DUTCH BRIEF US, UK, AUSTRALIA ON URUZGAN FORCE GEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000562 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2017 TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF NL AS UK NO FR LO SUBJECT: DUTCH BRIEF US, UK, AUSTRALIA ON URUZGAN FORCE GEN EFFORTS REF: A. THE HAGUE 1856 AND PREVIOUS B. SOFIA 1218 Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. We found Netherlands Ambassador Herman Schaper unfocused and gloomy on October 16 in briefing key RC-S allies on Uruzgan backfill requests. Dutch engagement with its top three target nations has yielded some results, but not nearly enough. Slovakia is expected shortly to confirm the government's intent to send approximately 50 soldiers. According to Schaper, Norway's Defense Minister and CHOD would like to send a quick reaction force (QRF) company to help the main Dutch battle group, but Norwegian coalition politics will make a government decision tough to reach (frankly we find this prospect wildly unrealistic; Norwegian F-16s or OMLTs would strike us as a better "ask"). The Danes reportedly rejected the request to send F-16s, noting they are already heavily engaged in Afghanistan and others should do more. France continues to discuss options with the Netherlands, but has shown little interest in sending trainers or other assets to the south. Meanwhile, bilateral efforts have left the Australians "cautiously optimistic" that Singapore will provide a field hospital, one of the seven "modules" that the Dutch are pulling out of Uruzgan and want Allies to fill (reftel A). Ambassador Nuland pushed back on the Dutch to consider keeping their OMLTs in Uruzgan if Allies came through with other forms of assistance, and asked the Australians to think hard about OMLTs, too. The Dutch Council of Ministers will likely open discussion on the Uruzgan mandate renewal on November 9, immediately following the NATO force generation conference November 6-8. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Naming many NATO Allies, as well as Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Sweden, Ambassador Schaper briefed Ambassador Nuland, Australian Ambassador Thomas, and a United Kingdom Defense Advisor on largely unsuccessful Dutch efforts to obtain backfill from Allies in Uruzgan province prior to the Dutch Parliament's debate on the renewal of the Dutch ISAF mandate past its August 2008 expiration. The mood was not positive in The Hague, he stated. He noted a 50-soldier Slovak contribution for force protection could be in Uruzgan relatively shortly following an Slovak government decision that was expected imminently. Dutch-Norwegian mil-mil contacts on the possibility of a QRF company (the preferred Dutch option),an OMLT, or force protection elements had been positive, Schaper said, but Norwegian coalition politics would greatly complicate the decision, which was expected in early November. FM Store was the key, Schaper and Ambassador Nuland agreed. The Dutch were still working on France at the highest political levels, Schaper noted, but had been frustrated thus far at French unwillingness to consider training or other deployments to the south. As a bare minimum, The Netherlands is trying to convince France to send two of its three previously announced OMLTs to the south, but France has insisted they will be deployed to Kabul. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Schaper also mentioned limited, continuing contacts with the Hungarians and Czechs, but was not optimistic. He said the Dutch perceived a political block on support in the Bulgarian decision-making process, but that PM Balkenende would speak with his Bulgarian counterpart. Denmark had responded negatively to Dutch requests for F-16s, noting their current commitment in Helmand, but Ambassadors Nuland and Schaper agreed Norway could also be a good target for F-16s. ¶4. (C) Australian Ambassador to NATO Alan Thomas told the group that Singapore is interested in providing a Role 2 medical facility, one of the modules that the Netherlands is seeking from Allies and partners, and could make a decision by the end of the month. The Australians were cautiously optimistic, he said, but noted that Singapore has a history of backing out of decisions at the last minute on issues of force deployments to hostile areas. Detailing other Australian bilateral efforts, Thomas said that the Malaysians had told Australia they were only interested in financial contributions, while the Indonesians rejected military assistance, stating they would only consider participating in a "UN force." ¶5. (C) Ambassador Nuland asked the Dutch DCM (who took over the meeting in progress when Ambassador Schaper had to leave) to speculate on where the Dutch parliament would come down based on a best-case scenario of the options that had been discussed: Slovaks come to Uruzgan, Singapore sends a medical facility, and Norway commits "something." The DCM stressed his personal view was that gestures were more important to the Parliament than a line-by-line review of the seven modules the Dutch were currently seeking. Political optics were the key, he stated, and MOD van Middelkoop's case would be helped if he were able to tell Parliament he had found 200 ground troops to help Dutch forces in Uruzgan. Ambassador Nuland pushed back on the Dutch to consider keeping their OMLTs in Uruzgan if Allies came through with other forms of assistance, and asked the Australians to think hard about OMLTs, too. ¶6. (C) COMMENT. The two key near-term events at NATO will be the October 24-25 Noordwijk ministerial, and the November 6-8 force generation conference. It will be important to avoid a public foodfight at Noordwijk, where the spotlight will shine even more brightly on the Netherlands as hosts. The Dutch at NATO have been appreciative thus far of U.S. support efforts, but seem to be having difficulty closing deals with Allies we've teed up. It will be important to press the Dutch in the wake of OSD DASD Cagan's trip through Europe, and to focus our efforts on winning solid pledges from Allies prior to the November force generation conference. The conference will be the make or break event prior to the formal discussion process within the Dutch government that will begin with the November 9 Council of Ministers meeting in The Hague. Minimize Considered. NULAND