) DPKO provided USUN specific instances of GOS interference to ongoing deployments. These include land acquisition, which was granted in El Geneina after a long negotiation but is inadequate due to its location and lack of water. Second, communications equipment was impounded in El Fasher upon arrival for UNAMID. Also, frequent late approval of flight clearance requests cast doubt on all air missions and result in an inordinate amount of time wasted. Additionally, approval for an action may be granted at the federal level but disapproved at the local level. These examples, while seemingly minor on an individual basis, conspire to slow down HSP/UNAMID deployments and muddy up an already complicated TOA (REF B). ¶5. (C) TCC update: The UN still has no volunteers for helo's and transport units. ¶6. (C) Command and Personnel: AMIS Force Commander General Agwai supports the retention of the 16 U.S. (retired) Military Observers in their capacity as advisors/liaison officers. Berets - Konare is holding firm on the beret issue (REF C). Reportedly, he told USG Guehenno that he would accept blue berets, if the UN could convince President Bashir. In a meeting with USUN MSC and Pol officers (septel),Force Commander Agwai acknowledged the problem, noting that he refused to wear the green AU beret, but at the same time it made no sense for him to stand up in front of his men in a blue beret if they were all wearing green ones. He stressed that the issue needed to be resolved in some fashion, preferring that they be blue. ¶7. (C) The GOS has indicated that they will not/not permit the UN to set up additional broadcasting capabilities targeted at Darfur, however the UN is proceeding anyway and already has some capabilities in place.Also UNMIS has short wave capability that reaches anyone in Darfur with the right equipment. They are already transmitting a "limited amount" of Darfur related programming via this channel.The UN is also transmitting periodic programming through local commercial FM radio stations in Darfur. DPKO would very much like to expand its broadcasting capability with UNAMID and has included this requirement in the budget. They view this as an essential component of the Political process since the rebel rejectionist groups and the GOS currently have close to a monopoly on public information. (REF D) Khalilzad