SUBJECT: HLTF: NATO ALLIES ENDORSE U.S. PARALLEL

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000521

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM KCFE NATO RS OSCE
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: HLTF: NATO ALLIES ENDORSE U.S. PARALLEL
ACTIONS PROPOSAL

REF: A. A) STATE 126948 HLTF GUIDANCE

B. B) PARIS 3808 C) VILNIUS 0629 D) MEMORANDUM
CJ(2007)0658 DATED 12 SEPTEMBER 2007

Classified By: Classified by USNATO DCM Richard Olson for reasons 1.4 (
b and d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. At the September 13 HLTF, Allies endorsed the
U.S. &Parallel Actions Plan8 as the basis to end the
current impasse with Russia on the fulfillment of the
remaining Istanbul commitments and ratification of the
Adapted CFE Treaty. U.S. HLTF Representative Karin L. Look
also successfully convinced Allies to begin development of a
matrix of ratification plans, in order to flesh out the three
ratification tranches envisioned in the U.S. parallel actions
plan. Discussion of the parallel actions plan included a
discussion of how NATO should manage its advancement during
Germany,s upcoming CFE seminar: Germany appeared to have a
unique vision of the seminar as promoting new ideas; most
other Allies wanted to use the seminar to push the U.S.
approach.


2. The NATO Legal Advisor delivered a technical legal
analysis of Russia,s notification to suspend observance of
its CFE Treaty obligations, focusing on its July 14
statement, and the application of customary international law
as reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
He concluded that the Russian ¬ice of suspension8 does
not fulfill the CFE Treaty requirements for a withdrawal but
his conclusion did not address any other key issues. Look
also recalled the need to proceed with planning for the
U.S.-proposed Seminar on Implementation of the Adapted CFE
Treaty which is envisioned for Spring 2008. The next HLTF
meeting is tentatively scheduled for October 19 with a
possibility of moving that meeting to October 11 if
necessary. END SUMMARY.


Allies React to U.S. &Parallel Actions8 Concept
--------------


3. (C) Prior to the HLTF in Brussels, the United States,
Germany, United Kingdom and France (key Allies) met in Paris
on September 12 to review the agenda for the HLTF and
strategize on how to move forward at the HLTF regarding the
U.S. parallel actions plan. Look provided readout of
U.S.-Russian consultations the previous day based closely on
ref B. Discussion of how to manage the Russians and maintain
a unified Alliance position occupied much of the meeting.
Welcoming remarks by Philippe Carre, Director of the Bureau
of Strategic Affairs for Security and Disarmament at the MFA,
sounded a dissonant note as Carre returned to familiar themes
regarding the need to plan for post-CFE arms control when the
U.S. plan failed. This set of ideas was not echoed at any
other point in the meeting.


4. (C) France (Grand) and Germany (Biontino) stated frankly
that they would not support an effort, should the U.S. pursue
it, to convert the U.S. parallel actions plan into a formal
NATO proposal. Biontino was explicit: if the U.S. sought to
get Allied agreement on its text, there would be problems
because Germany did not agree with our interpretation of the
Istanbul commitments regarding Moldova. Grand argued that a
general NATO endorsement of the parallel actions concept at
the HLTF would leave the U.S. free to negotiate details with
Russia. While somewhat taken aback by the strength of French
and German concern on this point (which leaves Germany free
to maneuver, as well as the U.S.),the U.S. and UK accepted
the Franco-German approach since we had not intended to
transform the concept into a formal NATO paper, but rather we
planned to seek the clear support of all Allies at the HLTF
meeting. UK rep Ford, Grand, and Look stressed the need for
a unified message to Russia, particularly at the
German-hosted CFE seminar, October 1-2, in support of the
U.S. concept. (COMMENT: While Biontino, during this meeting,
seemed to concede the need for a unified message, including
at the upcoming seminar, he did not echo that sentiment
during the HLTF. END COMMENT). Look advised that at the
HLTF she would seek Allies, input to a ratification matrix
to flesh out this key detail of the U.S. concept, since A/S
Fried was likely to address CFE in his meeting with Kislyak
and we will need details for the &ratification side8 of the
ledger.


