NATO SENIOR DEFENSE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP)

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000624 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR T, EUR/PRA, EUR/RPM, AND AC/SEA DEFENSE FOR GSA (BENKERT, GROSS) E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2017 TAGS: MARR MCAP MNUC NATO PARM PREL SUBJECT: NATO SENIOR DEFENSE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP) STEERING COMMITTEE MEETINGS, SEP 14, 2007, AND OCT 11, 2007 Classified By: D/DEFAD CLARENCE JUHL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) The NATO Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) Steering Committee met on September 14th 2007 and October 11th 2007 at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Both meetings were co-chaired by senior representatives of the United States and of Poland. ¶2. (C) A paper entitled &Maritime Interdiction Aimed at the Prevention of Trafficking by Sea of WMD8 was approved by the DGP in July and was endorsed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) under the silence procedure on September 26. The paper describes the strategic context, extant political guidance, and general legal considerations for such operations and recommends that the NAC task appropriate NATO Bodies to explore the issue further and develop proposals for its consideration. The Chair announced that consultations would be conducted on the process of managing the various tasks contained in the paper. Allied Command Transformation (ACT) will provide a briefing on maritime interdiction detection capabilities early in the new year. ¶3. (C) The Co-chairs updated the DGP on the status of the policy document entitled &Fostering Host-Nation and Partners, CBRN Defense Capabilities.8 Inputs provided by nations during the summer months, primarily concerning the status of partner and contact countries and the term &host nation,8 were incorporated into the second draft of the paper. Comments received from Turkey and Belgium immediately prior to the meeting on October 11 would be incorporated into the paper by the International Staff (IS) who would re-issue the paper under silence to expire on October 19 (NOTE: Action has since been completed and paper has been approved by the DGP under the silence procedure). ¶4. (C) The next NATO summit will take place in BucQest in April 2008 and presents an ideal opportunity to highlight the many projects underway in the DGP. The WMD Centre briefed the committee on the form and content of DGP visibility at previous summits which consisted of the seminal contributions to the Washington and Prague summits, an activity display at Riga and important wording in the communiqus of others. Romania offered some ideas on topics that could be considered for the Bucharest Summit and highlighted the understandable importance their country attaches to DGP recognition. Without other inputs, the Chair asked the WMD Centre to prepare a working paper by the end of October which might serve to stimulate discussion on the issue at the November DGP plenary meeting and again encouraged nations to contribute ideas and suggestions to the WMDC beforehand (NOTE: Action has since been completed and paper was issued on November 5). ¶5. (C) The 2007 DGP Seminar took place in Prague, July 10-13, as the closing event of the Czech DGP Co-chairmanship. The seminar included demonstrations of a terrorist attack on a high-visibility event and a dirty-bomb attack on a military base followed by a static display of Czech defense equipment and capabilities. The seminar report, which highlights the twenty-six presentations given to over a hundred attendees, was issued by the WMD Centre for review and comment on September 11. The Chair announced that comments had been received from three nations. The comments would be incorporated into a new version to be redistributed under a short silence period ending October 19 (NOTE: Action has since been completed and report has been approved by the DGP under the silence procedure.) Greece asked that the term &agreed framework8 not be used in the report. They went on to say that the NATO-EU Capabilities Group has no authority and is not acting on an agreed basis. France recommended the phrase "concrete proposals" might be a good solution. ¶6. (C) The date for the 2007 NAC WMD Seminar was confirmed as the morning of November 15. The WMD Centre briefed the DGP on the foci of past seminars and on the primary objective for this year, which was to provide an opportunity for ambassadors to discuss operational issues and the political impact of such current initiatives as host-nation support, cooperation with other NATO bodies and interaction with the media. The background and details of each section of the scenario were explained and the questions that would hopefully prompt discussion were reviewed. The Chair pointed out the need to align the conduct and outcome of the seminar with opportunities provided by the Bucharest summit. Norway reminded the group that it was important to foster discussion at the political level and felt that some of the issues in the past had been too technical. Norway,s concern about the political aspect of the discussion was echoed by France and Germany, who went on to say that we might have discussion at the seminar which surfaces in Bucharest as well. Germany also indicated a desire to focus more on the future view to spark conversation on &transformation.8 Canada felt that the issue of threat qualification was missing and wanted it addressed. The Head of the WMD Centre observed that the military authorities would essentially be absent because of another commitment on that day and that this could be an opportunity to forego laborious military concerns and focus directly at the political level. The WMD Centre stated that it planned to conduct a POCs briefing on the seminar about one week before the event in order to provide them details with which to spin-up their ambassadors. ¶7. (C) SHAPE updated the committee on the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) of the newly renamed Combined Joint CBRN Defense Task Force. The Military Committee (MC) approved the first CONOPS in 2004. With the experience of four rotations and the lessons-learned from High-Visibility Events, it became apparent that the CONOPS needed to be revised and a review workshop was conducted in March 2006 in Sonthofen. The tasking for military implementation of the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) in October 2006 provided additional impetus and a new CONOPS was approved by the MC in July 2007. Key changes in the new version permit the participation in the Task Force of NATO partner nations, incorporates procedures for CBRN Reach-Back and Intelligence Fusion, supports the full range of tasks outlined in the Render Safe concept and enlarges the