SACEUR, COMISAF BRIEF ISAF PROGRESS AND CLEARLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000502 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2017 TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF SUBJECT: SACEUR, COMISAF BRIEF ISAF PROGRESS AND CLEARLY POINT TO WAY AHEAD TO ALLIES, ISAF PARTNERS Classified By: CDA Richard G. Olson, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In separate sessions first with the NAC in ISAF format (which includes the 11 non-NATO troop contributors) and then at 26 with the NAC, COMISAF General Dan McNeill described ISAF successes on the battlefield, and challenges in building an effective police force and strengthening Afghan governance, particularly on the national level. He urged Allies and partners to fill shortfalls in meeting NATO's commitment to field embedded Afghan National Army trainers (OMLTs). He urged nations to approve an initiative that would enable ISAF to use NATO common funding to contract cargo transport rotary wing (along with limited fixed wing) lift, thus alleviating a critical helicopter shortfall in theater; the initiative would also pave the way for contract lift to eventually move Afghan forces during independent operations and ease the strain on NATO rotary wing assets. General McNeill reiterated to the NAC his personal commitment and that of ISAF to avoid civilian casualties, sharing video clips and personal anecdotes to underscore the point. He also endorsed the idea of an "international gorilla," a pre-eminent statesman working outside of Afghanistan to marshal international resources and coordinate the efforts of capitals. He described his intentions for Afghan security forces to play a more prominent role in operations in the south and east in 2008. On counternarcotics, he noted the negative effect of poppy on all levels of society, and his intent for ISAF to aggressively implement its OPLAN-mandated tasks, but was clear that ISAF does not engage in eradication. SACEUR, in introducing General McNeill to the NAC, praised him for leading ISAF with "determination and vigor," and for taking the fight to the enemy at every opportunity. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- ISAF Winning the Fight, but Police, Governance, Training Lag -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Praising the soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen of ISAF, General McNeill told a meeting of the NAC in ISAF format that ISAF had achieved continued success on the battlefield, demonstrating superiority in every engagement with the enemy, who was "vexed," but not yet defeated. ISAF efforts against Taliban command and control structures had produced good results with the elimination of several Taliban commanders over the past months. He stated that ISAF's main effort would shift back to RC-South from RC-East later this month, and that in 2008, he hoped and intended to get more Afghan National Army (ANA) forces in the south and the east, and to get them out in front leading operations. General McNeill commended the reconstruction efforts of the 25 ISAF PRTs, noting almost $4 billion of projects throughout Afghanistan. He pointed, however, to the role of the poppy trade in undermining development work and acknowledged that not all Afghans had seen benefits due to the localized nature of many projects. He described the pervasive negative effects of corruption throughout all levels of government in Afghanistan, observing that progress had been achieved to varying degrees of success on all levels of the government, but that he was "somewhat pessimistic" on progress thus far on the national level. ¶3. (C) General McNeill said dysfunctionality and corruption in the Afghan Ministry of Interior is particularly troubling. A capable indigenous security force is key to any successful counterinsurgency effort, he argued, and the lack of progress in developing Afghan police gives reason for great concern. He challenged Allies to do more on police training, noting the tremendous gap in progress compared to training of the ANA, and the continuing complaints of Afghans that their police prey on, rather than protect them. General McNeill stated that embedded trainers in the ANA had been able to imbue Afghan soldiers with a sense of service and duty, creating an institution respected by the Afghan populace; he asserted the same would be necessary with the police. In response to a question from the Netherlands, he also noted that the international community should not close off the possibility of exploring appropriate, well-developed security arrangements on a local level, leveraging the key, traditional role oftribal elders and tribal justice USNATO 00000502 002 OF 004 throughout Afghan culture and history. He named Paktya and Khost as provinces where this