NATO SENIOR DEFENSE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP)

S E C R E T USNATO 000252 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR T, EUR/PRA, EUR/RPM, AND AC/SEA DEFENSE FOR GSA (BENKERT, GROSS) E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2017 TAGS: MARR MCAP MNUC NATO PREL PARM SUBJECT: NATO SENIOR DEFENSE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP) PLENARY MEETING, MARCH 27 2007 Classified By: DDEFAD CLARENCE JUHL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B&D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On March 27 2007, Mr. Joseph Benkert, OSD PDASD for Global Security Affairs, and Mr. Ivan Dvorak, Chief of Defense Policy and Strategy Division, Czech Republic, co-chaired the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) Plenary session. The DGP discussed Implementation of the Comprehensive Political Guidance, as it pertains to the DGP, two Food-For-Thought papers on Strengthening Host Nation CBRN Defense Capabilities and Maritime Interdiction Operations, respectively, the upcoming DGP Seminar in Prague, CBRN Reachback Capabilities, and a paper on the NATO-EU Cooperation on CBRN Defense. During the afternoon, delegates met in the DGP format with Ukraine (DGP-UKR) to discuss how NATO and Ukraine can cooperate together on CBRN defense in support of NATO-Ukraine Partnership Goals. End Summary. -------------- DGP POLICY GUIDANCE -------------- ¶2. (S) The first agenda topic was DGP Policy Guidance with the objective of showing the link between the NATO Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) and the DGP work plan. The WMD Center provided their views on the implications of the CPG for the DGP. The derivation and chronology of its development were reviewed as well as its planning objectives and position in the hierarchy of fundamental NATO documents. Practical cooperation with other international organizations was highlighted, and the role of the relevant planning disciplines in the management and oversight of the CPG objectives was described. The International Military Staff (IMS) followed with an explanation of MC550, the Military Committee Guidance for the implementation of the CPG. MC550 specifies that NATO forces will have the ability to conduct multinational joint expeditionary operations with no host nation support. Furthermore, this will be done taking into account threats of WMD and terrorism and providing for protection of host nation populations with support to consequence management. The last briefing in the series on policy guidance was given by Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and provided an overview of the relevant parts of the Defense Requirements Review (DRR). The DRR is part of the defense planning cycle process and was established by SACEUR to be able to state a Minimum Military Requirement (MMR). It incorporates a specified level-of-ambition amongst other planning factors. The differences between the force goals for 2006 and the force plans for 2008 relevant to CBRN were highlighted. A CBRN capability package initiative to cover seven shortfall areas is planned and will be worked by a Tiger Team beginning in May. ¶3. (U) The United Kingdom reviewed its Food-For-Thought paper on Strengthening Host Nation CBRN Defense Capabilities which had been introduced in detail during the March 1 Steering Committee meeting. It was characterized as blue-sky thinking on how NATO and coalition partners could prepare for a CBRN attack or operate within such an environment. NATO should promote the ability of potential host nations and other partners to prepare for and respond to CBRN events in order to maintain NATO,s political and military freedom of action uring deployed operations. The French delegate staed that France needs more time to understand som of the terms and meaning of specific parts of te document. The Turkish delegate requested that he document refer to taking account of scarce resurces and that it be aligned with MC161 (Militar Intelligence Assessment on Proliferation),so tha it would be based on a credible threat assessmet. In the opinion of the Belgian delegate, the pper should be worked in coordination with other NTO bodies and should restrict its focus to DGP afairs. Mindful that the paper had been availabl for only a week, the authors requested comments b April 20. ¶4. (U) The subject of maritime iterdiction was opened with a briefing from SHAPE n Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR (OAE), its compositon, and features. The general assessment is that OAE has a positive deterrent effect and is an enhancement to partnership. The nature of compliant boarding is a major limitation that is aggravated by the fact that 85 percent of maritime traffic is flagged in a nation other than where it is owned. The detection of WMD onboard also poses a problem and a study is underway in ACT to evaluate technologies to improve capabilities. Following the OAE briefing, the United States introduced its paper on Maritime Interdiction as a Tool to Combat WMD Proliferation. This paper is a result of the 2006 NAC WMD Seminar and explores the strategic context for which maritime interdiction of WMD might occur, the existing NATO guidance permitting it, and the challenges that are faced. The Canadian delegate asked about the scope of the technical requirements to be provided by