scope of support to non-NRF activities. The way-ahead for the CONOPS, being lead by ACT, include a Task Force re-enforcement policy which would permit it to be augmented when needed by nations with special capabilities. Several nations expressed their satisfaction with the direction of the new CONOPS and their wish to remain abreast of its implementation. The NMA commented that NRF force generation shortfalls will present challenges to the implementation of the CONOPS and that, since they are likely to continue, they are of concern to the DGP. Another such briefing will be offered for the February 2008 DGP meeting in EAPC format. ¶8. (C) The WMD Centre provided a briefing to the committee on the NATO Strategic Intelligence Estimate, including MC161, 165 and 166. These documents provide NATO-agreed statements on the risks and threats facing the Alliance, are important elements of the NATO Intel Warning System and crisis management process, and provide levels of concern from routine through abnormal and significant to extreme. The documents provide statements on countries of concern and the collective terrorist threat facing NATO. ¶9. (C) The Medical Branch of the International Military Staff (IMS) provided a presentation on NATO Medical Intelligence. Until recently there was no medical intelligence in the information provided to the operational commander. In 2003 the Strategic Commands established a MEDINT course at Oberammergau and added staff positions at Allied Command Operations (ACO). The focus is now on how MEDINT will support the NATO Indicators and Warning System (NIWS) and how to improve sharing of information over the Battlefield Information, Collection and Evaluation System (BICES). ¶10. (C) As part of the DGP,s continuing efforts to monitor capabilities of the CBRN Defense Battalion, the USAF Homeland Medical Plans section of the Office of Air Force Surgeon General provided a presentation on their Joint Biological Agent Identification Detection System (JBAIDS). This system is a joint-services capability to identify bacterial and viral agents using real-time PCR technology. It is normally housed in a BSL-2 testing trailer and is deployed at Military Treatment Facilities worldwide. A BioVeris M1M system is available as well for identifying toxins. ¶11. (C) The COMEDs representative provided an update on the NATO Disease Surveillance System (DSS). He reported on the June 2007 seminar in Halifax during which procedures for civil-military interface in disease surveillance were developed. Following that, in Warsaw in September, plans were approved for implementation of a new entity ) the Multinational Medical Analysis Center. Five nations will contribute expertise to the center to be co-located with national facilities in Munich and other nations may subsequently elect to participate as well. The operating procedures will be developed to focus on the medical analysis cycle: the collection of data, analysis, interpretation and dissemination of results to operational commanders. The overall timeline for development of the NATO DSS remains unchanged since the last report: we have an interim capability now, advanced capability is expected in 2008 with full capability in the 2010-2012 window. Portugal wished to know to what extent Medical Intelligence (MEDINT) would play a role in the Munich center and was informed by the briefer that its function was to focus on the appearance of symptoms and their interpretation and that MEDINT would play a supporting role. ¶12. (C) The WMD Centre reported on the June 12 and October 8 meetings of the NATO-EU Capabilities Group. At the former, the IS gave a presentation on NATO CBRN activities. At the latter, the EU reciprocated with a presentation on bio-detection programs and those for countering IEDs. By all reports, both events were rather perfunctory and provoked little discussion of substance other than several interventions expressing the wish to avoid duplication of effort. Following the WMD Centre report, Canada stated that the DGP should focus on what they called &incoherence of activities8 between the two organizations, i.e., nations being asked different things by each. The Czech Republic highlighted the importance of these discussions and proposed that the EU and NATO determine in which ways their respective military operations differ from one another and which CBRN capabilities may be common to both. As a next step, a single-issue NATO-EU meeting, reinforced by experts, could be held to exchange information on CBRN defense and force protection more broadly with a view toward identifying areas of potential duplication. ¶13. (C) The WMD Center reviewed the results of the last joint meeting with Ukraine at which it was agreed to exchange information on concepts, CBRN protection, and NATO standards. Furthermore, steps would be taken to increase their participation in NATO activities where appropriate and to assist them with language training. The Czech Republic is leading the effort to improve the exchange of CBRN information with the Ukraine and provided the DGP with a report on its planning for a January 16, 2008, workshop with them. The topic will be CBRN Policy and several nations have stepped forward to offer briefings. The committee decided to establish a tiger-team of interested nations to work the issue. The preliminary agenda for the workshop will be sent to the Ukraine by the Czech Republic. Romania asked if the workshop is to be supported by experts and was informed that nations could decide who to send but the desired participants from the Ukraine were the senior civil policy makers and nations should plan accordingly. Hungary thanked the Czech Republic for their very capable leadership on this project and offered to assist in any way possible. Bulgaria affirmed their un-reserved support for dialog with the Ukraine and stated their intention to participate. ¶14. (C) The document entitled &Fostering Host-Nation and Partners, CBRN Defense Capabilities8 tasks the WMD Centre to host a tabletop exercise of interested partners to discuss the threat of WMD and how best to leverage their defense capabilities in a combined operating environment. The WMD Centre briefed the group on its initial thoughts for this exercise. The format for such an event might consist of a threat briefing, some scene-setting activities involving a bio-attack, presentations by nations on what their response to such an event might be, followed by a general discussion. The NAC WMD seminar in November may provide some ideas or direction. The envisioned date is April 2008, notwithstanding the Bucharest Summit and CMX 08 which take place in the same month. Although the objective of the event is clear, its characterization as an exercise is not firm yet and the identification of the "international partners" has been carefully avoided. NULAND