NATO SENIOR DEFENSE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP)

S E C R E T USNATO 000092

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, ISN (GODBY),EUR/RPM (TIERSKY)
DEFENSE FOR OUSD POLICY (GREEN, STEIN, IANACONE, VEIT),
OUSD ACQUISITION TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS (HOPKINS, HENRY,
HENNEGAN, DELANEY),JOINT STAFF/J-5 (CDR SWAIN),DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (UNGER),EUCOM FOR CS (MAJ GEN CATTO)
AND ECJ5 (MAJ GEN REMKES)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2017
TAGS: MARR MCAP MNUC NATO PARM PREL
SUBJECT: NATO SENIOR DEFENSE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP)
PLENARY MEETING, 24 JAN 2007

Classified By: DDEFAD CLARENCE JUHL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B&D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. On 24 January 2007, Mr. Joseph Benkert, OSD
PDASD for Global Security Affairs, and Mr. Ivan Dvorak, Chief
of Defense Policy and Strategy Division, Czech Republic,
co-chaired the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP)
Plenary session. The DGP discussed policy guidance from the
Riga Summit, new initiatives for outreach with other NATO
bodies dealing with Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear (CBRN) issues, outreach with Ukraine on CBRN defense,
updates from the NATO International Staff (IS) on CBRN
capabilities, and a change to the Work Programme to add an
additional Plenary session in March 2007. During the
afternoon, delegates met in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council (EAPC) format to listen to national briefings from
Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Poland,
Slovakia, and Sweden on CBRN capabilities. End Summary.

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DGP POLICY GUIDANCE ) RIGA SUMMIT OUTCOMES
--------------


2. (U) Mr. Steve Sturm, NATO Defense Policy and Planning
Division (DPP),presented an informational briefing on
NATO,s Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG),which was
endorsed at the Riga Summit. The CPG,s goal is to provide
a planning framework and political direction for the next
10-15 years and to achieve increased coherence through an
effective management mechanism. Mr. Sturm highlighted the
fact that the CPG identifies Terrorism and the spread of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as specific threats to NATO
and that with an increased probability of the use of WMD
through asymmetric means, NATO must be prepared to deter
adversaries and defend its populations and troops against
terrorists, WMD attacks. He asked that the WMD Centre
(WMD-C) provide a briefing on implications of the CPG on the
DGP at the next Steering Group meeting, scheduled for March
1st.


3. (U) WG Cmdr Andy Proudlove, RAF, from the NATO WMD-C,
provided an informational briefing on the importance of
NATO,s CBRN defense capabilities to the Riga Summit agenda,
the theme of which was Threats, Risks and Challenges. The
capability to defend against CBRN hazards is of primary
importance and the Summit Communiqu urged nations to adapt
their forces accordingly. The Communiqu also addresses the
risks posed by the North Korean nuclear test and the
continuing stalemate with Iran, and reaffirms the major role
played by the various arms control regimes. At Riga, twelve
nations contributed to a CBRN exhibition that featured some
NATO capabilities such as the NATO Centers of Excellence
(COE),the CBRN Defense Battalion, Reach-back capability,
Render Safe policy, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal. In
response to a question on Reach-back, the International
Military Staff (IMS) explained that the Reach-back
requirement was under development and would be embedded in
the Concept of Operations for the CBRN Battalion.

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DGP AND NATO ACTIVITIES
--------------


4. (C) Mr. Carsten Fausboll, Director of Civil Emergency
Planning (CEP) within the NATO Operations Division, provided
an informational briefing on the results of the Senior Civil
Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) conference held in Oslo,
Norway in October 2006 on "Non-binding Guidelines and Minimum
Standards for Protection of Populations against CBRN Risks."
This briefing was given in an effort to strengthen
cooperation between SCEPC and the DGP. The aim of this
conference was to develop "non-binding" coordination
mechanisms for integrating the civil side of a nation,s
response to a CBRN attack. Mr. Fausboll admitted that one of
the issues slowing the coordination of civil and military
response to a CBRN event is the lack of coordination between
the European Union (EU) and NATO. In the future Mr. Fausboll

