GEORGIAN MINISTER BAKRADZE REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000539 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO GG SUBJECT: GEORGIAN MINISTER BAKRADZE REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF FROZEN CONFLICTS REF: A. STATE 137294 ¶B. EUR PRESS GUIDANCE 09/28/07 ¶C. GEORGIAN NON-PAPER E-MAILED TO EUR/RPM Classified By: DCM Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Georgian Conflict Resolution Minister Bakradze led an interagency delegation to meet with Allies in a Georgian-initiated discussion of its disputed territories. Bakradze's presentation, his forthright responses to tough questions, and Georgia's associated non-paper hit all the right notes -- reassuring Allies that Georgia remains committed to negotiated settlements with its separatist regions, that it is not seeking to draw NATO into its disputes with Russia, and that the prosecution of government critics indicted for corruption will follow due process. Bakradze's performance quelled some of the unease felt at NATO over Georgia' recent announcements of a military buildup and the arrest of high-profile political opponents. End Summary. -------------- BAKRADZE PLAYS WELL TO A FULL HOUSE -------------- ¶2. (C) Georgian State Secretary for Conflict Resolution Davit Bakradze updated NATO's Senior Political Committee Reinforced with Defense advisers (SPCR) on the disputed territories in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and fielded questions on a broader range of issues. Interventions by all but four Allied delegations, which filled 49 of 52 front-row seats, demonstrated a high level of interest in Bakradze's presentation. Georgian Foreign and Defense Ministry representatives accompanied Bakradze but did not participate in the discussion. ¶3. (C) Bakradze hammered home his main message: Georgia's commitment to the peaceful resolution of the frozen conflicts. He addressed the situations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in some detail, outlining their respective challenges and proposed solutions (REF C). His emphasis on maintaining a "minimum-risk approach, without artificial deadlines" was music to the ears of skeptical Allies, whose doubts about Georgia's intentions had been raised by continuing violent incidents in the separatist regions and by Tbilisi's unveiling of plans to build up its military forces. -------------- TOUGH QUESTIONS FROM ALLIES -------------- �0A;¶4. (C) Notwithstanding Bakradze's positive message, he faced pre-coordinated tough questioning from NATO's "friends of Georgia" (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania -- joined by the UK and U.S.) and regular skeptics (led by the Netherlands, France, Germany). DCM deployed Ref A guidance, stressing the need for continued restraint in the face of provocations from Russia and separatist forces, while reiterating USG support for Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations and its sovereignty and territorial integrity. ¶5. (C) In a unanimous chorus, every Allied intervention reinforced the message that the Georgian government must not resort to force to reunify the nation. Several pointed to the leading roles of the OSCE and UN in addressing frozen conflicts. All the "friends" save Poland and Lithuania specifically re-affirmed support for MAP for Georgia. Turkey was unusually forthright in support of Georgia's territorial integrity. Latvia (by prior arrangement with the other "friends") asked the toughest questions about Georgia's intentions in standing-up a Fifth Brigade and arresting Okruashvili. On rule of law issues, Hungary, Lithuania, and the Netherlands also asked about the circumstances behind Okruashvili's arrest. -------------- -- NON-USE OF FORCE THE "CORE" OF GEORGIA'S POLICY USNATO 00000539 002 OF 002 -------------- -- ¶6. (C) Bakradze did not duck any questions. On the Okruashvili arrest, he explained that a corruption investigation had been conducted since May, and that the former Minister had raised his political profile just as it became clear that he would be implicated. Finally, Okraushvili sharpened his attacks on Saakashvili as a "preemptive" maneuver to avoid arrest. However, the current democratic government would not follow the practice of previous regimes that might drop an investigation to quell opposition to the Government. Bakradze insisted that the case against Okruashvili was solid, and would be proven to a high standard, since the government knew it would likely be referred to Strasbourg. While the government did not enjoy the spectacle of other opposition parties taking up the case, Bakradze promised that there would be no repercussions against politicians merely for playing politics. ¶7. (C) On the decision to stand up a Fifth Brigade, Bakradze urged Allies to put their questions to the Georgian Defense experts who would meet with them in early November. However, he assured them in his own capacity that the purpose of the Fifth Brigade "has nothing to do with conflict resolution" and that "the non-use of force is the core of our policy." Addressing suggestions that the government was responding to strong domestic pressure to resolve separatist conflicts by other means, he cited a recent public opinion poll which instead showed 90% support for peaceful settlement of those issues. He reiterated Georgia's moves to engage Abkhazian and South Ossetian populations in direct dialogue (REF C). Hitting directly at some Allies' nervousness that Georgia would seek to involve NATO in a conflict with Russia, he asserted that Georgia "has no place for Article 5 in our conflict resolution strategy." He said that Tbilisi is ready to negotiate "any issue with Moscow except our sovereignty, territorial integrity, and freedom of choice" to join international organizations (including NATO). NULAND