NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL READOUT JUNE 20 2007

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000380 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2017 TAGS: NATO PREL AF SUBJECT: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL READOUT JUNE 20 2007 Classified By: DCM Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: -- Afghanistan: Deputy Secretary General (D/SYG) Minuto Rizzo reviewed the June 14-15 Defense Ministerial. Allies expressed deep concerns over continuing civilian casualties, including the Spanish PermRep,s insinuation that ISAF,s targeting policy was not being adhered to. Ambassador Nuland directly refuted the Spanish position and urged Allies to stand firm and be proactive in highlighting Taliban responsibility for putting civilians at risk. -- Kosovo: D/SYG updated the NAC on developments in the UN Security Council and Deputy Chairman of the Military Committee (D/CMC) outlined the status of the additional reserve forces that COMKFOR can call on as needed. -- SAC C-17: D/SYG noted that the Strategic Airlift charter passed silence. -- Iraq: D/CMC stated that the memo tasking SHAPE to provide the Autumn Periodic Mission Review (PMR) input by 14 September 2007 was approved by nations on June 18. -- Darfur: D/SYG noted that the Sudanese government recently accepted, unconditionally, the AU/UN &hybrid8 force for Darfur. An official request from the AU is expected in the next few days requesting that NATO extend its current support for AMIS. -- Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty: The Hungarian PermRep remarked that Russia had turned down a Hungarian CFE inspection notification. Ambassador Nuland noted the U.S. would notify Russia of a U.S. and Allied guest CFE inspection for June 25, the same day the NRC would be meeting in St. Petersburg. END SUMMARY. Afghanistan -------------- ¶2. (C) D/SYG Minuto-Rizzo chaired the NAC, (the SYG is on a visit to Canada),and began the meeting by reviewing the June 14-15 Defense Ministerial. While encouraged by positive pledges of forces, trainers, and capabilities, he reminded Allies that more needed to be done. He highlighted a continuing lack of embedded trainers (OMLTs) and the need to replace the U.S. RC-South helicopter bridging force in January 2008. On equipping the ANA, he stated that NMAs have received a revised, prioritized equipment list from the GOA and CSTC-A, which focused on western, NATO-standard equipment. He also highlighted the continuing lack of transport for several current NATO donations to the ANA. �A; ¶3. (C) D/CMC LTG Eikenberry noted that Allied Command Transformation and Allied Command Operations are continuing to look at select aspects of NATO,s long-term training support to the ANA, in light of a CSTC-A command review scheduled for November 2007, and the continued unwillingness of NATO nations to resource short-term training initiatives that were agreed to in February 2007. ¶4. (C) IMS AD for Operations, MG Fenton told the NAC during his operations brief that OMF activity throughout Afghanistan was consistent with years past for this summer time period, despite the spikes witnessed recently in Uruzgan. He cited intelligence reports that indicated large groups of OMF in RC-West, to include foreign fighters, and stated that their concern will likely remain on Farah. Operation Adalat in northern Kandahar remains the main tactical effort in RC-S. He pointed to the continued success in RC-East of Operation Maiwan, led by the 203rd ANA Corps, which has also allowed ISAF to better assess ANSF capabilities. USNATO 00000380 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) The ensuing discussion revealed deep concerns among the PermReps for the near-daily news from theater about civilian casualties. The Spanish PermRep questioned military adherence to ISAF,s agreed targeting policy, which among several considerations notes concern for collateral damage incommensurate with expected gains, as well as media/public reaction, (Comment: other consideration includes the prevention of damage to ISAF forces. End Comment.) When pressed by Ambassador Nuland for specific examples ) "facts matter if we are serious about providing advice," she commented ) the Spaniard refused to discuss specifics, citing &all of them.8 Noting the effect on domestic public opinion, as well as strategic risk to the mission should Afghan support lag, he called for wide-ranging informal discussions at NATO on civilian casualties, to include an examination of what constituted "in extremis" support. ¶6. (C) Ambassador Nuland expressed support for quick investigations by ISAF of incidents involving alleged civilian casualties, and quick reporting to the NAC, but drew a deep line in the sand against the Spanish insinuations. She said the recent event involving the tragic deaths of seven children in Paktika was an OEF operation, based on intelligence and surveillance that indicated the presence of a high-value target, and that subsequent investigation showed the Taliban had forcefully kept civilians as human shields. This is the type of enemy we confront, she noted. She urged Heads of State and Government and ministers to engage publics by explaining ISAF,s mission and the tactics of the enemy. The Ambassador also reinforced SecDef Gates' ministerial message following the decision to extend the