NATO SENIOR DEFENSE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP)

S E C R E T USNATO 000252

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, EUR/PRA, EUR/RPM, AND AC/SEA
DEFENSE FOR GSA (BENKERT, GROSS)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2017
TAGS: MARR MCAP MNUC NATO PREL PARM
SUBJECT: NATO SENIOR DEFENSE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP)
PLENARY MEETING, MARCH 27 2007

Classified By: DDEFAD CLARENCE JUHL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B&D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. On March 27 2007, Mr. Joseph Benkert, OSD
PDASD for Global Security Affairs, and Mr. Ivan Dvorak, Chief
of Defense Policy and Strategy Division, Czech Republic,
co-chaired the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP)
Plenary session. The DGP discussed Implementation of the
Comprehensive Political Guidance, as it pertains to the DGP,
two Food-For-Thought papers on Strengthening Host Nation CBRN
Defense Capabilities and Maritime Interdiction Operations,
respectively, the upcoming DGP Seminar in Prague, CBRN
Reachback Capabilities, and a paper on the NATO-EU
Cooperation on CBRN Defense. During the afternoon, delegates
met in the DGP format with Ukraine (DGP-UKR) to discuss how
NATO and Ukraine can cooperate together on CBRN defense in
support of NATO-Ukraine Partnership Goals. End Summary.

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DGP POLICY GUIDANCE
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2. (S) The first agenda topic was DGP Policy Guidance with
the objective of showing the link between the NATO
Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) and the DGP work plan.
The WMD Center provided their views on the implications of
the CPG for the DGP. The derivation and chronology of its
development were reviewed as well as its planning objectives
and position in the hierarchy of fundamental NATO documents.
Practical cooperation with other international organizations
was highlighted, and the role of the relevant planning
disciplines in the management and oversight of the CPG
objectives was described. The International Military Staff
(IMS) followed with an explanation of MC550, the Military
Committee Guidance for the implementation of the CPG. MC550
specifies that NATO forces will have the ability to conduct
multinational joint expeditionary operations with no host
nation support. Furthermore, this will be done taking into
account threats of WMD and terrorism and providing for
protection of host nation populations with support to
consequence management. The last briefing in the series on
policy guidance was given by Allied Command Transformation
(ACT) and provided an overview of the relevant parts of the
Defense Requirements Review (DRR). The DRR is part of the
defense planning cycle process and was established by SACEUR
to be able to state a Minimum Military Requirement (MMR). It
incorporates a specified level-of-ambition amongst other
planning factors. The differences between the force goals for
2006 and the force plans for 2008 relevant to CBRN were
highlighted. A CBRN capability package initiative to cover
seven shortfall areas is planned and will be worked by a
Tiger Team beginning in May.


3. (U) The United Kingdom reviewed its Food-For-Thought
paper on Strengthening Host Nation CBRN Defense Capabilities
which had been introduced in detail during the March 1
Steering Committee meeting. It was characterized as blue-sky
thinking on how NATO and coalition partners could prepare for
a CBRN attack or operate within such an environment. NATO
should promote the ability of potential host nations and
other partners to prepare for and respond to CBRN events in
order to maintain NATO,s political and military freedom of
action uring deployed operations. The French delegate staed
that France needs more time to understand som of the terms
and meaning of specific parts of te document. The Turkish
delegate requested that he document refer to taking account
of scarce resurces and that it be aligned with MC161
(Militar Intelligence Assessment on Proliferation),so tha
it would be based on a credible threat assessmet. In the
opinion of the Belgian delegate, the pper should be worked
in coordination with other NTO bodies and should restrict
its focus to DGP afairs. Mindful that the paper had been
availabl for only a week, the authors requested comments b
April 20.


4. (U) The subject of maritime iterdiction was opened with
a briefing from SHAPE n Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR (OAE),
its compositon, and features. The general assessment is that
OAE has a positive deterrent effect and is an enhancement to
partnership. The nature of compliant boarding is a major
limitation that is aggravated by the fact that 85 percent of

maritime traffic is flagged in a nation other than where it
is owned. The detection of WMD onboard also poses a problem
and a study is underway in ACT to evaluate technologies to
improve capabilities. Following the OAE briefing, the United
States introduced its paper on Maritime Interdiction as a
Tool to Combat WMD Proliferation. This paper is a result of
the 2006 NAC WMD Seminar and explores the strategic context
for which maritime interdiction of WMD might occur, the
existing NATO guidance permitting it, and the challenges that
are faced. The Canadian delegate asked about the scope of the
technical requirements to be provided by the Conference of
National Armaments Directors (CNAD). The Belgian delegate
found problems with the titles and links to other documents
and ideas. While they appreciated the principles, the French
delegate stated that there can be no extension to OAE at this
stage. The British delegation offered to share its
considerable knowledge on the legal questions, while the
Turkish and Italian delegates stated that they saw
ambiguities and unresolved difficulties in the document and
had some misgivings that would require more work; notably the
need for a sound legal basis.

