NATO SENIOR DEFENSE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP)

S E C R E T USNATO 000092 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR T, ISN (GODBY),EUR/RPM (TIERSKY) DEFENSE FOR OUSD POLICY (GREEN, STEIN, IANACONE, VEIT), OUSD ACQUISITION TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS (HOPKINS, HENRY, HENNEGAN, DELANEY),JOINT STAFF/J-5 (CDR SWAIN),DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (UNGER),EUCOM FOR CS (MAJ GEN CATTO) AND ECJ5 (MAJ GEN REMKES) E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2017 TAGS: MARR MCAP MNUC NATO PARM PREL SUBJECT: NATO SENIOR DEFENSE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP) PLENARY MEETING, 24 JAN 2007 Classified By: DDEFAD CLARENCE JUHL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B&D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On 24 January 2007, Mr. Joseph Benkert, OSD PDASD for Global Security Affairs, and Mr. Ivan Dvorak, Chief of Defense Policy and Strategy Division, Czech Republic, co-chaired the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) Plenary session. The DGP discussed policy guidance from the Riga Summit, new initiatives for outreach with other NATO bodies dealing with Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) issues, outreach with Ukraine on CBRN defense, updates from the NATO International Staff (IS) on CBRN capabilities, and a change to the Work Programme to add an additional Plenary session in March 2007. During the afternoon, delegates met in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) format to listen to national briefings from Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Poland, Slovakia, and Sweden on CBRN capabilities. End Summary. -------------- DGP POLICY GUIDANCE ) RIGA SUMMIT OUTCOMES -------------- ¶2. (U) Mr. Steve Sturm, NATO Defense Policy and Planning Division (DPP),presented an informational briefing on NATO,s Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG),which was endorsed at the Riga Summit. The CPG,s goal is to provide a planning framework and political direction for the next 10-15 years and to achieve increased coherence through an effective management mechanism. Mr. Sturm highlighted the fact that the CPG identifies Terrorism and the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as specific threats to NATO and that with an increased probability of the use of WMD through asymmetric means, NATO must be prepared to deter adversaries and defend its populations and troops against terrorists, WMD attacks. He asked that the WMD Centre (WMD-C) provide a briefing on implications of the CPG on the DGP at the next Steering Group meeting, scheduled for March 1st. ¶3. (U) WG Cmdr Andy Proudlove, RAF, from the NATO WMD-C, provided an informational briefing on the importance of NATO,s CBRN defense capabilities to the Riga Summit agenda, the theme of which was Threats, Risks and Challenges. The capability to defend against CBRN hazards is of primary importance and the Summit Communiqu urged nations to adapt their forces accordingly. The Communiqu also addresses the risks posed by the North Korean nuclear test and the continuing stalemate with Iran, and reaffirms the major role played by the various arms control regimes. At Riga, twelve nations contributed to a CBRN exhibition that featured some NATO capabilities such as the NATO Centers of Excellence (COE),the CBRN Defense Battalion, Reach-back capability, Render Safe policy, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal. In response to a question on Reach-back, the International Military Staff (IMS) explained that the Reach-back requirement was under development and would be embedded in the Concept of Operations for the CBRN Battalion. -------------- DGP AND NATO ACTIVITIES -------------- ¶4. (C) Mr. Carsten Fausboll, Director of Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) within the NATO Operations Division, provided an informational briefing on the results of the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) conference held in Oslo, Norway in October 2006 on "Non-binding Guidelines and Minimum Standards for Protection of Populations against CBRN Risks." This briefing was given in an effort to strengthen cooperation between SCEPC and the DGP. The aim of this conference was to develop "non-binding" coordination mechanisms for integrating the civil side of a nation,s response to a CBRN attack. Mr. Fausboll admitted that one of the issues slowing the coordination of civil and military response to a CBRN event is the lack of coordination between the European Union (EU) and NATO. In the future Mr. Fausboll looks to strengthen SCEPC-DGP coordination at the 2007 North Atlantic Council (NAC) WMD Seminar, the 2007 DGP Seminar, the new initiative on &Improved cooperation with other NATO bodies,8 and through coordinated responses on topics such as reach-back, maritime interdiction, and disease surveillance. Mr. Fausboll was asked by delegate members to provide this briefing at the EAPC seminar in the afternoon, to which he agreed. Some comments from nations: Norway voiced support for the work of the SCEPC and stated that it should be broadened to partners; Slovenia supported the exchanges of briefs with the SCEPC; Romania called for strong support from NATO to civil authorities, furthermore CEP is an area for cooperation with the EU; France wanted cooperation with SCEPC to be "invisible." ¶5. (C) The US co-chair led a discussion on the DGP paper on "Improved Coordination with other NATO Bodies" (DGP-N(2006)0014-REV2). The Chairman explained that the intent of the paper was to improve cooperation and coordination, and avoid duplication among the various NATO bodies involved in CBRN defense. In an effort to start the process, the DGP proposed to conduct an initial meeting of the bodies and the NATO Military Authorities and to hold it annually thereafter if it proves to be of value. The Chairman characterized the meeting as an informal exchange that might take place in the same time frame as the March DGP plenary. France requested changes to the DGP paper, stressing the meeting's informal status and recognizing that the role of the DGP is to "guide" policy rather than to coordinate the other groups, activities. They also proposed that the workshop be conducted under the auspices of the International Staff. The United Kingdom endorsed the paper stating that the DGP's mandate is clear and that the results of a March meeting could be incorporated into the DGP work plan. Canada recognized the importance of improved cooperation and felt that it was in the spirit of Riga to avoid duplication of work, although there was concern about the short timeframe to prepare. Romania saw cooperation as de-jure and therefore the paper should be supported and the process assessed after the initial meeting. Norway and Italy voiced their support for the