MISSILE DEFENSE: A/S ROOD CONSULTS WITH CZECH,

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000265 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017 TAGS: NATO PREL CZ PL RU SUBJECT: MISSILE DEFENSE: A/S ROOD CONSULTS WITH CZECH, POLISH, FRENCH, AND GERMAN COUNTERPARTS REF: A. USNATO 263 ¶B. USNATO 264 Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland for reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On the margins of the April 19 meetings at NATO HQ on Missile Defense (reftels),Assistant Secretary Rood briefed his Czech, Polish, French and German counterparts on his April 17 meetings in Moscow and the U.S. offer of Cooperation across the full spectrum of missile defense activities with Russia. Polish Under Secretary of State Waszcykowski laid down markers in advance of the start negotiations on placement of missile defense interceptors, pressing for additional U.S. security guarantees to accompany any agreement to build a site in Poland and arguing for additional defense cooperation or hardware for Poland to provide security at the site. Czech Deputy FM Pojar praised the U.S. offer of cooperation to Russia and said Russia was trying to weaken the transatlantic relationship. German Political Director Brandenburg noted concerns about Russia,s reaction and floated the idea of an inspection/verification regime with Russia. French MFA Director of Strategic Affairs Carre said France would not oppose a U.S. system, supported NAC and NRC discussion, agreed on the threat, but might have concerns about the "NATO-ization" of the U.S. system. End summary. ¶2. (C) Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation Rood briefed his Czech, Polish, German, and French counterparts in separate meetings on April 18 and 19 in Brussels on the U.S. offer of MD cooperation given to Russian DFM Kiselyak and LTG Buzinskiy in Moscow on April 17. He said his visit to Moscow was a follow-up to the March 28 phone between Presidents Bush and Putin. A/S Rood told them that the USG offered the "full spectrum of cooperation" to the Russians in a two page non-paper (non-paper reported septel). Rood explained that this was not a detailed proposal and that further discussion would be necessary to flesh out projects should Russia show interest in any of the specific areas proposed by the U.S. A/S Rood said we did not expect the Russians to immediately accept our offer, and noted that even if they turned down the offer it would still be beneficial to mitigating Russian criticism and demonstrating U.S. sincerity in attempting to build trust and cooperation. He told the four Allies that we plan to distribute the non-paper in both the NRC/R and NAC/R on April 19, but do not plan to release it to the press. -------------- PERSISTENT POLE -------------- ¶3. (C) Undersecretary of State Witold Waszcykowski praised our "pragmatic approach" toward the Russians, but cautioned that MD was not a technical issue for the Russians, it was political. The location of the two planned sites in Central Europe was still highly sensitive to them. Ten interceptors were no threat to Russia. He said Russia could influence policy in Western European capitals, but Moscow had no sway with new NATO members. A/S Rood told him that it was important to reach out to the Russians and this could help reduce Russian wedge-driving; however, we would never give Russia a veto over the project. ¶4. (C) Wascykowski referred to the stationing of U.S. interceptors in Poland as a "test" of whether it was truly a full member of NATO. He lamented Poland's "second-class status" in NATO and expressed a hope for a more solid security guarantee directly from the U.S. A/S Rood strongly countered that there should never be any doubt of American commitment to Article 5, and that we clearly viewed Poland as a full member of NATO and not a "second-class" member. ¶5. (C) Wascykowski described the interceptor site as a "naked base" in need of protection and pressed repeatedly for a long-term military cooperation agreement to accompany any agreement to build the base in Poland. Wascykowski said this must be part of upcoming negotiations on placement of interceptors in Poland. Rood acknowledged that protection of the base would be the subject of upcoming negotiations. A/S Rood said the U.S. and Poland needed to first assess the threat to the interceptor base before we designed extraordinary protection for it. He explained that we did not envision a hardened site and have only standard protection in our other interceptor bases. A/S Rood told him agreement on a base would be path breaking and could lead to political, economic, and military benefits; however, he declined Wascykowski,s desire for him to commit in principle that Poland would receive enhanced defense cooperation as a result of accepting an interceptor base before the negotiations even begin. -------------- LAID-BACK CZECH -------------- ¶6. (C) In sharp contrast to Wascykowski, Czech DFM Thomas Pojar was much more subdued. He said he did not expect a positive response from the Russians on the U.S offer of cooperation, but the offer would be helpful for the internal European debate on missile defense. Pojar contended that Russia had three goals: bash the missile defense plans for domestic political consumption; weaken the transatlantic relationship; and be treated with respect by the United States. -------------- FRENCH AND GERMANS -------------- ¶7. (C) German Deputy Political Director Ulrich Brandenburg said that 10 interceptors did not represent a threat to the Russian strategic force. He praised the U.S. offer of cooperation as a sound strategy, even if the Russians did not immediately seize upon it. He asked if the U.S. would be willing to accept the stationing of Russians officers at the site or submit to Russian inspections at short notice. A/S Rood explained that the sites are not located on U.S. territory and this was a sensitive issue in Poland. In addition, such a proposal reinforced the outdated concept of a strategic balance between NATO and Russia that we were trying to move beyond. ¶8. (C) French MFA Director of Strategic Affairs Phillipe Carre told A/S Rood that France had concerns about potential "NATO-ization" of the U.S. system. France was fine with a U.S. system, supported discussions in NATO and the NRC, and agreed that there was a threat, but was probably not ready for a NATO system. He suggested that a NATO system might somehow undermine the independent French nuclear deterrent although he said this was his personal opinion. He tried to explain that France could not be dependent on NATO MD and still be truly independent. He asked the U.S. not to seek a NATO blessing for the U.S. system in Oslo and to encourage the Czechs and Poles to be quiet on this subject. NULAND