U.S. helicopter bridging force in RC-South for another six months: Allies needed to dig deep to come up with replacements when U.S. helos leave in January 2008. She foreshadowed that in the run-up to the October 2007 Defense Ministerial we would ask the Alliance to take a look at a more systemic approach to the Alliance,s chronic helicopter shortfall in Afghanistan. ¶7. (C) The UK strongly supported Ambassador Nuland,s intervention on ISAF, and defended the OEF mandate, which was valid, he stated, in countering the endemic terrorist threat that exists in Afghanistan. He cautioned the Spanish not to confuse strategy with operational military decision-making. The Italian ambassador supported Ambassador Nuland,s call for quick investigations of civilian casualties, noting that his government was trying to shape public opinion and needed information to do it. Norway supported the Italians in this regard, as well as the Spanish in calling for a closer examination of the nature of "in extremis" support, and ramifications for ISAF/OEF coordination. He stated that ISAF needed to be cautious and not lean too far toward "explaining away" civilian casualties by blaming solely the nature of the enemy. Germany alluded to the negative effects reports of civilian casualties could have on October 2007 discussions in the Bundestag on mandate renewals. The French ambassador supported the call for quick investigations into incidents with alleged civilian casualties. He noted that public opinions don't make a distinction between ISAF and OEF, urged better risk assessments in mission planning, and defining better "in extremis" support. When challenged by Ambassador Nuland, he clarified he was not criticizing OEF planning or asking for operational oversight by the NAC, but rather asking for more discussion of ISAF strategy within the NAC. Kosovo -------------- ¶8. (C) D/SYG reiterated the ongoing efforts in the United Nations to reach agreement on a new Security Council Resolution on Kosovo. He noted the expanded Contact Group Meeting in Sarajevo at the Deputy Political Directors level. The D/CMC provided an update on the security situation in Kosovo saying that the apparent delay in status process may incite a reaction from the Kosovo Albanians, with the USNATO 00000380 003 OF 003 potential for violence. He also outlined the status of the additional reserve forces that COMKFOR can call on as needed. The German PermRep noted for Council the results of the EU,s recent meeting of the GAERC saying that Foreign Ministers expressed their continued support for Ahtisaari and his proposals serving as the basis for a new resolution. They stressed the importance of a new resolution as a precondition for the EU mission to Kosovo and welcomed the resumption of the Stabilization and Accession talks with Serbia. He expected the discussion on Kosovo to continue at the upcoming EU summit in Brussels. Iraq -------------- ¶9. (C) D/CMC stated that the memo tasking SHAPE to provide the Autumn Periodic Mission Review (PMR) input by 14 September 2007 was approved by nations on June 18. The Autumn 07 PMR will include an assessment of progress made in transitioning NTM-I activity to a mentoring role, an update of the Resource Development Plan, a status update on the Gendarmerie-Type Training, and an assessment of the NTM-I Force Protection. Darfur -------------- ¶10. (C) D/SYG Minuto Rizzo noted that the Sudanese government recently accepted, unconditionally, the AU/UN "hybrid" force for Darfur. The UN will have overall control of the mission. He added that the UNSC is expected to recommend funding the mission, and will propose deploying the force without delay. Separately, the D/SYG said an official request from the AU is expected in the next few days, requesting that NATO extend its support for AMIS. C-17 -------------- ¶11. (C) D/SYG noted that final agreement had been reached on the language of the NATO Airlift Management Organization (NAMO) Charter, (SG(2007)0419 passed silence on June 20, 2007). It will be made public upon finalization, allowing countries to proceed on this Riga commitment. Norway announced that they will increase their hours from 100 to ¶400. CFE --- ¶12. (S/NF) Hungary's PermRep stated that, in response to Hungarian notification of a CFE inspection, the Russian Federation replied that it was "withholding the arrival of the team," a response Hungary did not think was permitted by the treaty but which meant, in effect, the inspection would not happen. Hungary stated the response was similar to the Russian response to Bulgaria's recent inspection notification. Ambassador Nuland reported the U.S. would inform Russia of a U.S. and Allied CFE inspection for June 25, when the NAC would be visiting Russia. She expected the U.S. might receive a similar reply as Hungary. She also noted the possibility that Russia could announce a more formal moratorium on the CFE Treaty while the NAC was in Russia next week. If that happened, it would be essential that Allies sent a unified response. The Turkish PermRep expressed that a CFE Treaty without the Flank regime, if that is what Russia is seeking, would be unimaginable to Turkey. The French PermRep suggested a continued discussion over this topic, in another forum, later in the week. The D/SYG noted that the planned call between the SYG and FM Lavrov had not yet happened. NULAND