DPKO REQUESTS U.S. INTERVENTION WITH THE AU ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001001 SIPDIS SIPDIS IO AND AF FOR FRONT OFFICE; PLEASE PASS TO SE NATSIOS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SU MOPS SUBJECT: DPKO REQUESTS U.S. INTERVENTION WITH THE AU ON UNAMID INSIGNIA REF: A. USUN 00964 ¶B. USUN-IO EMAILS 11/08/07 ¶C. KHARTOUM 01742 Classified By: Ambassador Jackie Wolcott for Reasons 1.4 B/D. ¶1. (U) Please see action request in paragraph 11. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: DPKO U/SYG Guehenno complained that the Government of the Sudan (GOS) still has not made a "strategic decision" to cooperate with UNAMID deployment, as demonstrated by the ongoing delays and continuous stream of "anti-UNAMID propaganda" in the Sudanese media. AMB Wolcott pressed Guehenno to deliver to USUN the UNAMID rules of engagement and the October 2 SYG letter to President Bashir on TCCs. Guehenno asked for U.S. assistance to convince African Union Chairperson Konare to back down on his insistence that UNAMID accoutrement not carry UN insignia. DPKO officials said that reported staffing shortages in Darfur will be quickly alleviated by the transfer of authority. END SUMMARY. -------------- GOS Wavers Initially On Addis Meeting -------------- ¶3. (C) AMB Wolcott met with DPKO U/SYG Guehenno November 8 to discuss UNAMID deployment and Guehenno's plans to meet with Sudanese Major General Maghzoub in Addis Ababa (ref A). Guehenno reported that the Government of Sudan (GOS) had backpedaled on confirming the meeting after Guehenno called Sudanese General Maghzough to clarify that the meeting would be primarily technical in nature and not an opportunity for the GOS to renegotiate the TCC list or make changes to the deployment timeline. Guehenno said that he had communicated to Maghzoub that the meeting had to produce a conclusion on the outstanding deployment issues, "I told him I am not about to travel ten thousand miles to give the same deployment briefing." Guehenno said he planned to meet with African Union officials on November 11 and Sudanese officials on November 12. (NOTE: Subsequent to the meeting DPKO confirmed that Guehenno had departed for Addis Ababa as planned. END NOTE.) ¶4. (C) AMB Wolcott responded that the U.S. supported DPKO's resolve with the Sudanese on UNAMID deployment. Guehenno responded that the UN had very little flexibility to negotiate with the GOS on force composition, "If we make any more concessions, our forces will be out there naked." ¶5. (C) Guehenno said he is willing to make "presentational changes" if it would speed UNAMID deployment by helping President Bashir to "save face." Guehenno emphasized that any major adjustments to the force composition or timeline would be extremely difficult because of the limited number of specialized military assets and political sensitivities with many TCCs. Increasing Egyptian participation, for example, would please the GOS but alienate Darfur rebel groups. -------------- DPKO: GOS Not Cooperating With UNAMID -------------- ¶6. (C) Guehenno assessed that ongoing Sudanese efforts to delay UNAMID deployment reflected the lack of a "strategic decision" to cooperate with the UN (details on UN assessment GOS non-cooperation reported septel). Guehenno said that the UN understood that the GOS was unlikely to ever "embrace" the peacekeeping deployment. The UN strategy is to deploy a force that is capable enough to show rapid improvements in security, thus demonstrating to the GOS that enhanced cooperation with UNAMID will help calm rebel activity and enable a political process. If the UN is unable to deploy a capable force, however, the most likely scenario would be a negative cycle of events and UNAMID would become "merely the new AMIS." Guehenno highlighted the lack of an official GOS response to the UN-AU TCC list and the continuous stream of incendiary "anti-UNAMID propaganda" in the Sudanese media as evidence of the government's overall attitude. -------------- Konare Still Making Trouble on Blue v. Green Berets -------------- USUN NEW Y 00001001 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) Guehenno requested U.S. intervention to convince AU Chairperson Konare to agree to allow UNAMID forces to wear UN insignia. According to Guehenno, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Said Djinnit had intervened with Konare to attain his agreement that UNAMID forces would wear blue berets. Konare had responded that, at best, he would agree to a uniform that was not "blue or green." Guehenno said the blue beret issue is extremely important because non-African TCCs would "not participate in any thing short of a blue force." -------------- UNAMID Shortfalls -------------- ¶8. (C) AMB Wolcott noted that the U.S. is approaching potential TCCs to resolve the remaining UNAMID shortfalls of helicopters and transportation units. Guehenno said that he appreciated the Deputy Secretary's role in particular. AMB Wolcott pressed Guehenno to deliver to USUN the UNAMID rules of engagement and the October 2 SYG letter to President Bashir on TCCs, so as to facilitate U.S. diplomatic engagement on UNAMID. Guehenno agreed and directed his staff to provide the documents (ref B). ¶9. (C) AMB Wolcott inquired about reports that UNAMID staffing shortfalls are adversely impacting UN operations in Darfur (ref C). DPKO Darfur Planning Director Mike Gaouette responded that the staffing situation is not quite as severe as it "may appear from our office in al-Fasher." Most of the UN staff currently in place are components of the UN support packages for AMIS. With the Transfer of Authority (TOA) on December 31, more of the personnel will be available to support UN operations. ¶10. (C) Guehenno said he had delegated authority to UN officials in the Sudan to hire middle and lower level staff. Senior appointments, however, will take more time because they require approval from UN HQ in New York. -------------- Action Request -------------- ¶11. (C) The accoutrement issue is a substantive one that could potentially adversely impact deployment and participation by non-African TCCs. USUN requests that the Department intervene with AU Chairperson Konare, if possible, before the UN-AU meeting in Addis Ababa on November 11. Khalilzad