NATO SENIOR DEFENSE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP)

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000625 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR T, EUR/PRA, EUR/RPM, AND AC/SEA DEFENSE FOR GSA (BENKERT, GROSS) E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2017 TAGS: MARR MCAP MNUC NATO PARM PREL SUBJECT: NATO SENIOR DEFENSE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP) PLENARY MEETING, NOV 14, 2007, AND NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC) WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) SEMINAR, NOV 15, 2007 Classified By: D/DEFAD CLARENCE JUHL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The NATO Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) met in plenary session at NATO HQ on November 14. The committee was co-chaired by Mr. Joseph Benkert (PDASD/OSD/GSA) of the United States and Mr. Cezary Lusinski (MOD) of Poland. Associated with this month's Plenary, the DGP also sponsored the annual North Atlantic Council (NAC) Seminar on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) on November 15. END SUMMARY. -------------- DGP PLENARY -------------- Policy Guidance: ¶2. (C) During the DGP Plenary, the committee discussed the recently approved policy document on Fostering Host Nation and Partners, CBRN Defense Capabilities. The Chair noted that the paper had been sent to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) under silence to expire on November 23rd (document has since passed silence). The document explores ways that NATO could increase outreach to partners, potential host nations and international organizations with the objective of improving defenses against CBRN threats to NATO deployed forces. ¶3. (C) PDASD Benkert then opened discussion on a food-for-thought paper on potential DGP deliverables to the Bucharest Summit by recalling conclusions reached during a working lunch that immediately preceded the Plenary. During the lunch, which was attended by senior DGP representatives from many of the 26 nations, discussion focused on proposals identified in the paper, such as the need for an overarching NATO CBRN Defense Strategy, possibilities for increased outreach to partners on CBRN defense, accelerating non-proliferation initiatives such as development of a NATO WMD Maritime Interdiction capability, and ways that the DGP can communicate to the Heads of State and Government (HOSG) the many Alliance CBRN defense accomplishments since Prague and Riga. During the Plenary, the WMD Center also highlighted guidance from the Secretary General's Operational Roadmap for the Bucharest Summit and provided an historical overview of DGP contributions to past summits. Canada saw merit in the creation of a NATO CBRN Defense Strategy as it would legitimize DGP work and could provide a framework to enhance outreach activities with partners. Concerning the proposal for a maritime interdiction capability, Canada requested clarification regarding what would be presented to HOSG at Riga, stating that announcing that NATO would create this capability at Bucharest might be premature. The &deliverable8 for Bucharest would not be such an announcement, but rather a notation that since maritime interdiction of WMD was identified in the Bucharest Summit Roadmap as a potential means for combating terrorism, the DGP is accelerating the implementation of recommendations from the recently approved policy paper on this topic, which calls for the development of proposals for NAC consideration. Spain and the Czech Republic voiced their support for a strategy document and found the questions of international outreach and NATO-EU cooperation worthy of further discussion. France added that a defense strategy document could be beneficial and, noted that while strengthening of NATO-EU cooperation might be acceptable in principle, the process is premature and needs further discussion. The UK wished to see Bucharest as an opportunity to advertise NATO CBRN capabilities to an external audience. The Chair requested formal comments from nations on the paper by 30 November. A revised food-for-thought paper will include a draft framework for an overall CBRN defense strategy, possible wording for the communiqu, and suggested avenues to communicate DGP accomplishments. DGP and NATO Activities: ¶4. (C) The Chair recalled that cooperation with other NATO bodies was a continuing item on the DGP,s agenda and that all bodies engaged in NATO CBRN defense activities would gain by exchanging information and promoting joint work. At a meeting of Assistant Secretaries General in May there was agreement to conduct an ad hoc workshop on scenarios, training and exercises, and international outreach. A day-long workshop will be hosted by the WMD Center on the margins of the February DGP Plenary. The UK welcomed this initiative and observed that we are, in fact, getting progressively better at coordinating our efforts with other NATO bodies. Training, Exercises and Seminars: ¶5. (C) Poland announced that the annual DGP seminar would take place in Torun, Poland, June 16-20, 2008, focusing on the theme &CBRN Defense Transformation.8 The medieval town of Torun will provide an interesting venue and is located close to a military CBRN defense facility that will feature in the agenda. Detailed administrative arrangements will be available at the February DGP meeting. ¶6. (C) The WMD Center reviewed final preparations for the annual NAC WMD Seminar scheduled for the next day. The WMD Center held a preparatory session for DGP points-of-contact the previous week, which was well attended. As the committee reviewed the seminar questions for the ambassadors, Greece asked about the relationship of the capability shortfalls, specifically stand-off detection and the disease surveillance system, with NATO common funding. The consensus of the response was that there was no direct linkage but that this was a legitimate subject for discussion. ¶7. (C) The NATO Crisis Management Exercise (CMX) for 2008 will take place April 16-22. The DGP has a standing interest in ensuring that CBRN events are featured in the scenario. The WMD Center briefed the committee on the general themes and arrangements for the exercise. CMX08 will occur in the context of phases two and three of the NATO Crises Response System and will involve interaction with other organizations such as the UN. The Final Planning Conference will take place in January but planning status and relevant documents can be found at any time on the SHAPE/J8/CMX08 web site. It was agreed to move the date of the April Steering Committee meeting to the 14th to avoid conflict with the CMX dates. Capabilities: ¶8. (C) Under the Capabilities section of the DGP agenda, the committee was updated by SHAPE on the Combined Joint CBRN Task Force. The briefing covered the recently revised Concept of Operations, which includes changes in terminology; incorporates new capabilities such as a CBRN Reachback