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TRAINING, EXERCISES AND SEMINARS
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5. (U) The Czech co-chair reminded delegates of the
upcoming 2007 DGP Seminar in Prague from July 10-13.
Planning is on track for a successful meeting, though the
organizers are continuing to search for influential speakers
with varied international backgrounds. The Romanian delegate
asked for further information on the involvement of the civil
emergency systems in the activities.


6. (U) The Chairman announced that the report of the 2006
NAC WMD Seminar had passed silence and would be sent to the
NAC. Because many of the recommendations from the original
report have been incorporated into the Maritime Interdiction
paper, it was suggested that the report be sent to the NAC
following the agreement on the Maritime Interdiction paper
and determination of the topic for the 2007 NAC WMD Seminar.
There is concern about waiting until the conclusion of the
Maritime Interdiction paper, due to the amount of time that
has already elapsed since the NAC Seminar occurred and the
fact that the Maritime Interdiction paper is only in the
early stages of consideration.

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CAPABILITIES
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7. (S) The DGP received a briefing from Allied Command
Operations (ACO) on the operational concept for and the
implementation of the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center (IFC)
and the topic of CBRN reach-back in general. The concept has
been evolving for several years and involves many groups of
national and NATO command relationships. The current
arrangement is for an analysis lab in the lead nation to
respond to the CBRN Battalion in the field. As the IFC in the
UK and the CBRN Center of Excellence (CoE) in the Czech
Republic become operational, they will assume a coordinating
function among the national labs. Eventually, the CoE will
perform as the reach-back resource and the IFC will
deconflict and provide all NATO intelligence. Schematics
depicting these rather involved arrangements will be posted
on the WMD web-site. Despite what appeared to be a complex
communication process, ACO assured the DGP that the process
would not impose delays in the flow of information.

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INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH
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8. (C) The committee considered a draft document on
NATO-European Union (EU) Cooperation on CBRN Defense issues.
This initiative derives from a 2003 NAC document that calls
for the establishment of coherent, transparent and
mutually-reinforcing development of capability requirements
common to the two organizations. The focus of the effort will
be the NATO-EU Capabilities Group and the DGP will endeavor

to put CBRN issues on its agenda to foster discussion and
avoid duplication of effort. The French delegate provided
written input for some changes in several parts of the DGP
document. The WMD Center stated that it already has had some
informal staff-to-staff contacts with EU counterparts. While
there was general support for the project, it was clear after
the discussion that some portions of the document could be
improved and a new version circulated. This was accomplished
following the Plenary meeting, and subsequently passed
silence on April 4.


9. (U) Under Any Other Business (AOB),the Chairman
requested that nations consider topics for the 2007 NAC WMD
seminar and nominate them to the WMD Center as soon as
possible. The Chairman also reminded delegates that the next
meeting, the DGP Steering Committee, will occur on April 25.

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DGP MEETING WITH UKRAINE
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10. (U) In a separate session, the DGP met with military
authorities of Ukraine to discuss areas for cooperation in
CBRN defense. The Director of the NBC Section of the
Ukrainian MOD stated that Ukraine was interested in
participating in international peace support operations and a
regular program of information exchange. Ukraine briefed the
structure of its CBRN forces including current equipment,
personnel, facilities, readiness, and logistics. Follow-on
discussion included questions and answers on military support
to civil authorities, Ukraine's participation in
international operations, plans for modernization, funding
for research and development, deploy-ability and airlift, and
the status of CBRN training and doctrine. The International
Staff briefed the status of NATO-Ukraine Partnership Goals
and highlighted that only three of the 94 goals addressed
specific CBRN matters, but that many run across the spectrum
of DGP issues. Roadblocks such as insufficient funding and a
lack of translation of documents appear to hinder progress.
The DGP Co-Chairman proposed that a Tiger Team be created to
continue the work of promoting dialog on CBRN defense with
Ukraine. This Tiger Team will meet for the first time on
April 16.
OLSON