particularly might work. ¶4. (C) Building on the training theme with the NAC in ISAF format, COMISAF made a strong push for NATO to meet its pledge to relieve U.S. embedded ANA trainers with NATO Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs). Nations were not doing well thus far, he stated. He reminded Ambassadors that each Allied OMLT enabled a U.S. team to shift its focus over to the Afghan police. He spoke well of ANA performance in the field, but explained how embedded NATO forces enhance that performance, assuring Afghan troops that they will have access to NATO's medevac and close air support if they find themselves in a large engagement. General McNeill underlined that ISAF had taken steps to work with each nation to devise customized solutions that would help them provide OMLTs. Even if a nation sought to place caveats on its OMLTs, ISAF would work to find middle ground with that nation to enable an appropriate deployment. Ambassador Nuland supported COMISAF during the follow-on discussion period, challenging nations to double their training efforts by year's end, and to double efforts again by the April NATO Summit in Bucharest. -------------- -------------- Helicopters: Key to Our Ops Now, and ANA Ops in the Future -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) COMISAF appealed ("I beg of you") to NAC and ISAF contributor Ambassadors, to favorably consider a SHAPE/ISAF initiative that would enable ISAF to contract helicopter lift support, using NATO common funding. Describing the crucial importance to the ISAF mission of rotary wing lift, he assured PermReps that the contracted helicopters - which would not carry equipment need to meet ISAF requirements to safely carry troops - would be used for cargo transport, thus taking stress and pressure off the extremely limited number of tactical helos in ISAF's inventory, freeing them for troop movements. Looking ahead, he also suggested that contracted tactical lift would also be essential to move Afghan forces around the battlefield in the future, thus reducing pressure on both ISAF soldiers and rotary wing assets. Ambassador Nuland reiterated to PermReps during the follow-on discussion that the U.S. helicopter bridging force in RC-South must leave on January 31, 2008, and urged Allies to support this contract initiative. -------------- -------------- Civilian Casualties: Taking the Utmost Care to Avoid -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Addressing the intra-Alliance tension and strains within governments over the past several weeks that had resulted from civilian casualties, COMISAF stressed in the meeting with the NAC the utmost care that he personally, and each ISAF soldier, takes to avoid civilian casualties. He acknowledged that ISAF has regrettably caused some civilian casualties, but stated the numbers were nowhere near those alleged in press reporting; Taliban information operations - unlike ISAF's - are not constrained by the need to be factual, he reminded Ambassadors. He noted that his recent Tactical Directive on reducing civilian casualties had resonated well with President Karzai, and that ISAF continues to seek the perfect solution. He also noted that OEF rapidly had adopted these guidelines to synchronize operational efforts as much as possible and to build transparency with Afghans and their government about international forces' operational intent. Amplifying his message, he showed Ambassadors various overhead imagery video taken during engagements, including shots of fighters disguising themselves with burkas and taking cover behind mud walls of civilian home compounds, plus ISAF helicopter gunships tracking enemy movements away from populated areas until they reached areas where ISAF forces could fire on them without risk to the civilian population. -------------- Discussion with Ambassadors -------------- USNATO 00000502 003 OF 004 ¶7. (C) During the follow-on discussion periods after each NAC session, Ambassadors focused most on international coordination, the readiness of Afghan forces to assume greater responsibility for security, and counternarcotics. Ambassador Nuland emphasized ANA training, helicopters, and the need for ISAF to improve its strategic communications. In the NAC (at 26) session, she also asked what more ISAF could do on narcotics, COMISAF's views on U.S. "white" SOF interaction with RC-South and RC-West, and his thoughts on Iran and Russia. ¶8. (C) The Norwegian and Dutch ambassadors asked General McNeill and NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan Daan Everts, also present, for their views on international cooperation in Afghanistan. Bulgaria, Canada, France, Spain, and Sweden inquired about the status of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); the Canadian Ambassador noted the