the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD). The Belgian delegate found problems with the titles and links to other documents and ideas. While they appreciated the principles, the French delegate stated that there can be no extension to OAE at this stage. The British delegation offered to share its considerable knowledge on the legal questions, while the Turkish and Italian delegates stated that they saw ambiguities and unresolved difficulties in the document and had some misgivings that would require more work; notably the need for a sound legal basis. -------------- TRAINING, EXERCISES AND SEMINARS -------------- ¶5. (U) The Czech co-chair reminded delegates of the upcoming 2007 DGP Seminar in Prague from July 10-13. Planning is on track for a successful meeting, though the organizers are continuing to search for influential speakers with varied international backgrounds. The Romanian delegate asked for further information on the involvement of the civil emergency systems in the activities. ¶6. (U) The Chairman announced that the report of the 2006 NAC WMD Seminar had passed silence and would be sent to the NAC. Because many of the recommendations from the original report have been incorporated into the Maritime Interdiction paper, it was suggested that the report be sent to the NAC following the agreement on the Maritime Interdiction paper and determination of the topic for the 2007 NAC WMD Seminar. There is concern about waiting until the conclusion of the Maritime Interdiction paper, due to the amount of time that has already elapsed since the NAC Seminar occurred and the fact that the Maritime Interdiction paper is only in the early stages of consideration. -------------- CAPABILITIES -------------- ¶7. (S) The DGP received a briefing from Allied Command Operations (ACO) on the operational concept for and the implementation of the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center (IFC) and the topic of CBRN reach-back in general. The concept has been evolving for several years and involves many groups of national and NATO command relationships. The current arrangement is for an analysis lab in the lead nation to respond to the CBRN Battalion in the field. As the IFC in the UK and the CBRN Center of Excellence (CoE) in the Czech Republic become operational, they will assume a coordinating function among the national labs. Eventually, the CoE will perform as the reach-back resource and the IFC will deconflict and provide all NATO intelligence. Schematics depicting these rather involved arrangements will be posted on the WMD web-site. Despite what appeared to be a complex communication process, ACO assured the DGP that the process would not impose delays in the flow of information. -------------- INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH -------------- ¶8. (C) The committee considered a draft document on NATO-European Union (EU) Cooperation on CBRN Defense issues. This initiative derives from a 2003 NAC document that calls for the establishment of coherent, transparent and mutually-reinforcing development of capability requirements common to the two organizations. The focus of the effort will be the NATO-EU Capabilities Group and the DGP will endeavor to put CBRN issues on its agenda to foster discussion and avoid duplication of effort. The French delegate provided written input for some changes in several parts of the DGP document. The WMD Center stated that it already has had some informal staff-to-staff contacts with EU counterparts. While there was general support for the project, it was clear after the discussion that some portions of the document could be improved and a new version circulated. This was accomplished following the Plenary meeting, and subsequently passed silence on April 4. ¶9. (U) Under Any Other Business (AOB),the Chairman requested that nations consider topics for the 2007 NAC WMD seminar and nominate them to the WMD Center as soon as possible. The Chairman also reminded delegates that the next meeting, the DGP Steering Committee, will occur on April 25. -------------- DGP MEETING WITH UKRAINE -------------- ¶10. (U) In a separate session, the DGP met with military authorities of Ukraine to discuss areas for cooperation in CBRN defense. The Director of the NBC Section of the Ukrainian MOD stated that Ukraine was interested in participating in international peace support operations and a regular program of information exchange. Ukraine briefed the structure of its CBRN forces including current equipment, personnel, facilities, readiness, and logistics. Follow-on discussion included questions and answers on military support to civil authorities, Ukraine's participation in international operations, plans for modernization, funding for research and development, deploy-ability and airlift, and the status of CBRN training and doctrine. The International Staff briefed the status of NATO-Ukraine Partnership Goals and highlighted that only three of the 94 goals addressed specific CBRN matters, but that many run across the spectrum of DGP issues. Roadblocks such as insufficient funding and a lack of translation of documents appear to hinder progress. The DGP Co-Chairman proposed that a Tiger Team be created to continue the work of promoting dialog on CBRN defense with Ukraine. This Tiger Team will meet for the first time on April 16. OLSON