NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL READOUT MAY 16, 2007

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000309 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2017 TAGS: NATO PREL AF SUBJECT: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL READOUT MAY 16, 2007 Classified By: DCM Richard G. Olson for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: -- Kosovo: During the NAC, the Turks forcefully drew a line in the sand, linking acceptance of the Transition Directive to acceptable language on NATO/EU relations and to the submission of the Technical Arrangements for NAC approval. -- Afghanistan: Deputy Chairman of the Military Committee (D/CMC) LTG Eikenberry provided a readout of the May 9-10 CHODs meeting. -- Afghanistan: In a separate meeting in ISAF Troop Contributors format, Deputy SACEUR (D/SACEUR) Reith laid out current NATO efforts on Afghan National Army (ANA) training and equipping and the need for NATO to do more, particularly with embedded trainers Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams(OMLTs). Canada intends to deploy six OMLTs to Kandahar soon, Poland will send two teams, and Latvia will send one. Spain is talking with Iran about Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) weaponry found in RC-West. -- Iraq: SYG noted that the Military Committee had endorsed the Gendarmerie training plan, while the Italian Deputy PermRep confirmed his nation's taking the lead role for the gendarmerie training mission. --CMX-08: UK expresses concern about objections to participation of international organizations in CMX-08, and observed the negative implications of these objections on comprehensive approach. Note: The May 16 NAC began with an exchange of views on the spring 2007 assessment of Georgia,s IPAP with Minister of Foreign Affairs Bezhuashvili, State Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Baramidze, and Minister of Defense Kezerashvili. Reporting on this session to follow septel. End note. END SUMMARY. Balkans: Kosovo -------------- ¶2. (C) The Secretary General (SYG) updated Council on proposed changes to the SHAPE input to the Strategic Transition Directive for NATO-KFOR, which came about as a result of bilateral negotiations with the Turkish delegation. The proposals were designed to address Turkish concerns regarding language on NATO cooperation with other international actors, particularly the EU,s ESDP mission in Kosovo during the 120-day transition period following the passage of a new UNSCR. According to the SYG, while two of the three proposed changes were acceptable to SACEUR, the latter had reservations about a Turkish-offered change regarding limiting cooperation with the international community to &in-theater and at the staff level8 in relation to the new Kosovo Security Force. The SYG said that if resolution could not be reached, he intended to call for another meeting of PermReps later the same day. ¶3. (C) The Turkish PermRep explained that the proposed changes were currently being considered in Ankara at the inter-agency level and that he hoped to have guidance on the way forward as a result. He then used his intervention to formally express Turkey's frustrations with the EU, as USNATO 00000309 002 OF 004 outlined in previous forums, saying that cooperation between NATO and the EU must be under the Agreed Framework. He again drew on the argument that the ESDP mission would benefit from KFOR,s security operations and therefore, the Agreed Framework should apply, specifically referring to the &strategic cooperation8 aspects. ¶4. (C) During the course of further discussion, the Turkish PermRep repeatedly took issue with the SYG's circulation of the Technical Arrangements (TAs) on Kosovo &for information8, insisting that they needed to be considered for approval by the NAC. The SYG, despite an attempt to separate the discussion of the TAs from the Transition Directive, defended his actions, saying that he felt obligated to distribute the TAs for Alliance members, information. He stated that he stood by his decision, unless told otherwise by the Council as a whole. The UK, U.S., Germany, and the Czech Republic voiced support for the SYG,s way forward on both the Transition Directive and the Technical Arrangements. The UK PermRep said that the urgency of the situation demands that we fulfill our responsibility to our troops in the field. Following several sharp and tense exchanges over the SYG's responsibility and the importance of consensus, the Turkish PermRep finally declared that he saw no sense in holding a meeting later the same day, since it would be impossible to have a constructive discussion on the Transition Directive if the TAs were not to be circulated for Allies, consultation and approval. (Note: The SYG did not hold another meeting on the issue May 16. End note.) Afghanistan -------------- ¶5. (C) SYG de Hoop Scheffer highlighted developments in Kabul over the political fate of Afghan FM Spanta. D/CMC Eikenberry gave the NAC a readout of the recent CHODs, meeting in Brussels. Many CHODs had concerns about the security situation in Afghanistan, and noted that operational success is closely linked with good coordination between ISAF and OEF. A number of CHODs recognized the need to follow military engagements with Quick Impact Projects and other rapid assistance. CHODs recognized a need for a more robust and coherent NATO effort on training the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF),expressed concern about NATO,s inability to fulfill its commitment to provide adequate numbers of embedded trainers (OMLTs),and discussed the possibility of easing OMLT requirements, such as more flexibility in tasks pursued, or regionalizing commitments. The Dutch PermRep welcomed the potential adjustments to OMLT requirements (Comment: the Dutch have long grumbled about CSTC-A OMLT certification requirements