C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000428

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2017
TAGS: MARR NATO PREL AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS REDUCTION IN SUPPORT TO ISAF

REF: THE HAGUE 01383

Classified By: Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Under instructions Dutch Charge Van Der Werff
and Col Tack (Dutch MilRep,s Office) met with Ambassador
Nuland on 25 July to foreshadow a GONL decision to reduce by
approximately one third their force presence in Urugzan in

2008. While no final decisions have been made, Van Der Werff
made it clear that the GONL expects to eventually transition
the military lead in Uruzgan to another (as yet unidentified)
nation in 2010. Dutch requested that when the decision
becomes public knowledge the USG adopt a tone of mild
disappointment, which will help the Government to sell the
package at home. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On 26 July 2007, Van Der Werff will inform the NATO
SYG, SACEUR, and principal partners in Regional Command South
(AUS, CAN, GBR) of Dutch intention to reduce force
contributions in support of ISAF operations. Between August
2008 and August 2010 the Netherlands will provide an
&adapted form of support8 to ISAF in the Uruzgan Province.
The Netherlands plans to maintain the lead in the Uruzgan
Province from 2008 to 2010, but thereafter intends to become
&a junior partner8 in the Province. The Netherlands
Government would like to place its emphasis on reconstruction
vice combat operations and force protection. According to
Van Der Werff, troop reduction is a national political
discussion in The Netherlands.


3. (C) Van Der Werff provided a possible scenario of Dutch
capabilities in Uruzgan post August 2008: Command of RC-S on
a rotational basis (plus agreed staff billets); Command of TF
Uruzgan (including staff); a PRT with 3 mission teams
(command and staff); 2 Observer Mentor and Liaison Teams
(OMLTs); a Battle Group (minus) (2 to 3 Companies, command
and staff, plus combat and combat support); Intelligence,
Surveillance, Targeting and Acquisition Radar (ISTAR)
Element; Armored Engineer Company; Logistic Support Element;
4xF-16; 4xAH-64; and agreed billets in ISAF and Kandahar
Airfield staffs. The following will be required
contributions by Allies or partners: Base protection at
Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawod; 2 OMLTs; Role 2 medical facility at
Tarin Kowt; 1 PRT mission team (including force protection);
1 Battle Group Company (preferably by mission team supplier);
2xF-16; and additional combat and transport rotary wing
assets.


4. (C) In discussion, Van Der Werff and Ambassador Nuland
assessed this to be an approximate one third reduction in
Dutch support. Van Der Werff indicated that The Netherlands
was actively seeking partners to mitigate these proposed
force reductions and was asking for assistance from the NATO
SYG and SACEUR to aid in this effort. AMB Nuland recommended
that if possible, NL should maintain its OMLTs and seek
assistance from NOR, SWE, and FRA to fill other gaps, since
OMLT reduction, in particular, will be seen as unhelpful to
overall strategy.


5. (C) According to Van Der Werff, these reductions will be
presented to the Netherlands, populace as significant. As
such, he requested USG support in expressing the &requisite
degree of disapproval8 once the proposals are made public in
order to preclude further reductions by the NL Parliament. He
stated, 8some moaning of the substantial reductions would be
helpful.8 Van Der Werff stressed that while no final
decisions have been taken, this demarche represented the
working hypothesis of The Netherlands Government. A decision
is expected prior to the end of August 2007.


6. (C) Ambassador Nuland advised Dutch to also coordinate
with Canberra early in the process, since Dutch plans will
have an impact on Australian presence in Uruzgan.

OLSON