5. (C) In the HLTF on the 13th, Allies unanimously (except

Denmark, which did not speak on any topic) endorsed the U.S.
¶llel actions8 plan as a basis for ending the current
impasse with Russia on fulfillment of remaining Istanbul
Commitments and ratification by NATO Allies of the Adapted
CFE Treaty. Conceptual support appears rock solid ) several
Allies noted that the U.S. proposal is the only game in town
that has a hope of saving CFE. That said, comments from
Allies touched on the following points:

-- A number of Allies voiced concerns about specific aspects
of its implementation.

-- Several Allies underscored the need to consider how
NATO-Russia agreement to move on the parallel actions plan
could be recorded in a way that elicited a politically
binding commitment from Russia (some Allies suggested a
NATO-Russia written statement/document, while others stated
they could be satisfied with something less formal).

-- Another widely shared concern was how to protect against
Russian backtracking once NATO Allies had started down a
ratification path.

-- Many also noted the importance of Russia withdrawing its
threat to suspend. Turkey added that it would also be
important for Russia to retract its views on eliminating the
flank.

-- All three Baltic states endorsed the parallel actions
plan while stressing the need for Alliance consultations on
accession to CFE by the Baltic states prior to any discussion
with Russia. As we heard in Vilnius at the end of August (ref
C) the Baltic States are reluctant to begin informal
consultations with Russia on accession to Adapted CFE as a
near-term political gesture, arguing that those talks could
lead them to make commitments (unspecified) that would
ultimately undermine their position in actual accession
negotiations. Several Allies, prepped by the U.S. team in
advance, underscored that in any discussion with Russia the
Baltics could count on total NATO support. HLTF chairman Bob
Simmons said he would seek IMS input on military
considerations. (COMMENT: A proposed schedule for
intra-Alliance discussions will be set out by the I.S. in the
next weeks. END COMMENT).


6. (C) The overall positive Allied response was facilitated
by U.S. Rep Look,s reports of the Fried-Kislyak discussion
of CFE in Paris. The fact that the U.S.-Russia exchange had
focused on the specific ideas in the paper, including
concrete ideas for next steps; had not dissolved into
recriminations about &linkage8 between Istanbul and Adapted
CFE ratification; and had resulted in plans for further
meetings, all had the effect of galvanizing Allies into
action. She noted that we should use all opportunities to
promote the plan, including the upcoming German-sponsored
seminar.


7. (C) France (Grand) not only supported the U.S. plan, but
endorsed the approach as essential, urged the HLTF to confirm
support for it and complete the ratification matrix. Grand
also noted the importance of using the Berlin Seminar to push
the U.S. plan. Norway strongly echoed France,s comments and
support.


8. (C) Germany (Biontino) while praising the U.S. plan,
noted that &flexible and open discussion is what we need8
and said that Germany favored informal meetings. Biontino
then described expectations in Berlin as a &platform for
open-ended informal discussions.8 He also stated that
Allies should use Berlin to discuss amongst ourselves what
should be our &bottom lines8 with respect to getting
Istanbul fulfilled and the A/CFE into force, clearly implying
that the U.S. plan was not Germany,s bottom line. Biontino
continued, regarding mechanics for the meeting, to say that
Germany (Groening) would listen to reps introductory
statements at the seminar and then he would decide what
issues would be discussed in the small groups. Biontino said
that Germany,s view is that the Alliance positions coming
from the CFE Extraordinary Conference in June 2007, were
&rough8 and &need to be refined,8 and that the seminar is
the place to do that. Biontino concluded his remarks with a
point Germany had gathered from its discussion with Russian
DFM Kislyak that President Putin had made the decision to
suspend CFE Treaty implementation and that he would have to
be consulted on any change to that action.