looks to strengthen SCEPC-DGP coordination at the 2007 North
Atlantic Council (NAC) WMD Seminar, the 2007 DGP Seminar, the
new initiative on &Improved cooperation with other NATO
bodies,8 and through coordinated responses on topics such as
reach-back, maritime interdiction, and disease surveillance.
Mr. Fausboll was asked by delegate members to provide this
briefing at the EAPC seminar in the afternoon, to which he
agreed. Some comments from nations: Norway voiced support
for the work of the SCEPC and stated that it should be
broadened to partners; Slovenia supported the exchanges of
briefs with the SCEPC; Romania called for strong support from
NATO to civil authorities, furthermore CEP is an area for
cooperation with the EU; France wanted cooperation with SCEPC
to be "invisible."


5. (C) The US co-chair led a discussion on the DGP paper on
"Improved Coordination with other NATO Bodies"
(DGP-N(2006)0014-REV2). The Chairman explained that the
intent of the paper was to improve cooperation and
coordination, and avoid duplication among the various NATO
bodies involved in CBRN defense. In an effort to start the
process, the DGP proposed to conduct an initial meeting of
the bodies and the NATO Military Authorities and to hold it
annually thereafter if it proves to be of value. The
Chairman characterized the meeting as an informal exchange
that might take place in the same time frame as the March DGP
plenary. France requested changes to the DGP paper, stressing
the meeting's informal status and recognizing that the role
of the DGP is to "guide" policy rather than to coordinate the
other groups, activities. They also proposed that the
workshop be conducted under the auspices of the International
Staff. The United Kingdom endorsed the paper stating that
the DGP's mandate is clear and that the results of a March
meeting could be incorporated into the DGP work plan. Canada
recognized the importance of improved cooperation and felt
that it was in the spirit of Riga to avoid duplication of
work, although there was concern about the short timeframe to
prepare. Romania saw cooperation as de-jure and therefore
the paper should be supported and the process assessed after
the initial meeting. Norway and Italy voiced their support
for the meeting and Belgium felt the paper could continue
provided the changes proposed by France were incorporated.
The Chairman concluded that there was general support for the
concept and that planning for a March meeting as proposed
would continue. The paper will be revised with the comments
received and circulated under the silence procedure.

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TRAINING, EXERCISES AND SEMINARS
--------------


6. (U) The Czech Republic co-chair presented the DGP
delegates with the final version of the report on the 2006
DGP Seminar in Paris (DGP-WP(2006)0005-REV2). This version
had only one change from the previous version, that being the
movement of some information from a paragraph into a
footnote. After a brief discussion of this change the
delegates agreed to the final version which will be sent to
the NAC PermReps for notation.


7. (C) The Czech co-chair led a discussion on the 2006 NAC
WMD Seminar report. The current version incorporated
delegates, comments from the last meeting of the Steering
Committee. The Norwegian representative noted that there
were too many presentations by experts which limited the
discussion of the PermReps. He was also dissatisfied with
the participation of the PermReps at the end of the Seminar.
Numerous delegates commented on the recommendations section
of the report, with the French and Belgian representatives
favoring the deletion of this section (because the PermReps
did not make any recommendations during the discussion),and
the UK, Latvian, and Canadian representatives wishing to keep
the recommendations (since these are the "Lessons Learned"
from the seminar). The International Military Staff (IMS)
stated that the military authorities are already engaged in
some of the work referred to and that restating it again was

unwarranted. The co-chair directed that all delegates put
their comments in writing within the next seven days, and the
co-chair representatives will incorporate the comments and
circulate a new version of the report.