meeting and Belgium felt the paper could continue provided the changes proposed by France were incorporated. The Chairman concluded that there was general support for the concept and that planning for a March meeting as proposed would continue. The paper will be revised with the comments received and circulated under the silence procedure. -------------- TRAINING, EXERCISES AND SEMINARS -------------- ¶6. (U) The Czech Republic co-chair presented the DGP delegates with the final version of the report on the 2006 DGP Seminar in Paris (DGP-WP(2006)0005-REV2). This version had only one change from the previous version, that being the movement of some information from a paragraph into a footnote. After a brief discussion of this change the delegates agreed to the final version which will be sent to the NAC PermReps for notation. ¶7. (C) The Czech co-chair led a discussion on the 2006 NAC WMD Seminar report. The current version incorporated delegates, comments from the last meeting of the Steering Committee. The Norwegian representative noted that there were too many presentations by experts which limited the discussion of the PermReps. He was also dissatisfied with the participation of the PermReps at the end of the Seminar. Numerous delegates commented on the recommendations section of the report, with the French and Belgian representatives favoring the deletion of this section (because the PermReps did not make any recommendations during the discussion),and the UK, Latvian, and Canadian representatives wishing to keep the recommendations (since these are the "Lessons Learned" from the seminar). The International Military Staff (IMS) stated that the military authorities are already engaged in some of the work referred to and that restating it again was unwarranted. The co-chair directed that all delegates put their comments in writing within the next seven days, and the co-chair representatives will incorporate the comments and circulate a new version of the report. -------------- CAPABILITIES -------------- ¶8. (C) LTC Rainer Burling from the IMS provided an informational briefing on the recent update to MC-511 (Bi-SC Concept for the Military Contribution to NATO,s Response to CBRN Threats, including the Proliferation of WMD and their Means of Delivery). This Concept for the defense of NATO troops against CBRN threats is in its 3rd version. Key changes in this version included: defining NATO's role in "cooperating" with outside agencies, versus "coordinating"; a discussion on CBRN IEDs; a reference to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and the inherent right to self-defense; and a discussion of deterrence by counter-strike. The IMS will be looking for Military Committee approval by the end of March ¶2007. ¶9. (C) LTC Theodoros Tsiolis, from Allied Command Operations (ACO) provided an update on the NATO Multinational CBRN Defense Battalion. The overall status of NATO Response Force (NRF) rotation eight is Fully Capable. He listed lead nations and shortfalls with the Battalion from NRF 08 to NRF 12 and said that they were expanding their database out to NRF 20. LTC Tsiolis also described the recent Defense Battalion deployment to Riga, Latvia in support of the 2006 NATO Summit as a "successful validation of MC-518 (Protection of a High-Visibility Event) which was fully integrated with Latvian intelligence, reconnaissance, and command and control." One shortfall that the employment uncovered was the need for standardization within various Headquarters for the use of NATO software. ACO will be looking into this problem and provide a recommended plan of action in the following months. -------------- INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH -------------- ¶10. (C) The Czech co-chair led a discussion on potential future consultations on CBRN defense with Ukraine. Six nations provided a draft paper on future consultations and suggested that the following three areas provide the focus of initial discussions: 1. Exchange of information on CBRN defense concepts and training standards for unit protection; ¶2. Exchange of information on CBRN protection of deployed units in NATO-led operations, including defense, surveillance, and infrastructure; and 3. Exchanges of personnel in training courses and training centers. Some delegates commented that an initial meeting on March 27 might not provide enough time to adequately prepare, but others felt it was necessary to begin this process. The Romanian representative noted that the consultations should be held in the NATO-Ukraine Committee (NUC) format. The co-chairs commented that the DGP was a more appropriate format for the meetings, and that a meeting of the DGP plus Ukraine was within the Charter of the NUC. The group agreed to a first meeting, the afternoon of March 27, on the margins of a DGP Plenary. -------------- FUTURE WORKPLAN -------------- ¶11. (U) The US co-chair led a discussion on the updated Rolling Agenda (DGP-D(2006)0003-ADD1). The major changes to the agenda are the addition of a Plenary in March, a consultation with Ukraine, and a meeting with other NATO organizations involved in CBRN activities. These meetings would be over the period of March 26-27. While the French delegation noted a conflict with another meeting scheduled for the same timeframe, no other delegations had a problem with the addition of the three meetings. -------------- DGP IN EAPC FORMAT -------------- ¶12. (U) Following the meeting of the DGP delegates, the co-chairs invited EAPC nations to join the DGP in EAPC format for discussions on national CBRN capabilities. Following introductory statements by the DGP co-chairs, which included a welcome to the newest EAPC members, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia, the meeting began with a briefing by WG Cmdr Andy Proudlove on the lessons learned from the December 20, 2006 Environmental and Industrial Hazards (EIH) workshop. The key lessons learned were that it is difficult to distinguish between an EIH incident and a CBRN attack, and that there have been a number of EIH incidents involving NATO forces over the past 20 years. The EIH discussion was followed by SCEPC's reprise of its earlier brief and seven briefings on national CBRN capabilities. Finland provided a briefing on its Biological Defense Capabilities; Poland discussed development of CBRN defense capabilities within their Armed Forces; Slovakia highlighted its CBRN Explosive Ordnance Disposal training; Georgia discussed its ideas on countering biological threats; Sweden discussed current trends in research associated with EIH policies; Azerbaijan presented its ideas on border security against WMD; and Bosnia-Herzegovina discussed the prevention of proliferation of WMD. The next steps will be to take a tiger team approach to generate ideas for a way ahead and future work between the DGP and EAPC nations. NULAND