SPECIAL ADVISER GAMBARI ON VISIT TO BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001007 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2017 TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM SUBJECT: SPECIAL ADVISER GAMBARI ON VISIT TO BURMA Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, Deputy Permanent Represen tative, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: During a November 10 telephone call and subsequent meetings on November 12, Special Adviser Gambari told Ambassadors Khalilzad and Wolff that he pressed Burmese authorities for a date to start a dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK); that ASSK prefers to meet with her party, develop an agenda and launch the dialogue on January 4 (Burmese independence day); and that UN participation in a three-way dialogue could come later. Gambari reviewed what he did and did not achieve during the visit; said the Burmese should be pressured to sign the ASEAN Charter at the November 18 summit; expressed interest in attending the November 21 East Asia Summit because China, India and Australia plus ASEAN would be present; reported ASSK's concern with the proliferation of special envoys for Burma; announced his intention to move forward with a small core group to support his efforts; and reported ASSK's view that sanctions are premature. Gambari said that the regime had agreed to the appointment of one UN liaison officer working for Gambari to stay in Burma. He recommended that the U.S. "link up better" with the Chinese, who are saying helpful things about Burma; need to be comfortable with what ASSK is doing; and have the best intelligence about what is happening on the ground. On his inability to see Than Shwe, Gambari also relayed Chinese hints that something might happen soon within the Burmese leadership, noting that the Burmese have a history of sidelining leaders who become problematic. Gambari will brief the Security Council on November 13. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In a telephone conversation on November 10, UN Special Adviser Ibrahim Gambari briefed Ambassadors Khalilzad and Wolff on his recent visit to Burma. Ambassador Wolff followed up with a meeting with Gambari early on November 12, and in a P-3 Ambassadors' meting with Gambari later that day. READOUT OF THE TRIP -------------- ¶3. (C) Gambari said he pressed Burmese officials for a date to start the national reconciliation dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK),as well as for clear time lines for the process. According to Gambari, the regime has not ruled out the idea of three-way talks with the UN participating, but believed the time was not yet right. They told Gambari that they needed "talks about talks" with ASSK first, and that ASSK wanted to meet with her party colleagues and develop an agenda for the talks before moving forward. ¶4. (C) According to Gambari, ASSK in fact told him in Rangoon on the last day of his visit that she wanted to devise an agenda for the dialogue, develop her role as the spokesperson for the ethnic minorities, and push for January 4 as the launch date (because of its significance to Burmese history as independence day). Gambari asked ASSK if she wanted technical or expert support as she prepares for the dialogue. She responded that she had the necessary expertise and support from two to three experts in her party (many of whom Gambari believes may be too old or out of touch). Gambari believes that ASSK is underestimating how tough the task ahead of her will be, and that the international community should "push for more support for her efforts," including regular visits with her party as well as meeting with ethnic minority groups. ¶5. (C) Gambari cited several other positive developments as a result of his visit: (1) UN Human Rights Envoy Paulo Sergio Pinheiro's scheduled visit to Burma November 11-15; (2) an agreement in principle to an ICRC visit and access to detainees; (3) an agreement in principle to release more political prisoners; (4) ASSK's meeting with the NLD Executive Committee (which should be allowed to occur regularly); (5) an agreement for ASSK to meet weekly with liaison minister Aung Kyi (she reported to Gambari being satisfied with her discussions with him so far although cannot yet assess his leverage); (6) an agreement for Gambari to read publicly ASSK's statement; and (7),the Prime Minister's agreement in principle that Gambari could visit as often as he needs (he has requested but not yet received a multiple entry visa). Gambari said he specifically wanted to be in Burma when the constitutional drafting committee meets so he can personally press for wider participation in the process. He noted that the regime had already agreed he could meet with the constitutional draft committee but added that the leadership had not agreed to reopen the draft. Gambari highlighted that ASSK would see this as a major "sticking point" in the upcoming dialogue. He added that it USUN NEW Y 00001007 002 OF 003 was likely ASSK would require assistance from the international community in proposing changes to the draft, should the regime allow it to be reopened. ¶6. (C) On the negative side, Gambari acknowledged to Ambassadors Khalilzad and Wolff that (1) his schedule was tightly controlled and scripted, limited to meetings in the capital; (2) many of those participating in his meetings with ethnic leaders, monks, and other civil society representatives were hand-picked by the government; (3) he was unable to meet with 88 Generation student leaders; (4) he was unable to hold meetings with detainees or secure additional releases; (5) he was unable to extract a time frame for implementation of the seven-step road map, and (6) he was unable to negotiate any meaningful lifting of conditions of detainment for ASSK. Gambari said he repeatedly pressed for improvements in these areas, in particular the treatment of ASSK if she is to credibly function as a partner in the dialogue. NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶7. (C) ASEAN SUMMIT: Gambari told Ambassadors Khalilzad and Wolff that he believes the Burmese government should be pressured to sign the ASEAN Charter at the upcoming ASEAN Summit. This would lock in a commitment to improved standards of political behavior and treatment of the Burmese people. He wants the ASEAN leaders to impress upon the regime the need for intensified cooperation with the Secretary General's