GEORGIAN MINISTER BAKRADZE REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000539

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIAN MINISTER BAKRADZE REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO
PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF FROZEN CONFLICTS

REF: A. STATE 137294

B. EUR PRESS GUIDANCE 09/28/07

C. GEORGIAN NON-PAPER E-MAILED TO EUR/RPM

Classified By: DCM Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Georgian Conflict Resolution Minister Bakradze led an
interagency delegation to meet with Allies in a
Georgian-initiated discussion of its disputed territories.
Bakradze's presentation, his forthright responses to tough
questions, and Georgia's associated non-paper hit all the
right notes -- reassuring Allies that Georgia remains
committed to negotiated settlements with its separatist
regions, that it is not seeking to draw NATO into its
disputes with Russia, and that the prosecution of government
critics indicted for corruption will follow due process.
Bakradze's performance quelled some of the unease felt at
NATO over Georgia' recent announcements of a military buildup
and the arrest of high-profile political opponents. End
Summary.

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BAKRADZE PLAYS WELL TO A FULL HOUSE
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2. (C) Georgian State Secretary for Conflict Resolution Davit
Bakradze updated NATO's Senior Political Committee Reinforced
with Defense advisers (SPCR) on the disputed territories in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and fielded questions on a
broader range of issues. Interventions by all but four
Allied delegations, which filled 49 of 52 front-row seats,
demonstrated a high level of interest in Bakradze's
presentation. Georgian Foreign and Defense Ministry
representatives accompanied Bakradze but did not participate
in the discussion.


3. (C) Bakradze hammered home his main message: Georgia's
commitment to the peaceful resolution of the frozen
conflicts. He addressed the situations in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia in some detail, outlining their respective
challenges and proposed solutions (REF C). His emphasis on
maintaining a "minimum-risk approach, without artificial
deadlines" was music to the ears of skeptical Allies, whose
doubts about Georgia's intentions had been raised by
continuing violent incidents in the separatist regions and by
Tbilisi's unveiling of plans to build up its military forces.


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TOUGH QUESTIONS FROM ALLIES
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4. (C) Notwithstanding Bakradze's positive message, he faced
pre-coordinated tough questioning from NATO's "friends of
Georgia" (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania -- joined by the UK and U.S.) and
regular skeptics (led by the Netherlands, France, Germany).
DCM deployed Ref A guidance, stressing the need for continued
restraint in the face of provocations from Russia and
separatist forces, while reiterating USG support for
Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations and its
sovereignty and territorial integrity.


5. (C) In a unanimous chorus, every Allied intervention
reinforced the message that the Georgian government must not
resort to force to reunify the nation. Several pointed to
the leading roles of the OSCE and UN in addressing frozen
conflicts. All the "friends" save Poland and Lithuania
specifically re-affirmed support for MAP for Georgia. Turkey
was unusually forthright in support of Georgia's territorial
integrity. Latvia (by prior arrangement with the other
"friends") asked the toughest questions about Georgia's
intentions in standing-up a Fifth Brigade and arresting
Okruashvili. On rule of law issues, Hungary, Lithuania, and
the Netherlands also asked about the circumstances behind
Okruashvili's arrest.

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NON-USE OF FORCE THE "CORE" OF GEORGIA'S POLICY

USNATO 00000539 002 OF 002


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6. (C) Bakradze did not duck any questions. On the
Okruashvili arrest, he explained that a corruption
investigation had been conducted since May, and that the
former Minister had raised his political profile just as it
became clear that he would be implicated. Finally,
Okraushvili sharpened his attacks on Saakashvili as a
"preemptive" maneuver to avoid arrest. However, the current
democratic government would not follow the practice of
previous regimes that might drop an investigation to quell
opposition to the Government. Bakradze insisted that the
case against Okruashvili was solid, and would be proven to a
high standard, since the government knew it would likely be
referred to Strasbourg. While the government did not enjoy
the spectacle of other opposition parties taking up the case,
Bakradze promised that there would be no repercussions
against politicians merely for playing politics.


7. (C) On the decision to stand up a Fifth Brigade, Bakradze
urged Allies to put their questions to the Georgian Defense
experts who would meet with them in early November. However,
he assured them in his own capacity that the purpose of the
Fifth Brigade "has nothing to do with conflict resolution"
and that "the non-use of force is the core of our policy."
Addressing suggestions that the government was responding to
strong domestic pressure to resolve separatist conflicts by
other means, he cited a recent public opinion poll which
instead showed 90% support for peaceful settlement of those
issues. He reiterated Georgia's moves to engage Abkhazian
and South Ossetian populations in direct dialogue (REF C).
Hitting directly at some Allies' nervousness that Georgia
would seek to involve NATO in a conflict with Russia, he
asserted that Georgia "has no place for Article 5 in our
conflict resolution strategy." He said that Tbilisi is ready
to negotiate "any issue with Moscow except our sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and freedom of choice" to join
international organizations (including NATO).
NULAND