ALLIES SUPPORT U.S. MD OUTREACH TO RUSSIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000579 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2017 TAGS: NATO PREL MARR PARM IR RS SUBJECT: ALLIES SUPPORT U.S. MD OUTREACH TO RUSSIA Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Richard G. Olson. Reasons: 1.4 (b) an d (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: NATO Allies warmly endorsed recent U.S. Missile Defense (MD) proposals offered to Russia at the Oct. 17 reinforced North Atlantic Council (NAC) briefing offered by USD(P) Eric Edelman, A/S Daniel Fried and MDA. Dir. LTGEN Trey Obering. Allies further praised the U.S. effort to create a positive tone in its strategic dialogue (MD/CFE/post-START/INF) with Moscow and urged the U.S. specifically to continue seeking ways to anchor Russia in a cooperative stance on MD. Six Allies (Netherlands, Norway, Luxembourg, Romania, France and Germany) singled out the U.S. proposals of a phased activation of the European system as particularly constructive. Allies looked forward to further NATO-Russia Council dialogue with Russia and hoped NRC transparency would play a role in keeping Moscow positively engaged in the face of possible domestic temptations for Russian leaders to grandstand. Portugal reported that a Russian MFA official yesterday told EU embassies in Moscow that U.S. proposals had been deemed constructive and were lending a positive tone to the U.S.-Russian dialogue. Looking forward to MD's status by the April 2008 NATO Bucharest summit, many Allies welcomed LTGEN Obering's ideas on how the U.S. and NATO systems could be gradually integrated into one system in a series of program development stages. Allies in southeastern Europe most vocally keyed on the indivisibility of Allied security and the need for Allied solidarity, calling for further NATO-U.S. system integration endorsement by Bucharest. Meanwhile, Germany, Norway, Luxembourg, Belgium and France signaled the most cautious approach to the way ahead for NATO MD. The UK, Denmark and Italy were silent. End Summary. -------------- RECAP OF U.S. MD PROPOSALS IN MOSCOW -------------- ¶2. (C) U/S Edelman opened the briefing by noting that the U.S. and Russia had held three rounds of expert talks since the Kennebunkport summit, culminating in the October 11-12 two plus two ministerial meetings. These expert talks would continue and another two plus two ministerial meeting was planned in another six months. He laid out the U.S. approach last week of offering Moscow (septel) far-reaching options for: 1) joint development of a regional MD architecture; 2) a way ahead on the post-START framework; 3) a joint appeal for adding parties to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and 4) flexible ways to adapt the parallel actions plan for the Adapted CFE Treaty's implementation to shift a contentious strategic dialogue from a net negative to a net positive which could help address additional difficult issues, like Kosovo (note: and Fried later elaborated to include general energy security engagement and specific Caspian Basin energy issues. End Note.),later on this year and early in 2008. On MD, he outlined a regional architecture which embraced both Russian-owned and leased radars, the U.S. European system and a NATO system with linked command and control systems and significant sensor transparency. He said that offers to allow Russia transparency to sites in the U.S. would include liaison officers and data exchange. This also could possibly include Czech and Polish sites, should Prague and Warsaw allow. He also said that the U.S. had underscored that, while it would proceed apace with negotiating and building the Czech and Polish elements of the U.S. European system, it would be open to exploring a time-phased activation of those sites based on a dialogue with Moscow about the nature and pace of the development of the Iranian missile program (illustratively mentioned as possibly being built around Iranian missile flight tests, space launch vehicle tests and missile stand tests). ¶3. (C) On other strategic dialogue issues, he added that the U.S. had offered to consider extension of the Moscow Treaty deployable warhead limits of 1,700 to 2,200 with a legally binding set of transparency measures provided old-style START counting guidelines and other outdated START frameworks could be foregone. On INF the U.S. embraced the Russian idea to call on other nations in the United Nations First Committee to sign onto the INF limits. Finally, A/S Fried noted that he would later explain U.S. ideas on how to be further flexible on the parallel action plan for CFE in another Allied consultation meeting later on October 17 (septel). ¶4. (C) A/S Fried noted that the Russians at the start of the two-plus-two Ministerial seem to have been planning to emerge from the talks declaring no progress and blaming the U.S., perhaps to paint an adversarial image of the U.S. for Russian domestic consumption. But, unexpectedly facing forthcoming U.S. ideas, gradually (and in some cases reluctantly) came to see the constructive and potentially valuable nature of the U.S proposals. This led to contrasts between the publicly negative (and almost aggressive) characterization of the talks' nature and the constructive technical, intelligence and later political exchanges in private discussions. There appear to be differences between Russian officials and institutions. It is not clear whether Russia will take up the U.S. offers, he noted, but Moscow did not parallel its outwardly adversarial stance in the private exchanges. ¶5. (C) LTGEN Obering reported that Iranian missile development was proceeding apace, with liquid-fueled Shahab 3 IRBM's with a 1,300 KM reach in deployment followed by ongoing development of similar-ranged, solid-fueled BM-25 MRBM systems which would be adaptable to ranges out to 3,800 KM with a 500 KG warhead. He offered Allies an assessment of the Qabala radar in Azerbaijan based on site visits and later technical exchanges by MDA's MGEN O'Reilly which resulted in the view that the Qabala radar was more powerful and useful than first assessed, but still limited by its design parameters to use only as an early warning and cueing radar, albeit one with longer reach and power than first thought. He said information on the under construction Russian radar at Armavir was restricted and would not be provided until "political agreement" to cooperate is achieved. Still, it, too, was assessed to be only an early warning site, although its capabilities would likely vary from the Qabala facility. He noted that, with several recent successful tests, U.S. MD systems (naming Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD),Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense and the U.S. Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) mid-course interceptor system,) had enjoyed 30 of 38 successful hit-to-kill intercepts since 2001. He then elaborated a series of phased development steps NATO and the U.S. could take to gradually integrate their respective systems and achieve developmental efficiencies. -------------- ALLIES APPLAUD U.S. APPROACH, TRANSPARENCY -------------- ¶6. (C) In Q&A, Allies further praised the U.S. effort to create a positive tone in its strategic dialogue with Moscow and urged the U.S. specifically to continue seeking ways to anchor Russia in a cooperative stance on MD. Six Allies (Netherlands, Norway, Luxembourg, France, Romania and Germany) singled out the U.S. proposal for a phased activation of the European system as particularly constructive. Romania added that such an approach forced Russia to focus on the growing Iranian threat and to engage seriously on a joint approach. ¶7. (C) Allies looked forward to further NATO-Russia Council dialogue with Russia and hoped NRC transparency would play a role in keeping Moscow positively engaged in the face of possible domestic temptations for Russian leaders to grandstand. Germany said it was disappointed that Russia had not utilized the potential to move beyond political development to joint cooperation in NRC channels, specifically lamenting the recent Russian indefinite postponement of a long-planned NRC Theater Missile Defense (TMD) exercise to be held in Germany. (U/S Edelman concurred in reply.) Portugal reported that Russian MFA North America Office Director Igor Neverov on October 16 told EU embassies in Moscow that U.S. proposals had been deemed constructive and were lending a positive tone to the U.S.-Russian dialogue. Neverov reportedly added that Presidents Bush and Putin saw a chance for developing a lasting legacy in developing a positive strategic dialogue which could play an important role in marking the upcoming two hundredth anniversary of U.S.-Russian diplomatic ties. -------------- SEVERAL ALLIES ASSOCIATE MD AND ARMS CONTROL -------------- ¶8. (C) Norway and Luxembourg said that they wanted the U.S. to stay in engaged in convincing Russia to cooperate on a joint MD approach to prevent an offensive arms spiral between the two strategic powers. Belgium wondered whether joining the NATO and U.S. systems would disturb the positive momentum of the recent U.S. talks in Moscow. While stopping short of an explicit linkage, Germany said that "should MD positively progress," it would be best if it were to do so based on "positive momentum within arms control frameworks." Germany also said it would like to hear more details on transparency measures like the liaison team arrangements reported in the press. U/S Edelman replied that these arrangements were still conceptual, but were on the table for elaboration if Russia takes them up. -------------- THREAT DISCUSSION CONTINUES -------------- ¶9. (C) NATO SYG Jaap de Hoop Scheffer noted that the Allied threat assessment was agreed on October 9. Several Allies raised threat issues later in the NAC. Turkey said threats other than Iran (meaning at least Syria) need to be taken into account, with Spain pointing out that non-MD threats (WMD and otherwise) also need to be taken into account as Allies develop new capabilities. Canada asked whether the U.S. had made progress in narrowing the gap with Russia on threat perceptions, observing Russian threat assessments had been inconsistent and therefore less credible. In response, U/S Edelman said the U.S. had concerns about the potential of a Syrian missile program, but it was not as far advanced as that of Iran. He also said that the U.S. considers a wide-ranging homeland defense strategy necessary to address non-MD threats. On MD threat assessments, U/S Edelman noted that, while differences certainly still exist, even President Putin acknowledged a growing Iranian missile program whose reach was extending farther into Russia and Europe. -------------- ALLIES EXPLORE INTEGRATED U.S., NATO SYSTEMS -------------- ¶10. (C) The Netherlands said it saw U.S. mention of an "integrated" U.S.-NATO system as a step forward with integrated rather than linked command and control as an important difference. They further asked whether a common set of rules of engagement was contemplated. LTGEN Obering stated only that the U.S. would give Allies visibility into the rules of engagement. Germany asked who would set the criteria to consider in the joint assessment of the development of the Iranian missile program and wondered who would participate in deciding that milestones had been reached. Bulgaria also asked whether Russia was interested in participating in addressing the short and medium-range gaps intended for coverage in the NATO system. -------------- MIXED VIEWS ON MD AT BUCHAREST -------------- ¶11. (C) Looking forward to MD's status by the April 2008 NATO Bucharest summit, Allies welcomed LTGEN Obering's ideas on how the U.S. and NATO systems could be gradually integrated into one system in a series of program development stages. The Czech Republic and Poland said that they supported the U.S. European system's development and were proceeding with their respective bilateral negotiations with the U.S. at an expeditious pace. Canada observed that the U.S. proposals offered NATO a great cost saving as it tried to develop territorial MD. Allies in southeastern Europe most vocally keyed on the indivisibility of Allied security and the need for Allied solidarity, calling for further NATO-U.S. system integration endorsement by Bucharest. Turkey and the Netherlands also supported a U.S.-NATO combined system. Turkey was alone in raising continuing debris questions. Meanwhile, Germany, Norway, Luxembourg, Belgium and France signaled the most cautious approach to the way ahead for NATO MD. The UK, Denmark and Italy were silent. ¶12. (U) This cable has been cleared by USD Edelman, A/S Fried, and LTG Obering. OLSON