problem with ANSF inability to hold ground after ISAF has cleared it; the French Ambassador underlined his nation's long-standing commitment to training and followed up on his Defense Minister's idea of turning security responsibilities for at least one province over to the ANSF; while the Spanish ambassador asked for an overall assessment of ANSF prowess. The UK, supported by Ambassador Nuland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden sought COMISAF's views on how to enhance ISAF's support to Afghan counternarcotics efforts within the framework of ISAF's existing OPLAN. The UK ambassador detailed some counternarcotics activities of the UK's Task Force Helmand, such as providing security for CN shuras and logistics for the Afghan CN Police, transmitting radio broadcasts, and helping Afghans to plan interdiction operations. ¶9. (C) In other interventions, the German ambassador pointed to his government's Afghan Concept Paper, and underscored German intentions to increase development aid in 2008, enhance civilian reconstruction activities, remain militarily engaged in RC-North, strengthen cross-border cooperation with Pakistan, and bolster support for building and training ANSF, both army and police. Romania and Turkey stressed the importance of regional cooperation, particularly with Pakistan. The Czech Republic asked how to better integrate PRTs into ISAF's overall effort, stating PRTs differ too much in their respective approaches. ¶10. (C) Both General McNeill and SCR Everts endorsed the concept of an "international gorilla," i.e. a pre-eminent statesman working outside of Afghanistan to marshal international resources and coordinate the efforts of capitals. Looking at ANSF readiness, COMISAF noted the increasing ANA capacity to conduct operations and his intent to involve them to a greater extent in operations in the south and east in 2008, but stressed the important role that NATO OMLTs must play in the process. On counternarcotics, he noted the negative effect of poppy on all levels of society, and his intent for ISAF to aggressively implement its OPLAN-mandated tasks, but made clear that ISAF does not engage in eradication. The poppy trade undermines each goal ISAF is trying to achieve in Afghanistan, he explained, and he stated further thinking on tackling the problem should occur in a cooperative way between the Secretary General, SACEUR, JFC-B Commander General Ramms, and himself. He estimated that between 20 and 40 percent of the Taliban's finances were received from the poppy trade, but noted the UN believes it is higher. He stated that Governor Wafa in Helmand province is ineffective, and characterized the results of Governor Led Eradication, a program of which President Karzai is fond, as spotty: Governor Atta in Balkh province had achieved results, whereas Wafa had not. He asserted that the international community must gather strong resources behind an Afghan lead, and compel Afghans to solve the problem. ¶11. (C) On Pakistan, he noted ISAF's engagement via military channels with Pakistan through the Tripartite Commission, and the challenge to long-term success in Afghanistan caused by the continuing existence in Pakistan of a safe haven for insurgents. Concerning Iran, COMISAF acknowledged the existence of Iranian weaponry in Afghanistan, and noted that USNATO 00000502 004 OF 004 while he has no proof of governmental involvement, concern is growing. He expressed skepticism toward Russia, citing Russian FM Lavrov's recent trip to Afghanistan during which he stated it was time for NATO to leave Afghanistan. In response to the Czech question on PRTs, he commended U.S. policy, which places officers at PRTs for 12 months (some nations have 4-month rotations),and gives PRT commanders considerable leeway in spending money locally as they deem appropriate. ¶12. (C) Comment: SACEUR and COMISAF's joint appearance at the NAC had long been requested by many ISAF-contributing Allies and non-Allied Partners. Their joint appearance scratched a major coalition political itch. Including non-Allied ISAF contributors was a home run. It demonstrated concretely to more doctrinally-cautious Allies the demand for greater involvement which these partners have and could make a meaningful contribution to building more ISAF solidarity and unity of effort. Building on the September 5 briefing by UNODC Head Costa, the Generals' presentations also lent further momentum to consideration of how to address fuller CN tasks within the existing ISAF operational plan and reduced the stigma of the term counternarcotics in Allied ISAF. COMISAF's also squarely identified the priority of building Afghan police training. We should build on that message to urge corresponding Allied response in our ministerial deliberations on the road to Bucharest. OLSON