good offices mission, and to stop attacking it as a tool of the west. ¶8. (C) Gambari said there was no need for him to attend the ASEAN Summit (he has not been invited) since he had just met with ASEAN leaders during his last trip. However, he was inclined to take up the Prime Minster of Singapore's suggestion that he attend the November 21 East Asian Summit, which includes ASEAN, China, India and Australia. Gambari was also thinking about traveling on to Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia. He noted that these countries have been saying "some positive things," and that the Burmese Prime Minister had just visited their capitals. Another option, said Gambari, was to return to Burma around the Nov. 21 East Asia Summit both to keep up the pressure and to "regularize" his visits. ¶9. (C) SPECIAL ENVOYS: Gambari noted that ASEAN had refrained from appointing a special envoy for Burma. EU Foreign Policy chief Javier Solana had told him the EU would only appoint a "focal point," but Gambari now understood that the EU had identified a special envoy. He said ASSK told him she was not/not in favor of multiple envoys, concerned that the regime would pick and choose among them. Gambari recommended that we also lobby ASEAN not to appoint their own envoy. ¶10. (C) CORE GROUP: Gambari said he still believes the establishment of a small Core Group (with the countries he originally suggested) would be helpful to support his efforts. He stressed that the Burmese do not like the idea but would not oppose it. In any event, he was not seeking their permission. Gambari intends to go ahead with the initiative after he consults with the Secretary General. ¶11. (C) SANCTIONS: On the issue of sanctions, in particular regarding the utility of Security Council, regional group (e.g. ASEAN, EU) or individual country sanctions or threat of sanctions, Gambari said none of his ASEAN or Japanese interlocutors favored sanctions. That said, these same interlocutors see the threat of sanctions as an element of pressure to support Gambari's efforts, since they make clear that more sanctions would follow if cooperation is not forthcoming (likely from the U.S. or EU rather than the region). Gambari said that regime officials still "don't get it," and appear to be under the illusion that by cooperating with the UN, sanctions will be automatically lifted. Regime leaders have criticized him privately and publicly during each trip because the result has been more measures taken by the international community, including the Security Council, rather than less. Gambari has told them that the best way to counter this was with more cooperation. ¶12. (C) Gambari also reported that ASSK believes sanctions are premature, as are a package of incentives. She prefers that the intenational community consider "massive investment and aid," but only/only once she gives the signal. According to Gambari, she believes this would empower her to demonstrate that she is in a position to help turn things around for the Burmese people. USUN NEW Y 00001007 003 OF 003 UN STAFFING -------------- ¶13. (C) In response to a question from Ambassador Khalilzad on staffing support for Gambari in Burma to monitor and facilitate progress during his absence from the country, Gambari said that the regime had agreed to the appointment of one UN liaison officer to work directly for Gambari. Gambari has in mind a respected colleague (DPA officer Erwan Pouchous) who has accompanied him on each visit to Burma and the region. The idea would be to embed him in the UN country team but have him serve as a direct extension to Gambari and not be under UNDP control. Gambari hopes to have him in Rangoon either before November 21 or soon after. ¶14. (C) Regarding a replacement for (UNDP) Resident Coordinator Charles Petrie, Gambari recommended that the UN select someone already on the ground in Rangoon, on an interim basis for expediency and look for a truly strong successor as quickly as possible. Petrie will leave Burma on December 5. CHINA -------------- ¶15. (C) Gambari recommended to Ambassadors Khalilzad and Wolff that the U.S. "link up better" with China on Burma, a point that Lee Kwan Yew also made strongly to him. Lee reportedly stressed that if the Chinese are not comfortable with ASSK they will not play a constructive role. According to Gambari, the Chinese have told him that the status quo ante or business as usual in Burma is not sustainable. They have said that Burma can not be outside the minimal international norms for democracy, albeit "within the Burmese context." (Note: Gambari told the P-3, including Ambassador Wolff later on November 12, that the Chinese were saying helpful things to the Burmese including that the regime must respect the legitimate demands of its own people. End Note.) ¶16. (C) Gambari stressed that "we need the Chinese to continue to be helpful." He believes that they have the best intelligence about what is happening within the regime and could be helpful if they chose to share their assessments. According to Gambari, the Chinese have hinted that something might happen in the next month or so within the Burmese leadership. Gambari emphasized that the Burmese have a history of sidelining leaders who become problematic. He also cited the Foreign Minister's comment when Gambari complained about his inability to meet with Than Shwe. The Foreign Minister's response was: "he may be confused these days and, in any event, he is not the only decision maker." ASSK's HEALTH -------------- ¶17. (C) Gambari reported that ASSK "looked better than before." He said she was buoyed by the recent demonstrations because they represented the type of change in expectation that would be difficult to reverse. She also told Gambari that the blouses she wears when she appears in public always have a message to her supporters. According to Gambari, during this most recent visit, ASSK told him that the message she wore expressed support for his efforts and sympathy for the bad treatment he had received by Than Shwe. SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION -------------- ¶18. (C) Gambari is scheduled to brief the Security Council in open session on the afternoon of November 13. The P-3 shared with Gambari privately its suggested elements for a Presidential Statement (PRST) that were passed to the Council president (Indonesia) on November 9. The Indonesians are consulting with the Chinese on the elements. Khalilzad