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CAPABILITIES
--------------


8. (C) LTC Rainer Burling from the IMS provided an
informational briefing on the recent update to MC-511 (Bi-SC
Concept for the Military Contribution to NATO,s Response to
CBRN Threats, including the Proliferation of WMD and their
Means of Delivery). This Concept for the defense of NATO
troops against CBRN threats is in its 3rd version. Key
changes in this version included: defining NATO's role in
"cooperating" with outside agencies, versus "coordinating"; a
discussion on CBRN IEDs; a reference to Article 5 of the NATO
Treaty and the inherent right to self-defense; and a
discussion of deterrence by counter-strike. The IMS will be
looking for Military Committee approval by the end of March

2007.


9. (C) LTC Theodoros Tsiolis, from Allied Command Operations
(ACO) provided an update on the NATO Multinational CBRN
Defense Battalion. The overall status of NATO Response Force
(NRF) rotation eight is Fully Capable. He listed lead
nations and shortfalls with the Battalion from NRF 08 to NRF
12 and said that they were expanding their database out to
NRF 20. LTC Tsiolis also described the recent Defense
Battalion deployment to Riga, Latvia in support of the 2006
NATO Summit as a "successful validation of MC-518 (Protection
of a High-Visibility Event) which was fully integrated with
Latvian intelligence, reconnaissance, and command and
control." One shortfall that the employment uncovered was
the need for standardization within various Headquarters for
the use of NATO software. ACO will be looking into this
problem and provide a recommended plan of action in the
following months.

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INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH
--------------


10. (C) The Czech co-chair led a discussion on potential
future consultations on CBRN defense with Ukraine. Six
nations provided a draft paper on future consultations and
suggested that the following three areas provide the focus of
initial discussions: 1. Exchange of information on CBRN
defense concepts and training standards for unit protection;

2. Exchange of information on CBRN protection of deployed
units in NATO-led operations, including defense,
surveillance, and infrastructure; and 3. Exchanges of
personnel in training courses and training centers. Some
delegates commented that an initial meeting on March 27 might
not provide enough time to adequately prepare, but others
felt it was necessary to begin this process. The Romanian
representative noted that the consultations should be held in
the NATO-Ukraine Committee (NUC) format. The co-chairs
commented that the DGP was a more appropriate format for the
meetings, and that a meeting of the DGP plus Ukraine was
within the Charter of the NUC. The group agreed to a first
meeting, the afternoon of March 27, on the margins of a DGP
Plenary.

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FUTURE WORKPLAN
--------------


11. (U) The US co-chair led a discussion on the updated
Rolling Agenda (DGP-D(2006)0003-ADD1). The major changes to
the agenda are the addition of a Plenary in March, a
consultation with Ukraine, and a meeting with other NATO
organizations involved in CBRN activities. These meetings
would be over the period of March 26-27. While the French
delegation noted a conflict with another meeting scheduled

for the same timeframe, no other delegations had a problem
with the addition of the three meetings.

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DGP IN EAPC FORMAT
--------------

12. (U) Following the meeting of the DGP delegates, the
co-chairs invited EAPC nations to join the DGP in EAPC format
for discussions on national CBRN capabilities. Following
introductory statements by the DGP co-chairs, which included
a welcome to the newest EAPC members, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Montenegro, and Serbia, the meeting began with a briefing by
WG Cmdr Andy Proudlove on the lessons learned from the
December 20, 2006 Environmental and Industrial Hazards (EIH)
workshop. The key lessons learned were that it is difficult
to distinguish between an EIH incident and a CBRN attack, and
that there have been a number of EIH incidents involving NATO
forces over the past 20 years. The EIH discussion was
followed by SCEPC's reprise of its earlier brief and seven
briefings on national CBRN capabilities. Finland provided a
briefing on its Biological Defense Capabilities; Poland
discussed development of CBRN defense capabilities within
their Armed Forces; Slovakia highlighted its CBRN Explosive
Ordnance Disposal training; Georgia discussed its ideas on
countering biological threats; Sweden discussed current
trends in research associated with EIH policies; Azerbaijan
presented its ideas on border security against WMD; and
Bosnia-Herzegovina discussed the prevention of proliferation
of WMD. The next steps will be to take a tiger team approach
to generate ideas for a way ahead and future work between the
DGP and EAPC nations.
NULAND