9. (C) France,Canada, Norway, the UK, Turkey, Romania, and
othrs all underscored that the U.S. plan is a good offr to
Russia and urged Allies to use the German sminar to send a
unified message urging Russia to engage on the basis of it.
Canada countered Germany,s call for open-ended discussion by
pointing out that Allies actually had very little room for
maneuver if we were to remain true to the basic principle
that Istanbul must be fulfilled as the basis for entry into
force of the Adapted Treaty.


10. (C) The UK rep eloquently echoed this theme, making
clear that NATO must, in promoting the parallel actions plan,
also &hold the line8 on the core principles that keep us
in the Treaty; host nation consent and fulfilling Istanbul
commitments. The UK also emphasized the need to retain
freedom of action on the legal issue, including by
registering that Allies do not consider Russia,s
justification for suspension as adequate and the requirement
stated in the Vienna Convention to object within ninety days
of the notification. (Comment: The UK had planned to raise
the idea of a statement on this point at the HLTF, but had
run into a buzz-saw at the key Allies meeting in Paris,
partly because Germany did not share its legal analysis, but
partly also because of the content of a detailed UK draft
statement, which envisaged all NATO Allies that are parties
to the Vienna Convention to individually deliver essentially
identical objections to the depositary. In response to UK
rep Ford, U.S. rep Look made clear that the U.S. would
support a simple message that NATO did not consider Russia,s
stated justification for suspension to be adequate, but
warned in the key Allies meeting that the UK draft text
looked problematic on several fronts. END COMMENT).

11. (C) Romania (Micula),with the benefit of a 3-hour
bilateral dinner with Look and EUR/RPM DepDir Jennifer
Laurendeau the previous evening, welcomed the U.S. plan but
stressed that &filling in the blanks8 would be essential,
including to allow Romania to sell the plan of multi-stage
ratification process to its Parliament. Preserving the
appearance of unity could be difficult when some Allies had
ratified, and others not. (COMMENT: This is a fair question
that Allies have puzzled over for weeks. END COMMENT). It
would also be important to guard against accusations of bad
faith if Parliaments did not respond on the schedule
envisioned by the executive branch.

12. (C) Not business as usual. Several countries, most
vigorously France, also noted that it will NOT be business as
usual after December 12, if Russia suspends implementation of
the CFE Treaty. Grand was a key promoter of using the Berlin
Seminar to press Russia to move forward based on the U.S.
plan, and maintaining Alliance unity behind it. His call
also to use the seminar to send Russia a clear message that
suspension would not come without cost found wide support --
but not with Germany. U.S. rep Look, following all Allies,
remarks regarding the U.S. plan, thanked them for their
support for the plan, noting that it had been built on ideas
many had put forward over the past months. She emphasized
that pursuit of this plan will need to be a collective
endeavor: unity of purpose will be key as will using every
opportunity to press for its success.
Developing a Ratification Matrix
--------------

13. (C) Partly to facilitate the next U.S.-Russia discussion
of CFE (envisioned for September 21 in Washington) Allies, at
U.S. urging began to develop a matrix of ratification plans,
fleshing out the three ratification tranches envisioned in
the U.S. plan. Several Allies asked to be placed in the
first tranche: Norway, Italy, Hungary, Netherlands, Belgium,
and Luxembourg. Of these, only Hungary, Norway, and Bulgaria
envision that they could complete the process in 3-4 months;
others want to begin the ratification process early, not to
send a political signal, but because their national
procedures are so slow. The Czech Republic asked to be
placed in the second tranche; the U.S, UK, Romania, and
Turkey envision themselves in the final tranche. The UK
noted that it has completed its requirements for ratification
and has only to place the Treaty before Parliament for 21
days, and prepare the instruments of ratification for
signature prior to depositing with the Netherlands.