they allege discourage interest because they are too cumbersome and complex. End comment.) In response to a question from the SYG, D/CMC Eikenberry briefly described the 14 May incident in Pakistan, emphasizing that the shooting is still under investigation. ¶6. (C) In a second NAC the same day, held in expanded format with the 11 non-NATO ISAF contributors, D/SACEUR Reith briefed on NATO,s unfulfilled commitment to field 46 embedded trainer Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLT) and initiatives SHAPE was pursuing to rectify this, other unfulfilled short term NATO training commitments, longer-term training possibilities, and the status of NATO,s longstanding equipment support to the ANA. ¶7. (C) General Reith stated that SACEUR,s highest ANA USNATO 00000309 003 OF 004 support priority is fielding all 46 OMLTs that NATO committed to provide in the short term (only 20 have been provided). Over time, as the ANA grows, NATO has committed to provide a total of 103 OMLTs. He reiterated that each OMLT that NATO provides enables a U.S. embedded training unit to move over to training Afghan police, a key need in improving the overall security picture in Afghanistan. He thanked Canada for announcing at the May 9 CHODs meeting it would soon field six OMLTs in Kandahar, and the Poles (two teams) and Latvians (one team),but said NATO needed to do more. OMLTs are essential to building the type of competent Afghan security forces that will enable NATO,s military objectives to be met, he asserted. Reith detailed initiatives SHAPE has been pursuing to make deployment of OMLTs feasible to more Allies, including forming multinational OMLTs (which has proven successful in RC-N at the Corps and Brigade level, but should not be extended to kandaks and below); regionalizing the effort by asking &lead nations8 to assist with force generation and logistical support to smaller Allies; exploring options for greater common funding of combat information support and other technology; and increasing awareness of the OMLT program,s requirements and goals. ¶8. (C) D/SACEUR reminded Allies that in February 2007, the NAC had approved short-term training support initiatives for the ANA, which beyond revalidating the OMLT commitment, included filling staff billets within the CSTC-A command and engaging in mobile in-theater niche training, but that no Allies had come forward with offers. Military advice on possible longer-term training initiatives would be forthcoming in advance of the June Defense Ministers, meeting, he said, to include setting up branch schools, mentoring existing ANA institutions, and establishing a train-and-equip directorate within ISAF HQ Kabul, but pursuing grander objectives made little sense when NATO could not even fulfill its short term goals. ¶9. (C) On equipment support, D/SACEUR briefed that CSTC-A and the Afghan MOD were in the process of revising previous equipment lists, which will shift equipment needs away from Soviet-era weaponry toward NATO-standard equipment, and that list will be provided to NATO once finalized. Training and maintenance package offers associated with equipment will also be essential for nations to provide in the future. Hungarian and Slovenian small arms and ammunition have been delivered to Afghanistan, as well as 24 Turkish howitzers, but several other pending donations continue to lack transport. NATO,s transportation trust fund has 400,000 euros (Denmark, UK, and Luxembourg),but the total cost to move all pending donations is 4.7 million euros. ¶10. (C) Ambassador Nuland urged Allies to dig deep to provide needed OMLTs and equipment. One infantry company could produce six to ten OMLTs; ten OMLTs provided a return on investment far beyond their size. Each trained and equipped Afghan meant one less soldier that NATO had to deploy. She encouraged Allies to think creatively, and talk over options with CSTC-A, rather than to rule anything out preemptively. The Canadian PermRep stated that the six Canadian OMLTs would deploy within a month, and would work with the 1st Brigade of the 205 Corps in Kandahar. The UK supported Ambassador Nuland,s intervention, and asked for SHAPE to clarify the role and responsibilities of a &lead nation8 as part of SHAPE thought processes on regionalizing OMLTs. Croatia and Norway indicated plans to examine providing more OMLTs, while France detailed past ANA training USNATO 00000309 004 OF 004 efforts, but remained non-committal on future intentions. ¶11. (S) In response to a quick side brief by D/CMC that noted similarities between Iranian-supplied EFP weapons in Iraq and some found in RC-West, the Spanish PermRep informed the NAC that Spain was already talking to Iran about this. Iraq -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The SYG noted that the Military Committee has endorsed the Gendarmerie training plan for Iraq in MCM 0062-2007. He further stated that this plan meets the needs of the Iraqis. He will seek NAC approval by issuing the NMA advice under silence within the next few days. The Italian Deputy PermRep confirmed Italy's readiness to assume the role of lead nation for the Gendarmerie training mission, stating that this falls in line with Italy's high level of commitment to NTM-I. He noted that Italy currently runs three of the four NTM-I courses in-country, and that with the addition of 41 Carabinieri trainers, the total Italian NTM-I force, which is caveat-free, will be 121 personnel. AOB - CMX-08 -------------- ¶13. (C) The UK PermRep expressed concern about objections to the participation of International Organizations in the planning and conduct of CMX-08. He stated that this also negatively affects efforts on comprehensive approach. If the SPC-R (meeting on May 21) cannot resolve the issue, he suggested it be taken up by PermReps. The SYG noted that he shares this concern and hopes a way forward can be reached. NULAND