Coordination Centre, Intelligence Fusion and Render Safe; and permits participation by Partners, if approved by the NAC. SHAPE also discussed force generation for the battalion and recalled the SACEUR assessment of the NRF situation in July and the resulting proposal for a NRF Graduated Option. An assessment of the fills for the Battalion during NRF cycles nine and ten was provided. Partner nations were encouraged to participate by making offers at the spring force generation conference. Turkey reminded the committee that acceptance of any partner participation was subject to NAC approval. ¶9. (C) The Committee of Medical Advisors (COMEDS) updated the DGP on recent activity on disease surveillance. Four nations have agreed to provide support to a Multinational Medical Analysis Center to be co-located with a German medical facility in Munich. This analysis center will form one element of the surveillance pillar in the COMEDS, Medical Information & Communication System (MEDICS) and will provide near-real time analysis on unusual aggregations of symptoms to the operational commander. Working relationships with the U.S. CDC, EU, WHO and civil organizations in host nations will be a vital part of maintaining a comprehensive medical picture. The actions in the field will consist of electronically forwarding to Munich data on symptoms in a standardized format. Turkey asked about the status of the center and was advised that it is a multilateral arrangement and not a formal NATO structure. Portugal asked how the relations with external organizations was going to be pursued and was informed that those issues were on the agenda of the Joint Medical Committee (JMC). France saw the Munich capability as an example of pragmatic cooperation and encouraged others to consider what they might do. International Outreach: ¶10. (C) Poland and the Czech Republic recently hosted a tiger team to consider the format and content of a DGP workshop with Ukraine on CBRN defense policy. The workshop is a result of approved DGP policy guidance on cooperation with Ukraine, which calls for greater cooperation, including the exchange of information on CBRN defense concepts. The objective of the workshop is to exchange briefings between select Alliance members and Ukraine on their respective national CBRN policies, structures and planning. The target Ukrainian audience is civilian policy makers from Kiev. Ukraine informed the co-Chairs during side meetings that because the Ministry of Defense is undergoing considerable transformation, including in the area of CBRN Defense, it might be difficult to assemble the appropriate Ukrainian civilians to attend the workshop. The Co-Chairs opined that the workshop could provide Ukraine ideas for consideration as it proceeds with its transformation in this area. The committee will wait for a response to the invitation letter for the January 16-17 workshop with modest expectations. ¶11. (C) The WMD Center announced that planning was underway for the second DGP meeting in EAPC format, scheduled for the same day as the February 27 DGP plenary. EAPC nations will also be invited, along with other selected partners, to participate in an international tabletop exercise on CBRN Defense. The TTX is a tasking from the recently approved policy paper on &Fostering Host Nation and Partners, CBRN Defense Capabilities.8 The WMD Center will utilize some materials from the NAC WMD Seminar as a scene-setting scenario for the TTX. Any Other Business: ¶12. (C) The co-chairs closed the Plenary proceedings with an announcement of future meetings, including: a DGP Steering Committee on January 16; the DGP-Ukraine workshop on 16-17 January; an ad hoc NATO bodies meeting on 26 February; and a DGP Plenary and meeting with the EAPC on February 27. -------------- NAC WMD SEMINAR -------------- ¶13. (C) The sixth annual NAC WMD Seminar was chaired by the Secretary General on 15 November 2007, and focused on CBRN SIPDIS Defense Transformation. The seminar sought to weave together various strands of on-going work within the DGP, among them: accelerating the development of a robust NATO disease surveillance system (DSS) by fostering links with partners and other organizations, which will improve overall public health; developing partner and host nation CBRN defense capabilities; improving outreach and coordination among NATO and civilian organizations on CBRN defense; improving cooperation among NATO bodies; and developing an overall NATO strategy on CBRN defense. ¶14. (C) The seminar opened with a briefing by Mr. Ted Whiteside, Director of the NATO WMD Centre, on CBRN threats to NATO deployed forces, capabilities that NATO has already developed to counter those threats, and current "transformation8 initiatives to enhance capabilities. Seminar discussion was then facilitated by two videos featuring a biological threat to NATO deployed forces and local populations, one considering NATO's response with current capabilities and the other portraying the use of potential enhanced capabilities. The videos elicited much discussion on what additional work must done to improve NATO,s CBRN defense posture. ¶15. (C) The Polish PermRep noted that the gap between WMD and traditional weapons is narrowing, as perpetrators utilize weapons such as IEDs to deliver toxins and pathogens. He also raised the question of support for common funding or a merging of national funding to address challenges. The Czech PermRep highlighted the need for continued transformation, including shifting NATO,s approach from a focus on force protection to include non-proliferation, fighting terrorism and consequence management; he also noted the need to transform by creating smaller mobile units for consequence management outside of NATO,s borders and making wider use of national facilities such as the CBRN Center of Excellence or the Czech Republic's BSL-4 lab and medical facility. The UK PermRep raised the importance of greater cooperation among military and civilian sides of NATO (SCEPC and the military committees). U.S. Ambassador Nuland noted the absence of a single integrated plan and stated that endorsement by Heads of State and Government of an overarching CBRN defense strategy should be pursued at the Bucharest or Berlin Summits. The Spanish PermRep added to this point by noting that there should be short, medium and long-term objectives identified in such a strategy. The Bulgarian PermRep noted the need for threat assessment and also suggested that NATO consider common funding to develop certain capabilities. The Italian PermRep opined that action must be taken quickly to improve civil-military cooperation and coordination among NATO bodies. Other comments included the need to better define what types of outreach we can employ with partners, potential host nations, other international organizations and civilian authorities. A report of lessons learned will be distributed to nations for agreement and submission to the Council. NULAND