-- Many Allies were not ready to position themselves in a
tranche, but this will be elaborated once the I.S. circulates
a draft matrix early during the week of September 17. The
Czech rep suggested that &the big Allies8 should place

themselves in the final tranche, because they were better
placed to sustain any political pressure from Russia.


14. (C) Hesitations and Concerns: It was conspicuous that
no Ally criticized the U.S. for unilateral action on the
parallel action plan. All welcomed the U.S. initiative;
several (Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway)
said it resembled ideas they had advanced in the past. The
one sour note came from Germany, which argued that if the
U.S. plan had been advanced last year, it would have
succeeded; but now the Russian position had changed, and
prospects for CFE were much dimmer. Behind the enthusiasm
lie a number of specific concerns that the U.S. will have to
address in the next weeks.

German Seminar and French Follow-On Meeting
--------------


15. (C) In an ironic twist, it was not U.S.-Russia
negotiations that generated most Allied anxiety at this
meeting, but concerns, including by the U.S. rep, about
German plans for their upcoming seminar in Berlin. What we
heard from Germany and others amounts to the following:

-- Host Fritz Groening plans to hold several heads of
delegation-only events in order to &brainstorm.8 Most
Allies view this as an effort to press Allies to step away
from established NATO positions.

-- The Germans also envision a number of small group
discussions, which several Allies told us they view as an
effort to divide the delegations. Among these are the
little known key Allies (UK, FR, U.S., and GE)-and likely key
Allies-plus-Russia events; and small group discussions on a
variety of topics. Romania has been asked to chair the
exchange on &accession by new states parties8; Norway has
been asked to chair the session on Istanbul Commitments.
Both chairs are worried about what will happen elsewhere
while they are occupied.

-- An overwhelming number of Allies ) notably not Germany -
used the tour de table on the U.S. parallel action plan to
suggest Allies use the Berlin Seminar to press Russia to sign
up to the U.S. plan, not divert from NATO positions. All
except Germany underscored the need for a unified NATO
message at the event.


16. (C) The French Rep (Grand) tried to assuage Allied
concerns, with a moving speech urging Allies to use every
opportunity in the coming weeks to promote the U.S. plan with
Russia; to convince Russia that there would be consequences
if it went ahead with suspension in December; and to reassure
Turkey and Norway that Allies would unanimously oppose any
review of Adapted Treaty provisions prior to entry into force.


I.S. Legal Analysis of Russia,s Suspension Plans
--------------


17. (C) NATO,s Legal Advisor B. DeVidts gave a highly
technical presentation (ref D) concerning the Russian notice
of suspension and the application of customary international
law as reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. The presentation did not, unfortunately, address
specific questions raised regarding the validity of the
Russian notice to suspend implementation of the CFE Treaty.
Although ambiguous, his analysis could be understood to
refute the Russian theory that suspension was a &lesser
included right8 under the Treaty withdrawal provision by
stating that the ¬ice of suspension8 does not fulfill
the requirements provided in the CFE Treaty for a withdrawal.


-- Asked by several Allies whether NATO,s July statement in
response to the Russian notification of intention to suspend
would serve as a sufficient objection to the adequacy of the
Russian justification and the legitimacy of the Russian legal
analysis, DeVidts did not give a clear answer, saying only
that he would reflect on the question and provide a response.


Any Other Business
--------------


18. (C) France stated that it plans to hold a follow on CFE

seminar on November 5-6 if the seminar in Berlin proves
useful. The next HLTF is currently planned for October 19,
with the possibility of moving that meeting to October 11 if
the U.S. wants additional formal Allied input before the 2 2
event.


19. (C) U.S. Rep Look, noting that the agenda included the
food for thought paper on a &Seminar on Implementation of
the Adapted CFE Treaty,8 reminded Allies of the importance
of this workshop next Spring, which should go forward
provided Russia does not suspend implementation of the Treaty
in December.
NULAND