NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSION, MARCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000227 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2017 TAGS: PREL PARM NATO OSCE KCFE SUBJECT: NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSION, MARCH 29, 2007 Classified By: DCM Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In the NATO-Russia Council arms control discussion on March 29, 2007, Russian Ambassador Totskiy claimed that Russia "did not know what it needs to do" to get NATO to ratify the Adapted CFE (A/CFE),and asked for a list of outstanding Russian "debts" related to ratification. Allies urged Russia to fulfill its Istanbul commitments as the only path to ratify the A/CFE. Ambassador Totskiy suggested that if a Russian force is not acceptable in Transnistria, it should be replaced by an OSCE force, if Tiraspol would agree. End Summary. ¶2. (C) SYG de Hoop Scheffer opened the discussion by noting that it was timely for NRC Ambassadors to follow up the discussions held by NRC arms control experts (NRC/ACE) on March 22. He highlighted the importance of the CFE Treaty to all present and noted that Russia still needs to meet its Istanbul Commitments before we can move forward with the A/CFE. He suggested that nothing was "off the table" and opened the floor for what he hoped would be a constructive discussion. ¶3. (C) German PermRep Duckwitz was first to speak, clearly recognizing the importance of arms control to European security and suggesting that the topic needed more visibility (in the NRC). Noting the strategic value of the interlocking framework provided by the combination of CFE, the Vienna Document 1999, and the Open Skies Treaty, he pointed to the need to bring arms control regimes in line with the current security situation ) and the A/CFE is the way to do that. Czech PermRep Fule and Canadian PermRep Juneau were quick to reinforce these points, stating that their countries were ready to ratify A/CFE once Russia met its Istanbul commitments. They added that any new CSBMs to be considered in the OSCE must be based upon the 1993 Madrid mandate: verifiable, politically binding, and balanced (i.e., reciprocal). Juneau also noted that it would not consider any measure that sought to apply the benefits of A/CFE before the treaty entered into force. ¶4. (C) Spanish PermRep Benevides, citing Spain's role as OSCE CiO, wanted to promote progress in the pol-mil dimension and to address the frozen conflicts. He said Spain sees ratification of A/CFE as a significant step in achieving this. With regard to new CSBMs for the OSCE, he suggested that there were a number of tools already in place that were not being used and might be tapped, rather than creating new ones. Representatives from Belgium, France, Romania, Italy, Slovenia, and the Netherlands were all equally clear in calling for Russia to meet its Istanbul commitments and expressing their willingness to engage in discussions on new CSBMs (for the OSCE) that met the Madrid mandate. ¶5. (C) Russian Ambassador Totskiy welcomed the discussion on arms control, but felt the NRC should address the topic in a broader manner, not just focus on CFE, Open Skies and the Vienna Document. After complaining about the "difficulties" Russia faced with the current CFE Treaty, he commented that he felt A/CFE would most probably not be allowed to be ratified. Noting this had also been done in Vienna, he asked for a list of outstanding Russian "debts" related to ratification, adding that Russia "did not know what it needs to do" to get NATO to ratify A/CFE. Once such a list is provided, Russia is willing to discuss it. Raising another familiar question, he asked for a definition of "substantial" military forces as indicated in the Founding Act. With regard to Gudauta, he noted that Russia had left the base five years ago, but that they are still expected to guarantee the security of an OSCE mission in order for an inspection to ensure that all actions had been completed. Totskiy did not know how this could be accomplished. With regard to Moldova, he suggested that if a Russian peacekeeping force for Transnistria was not acceptable, then we should look at an OSCE force ) but only after Tiraspol gave a green light. ¶6. (C) Drawing from guidance, U.S. Deputy PermRep Olson highlighted the value of CFE as a political tool for building cooperative security, and reiterated that the A/CFE could not be ratified until all remaining Istanbul commitments had been fulfilled. Olson also noted that this was not a position of convenience since it would be more convenient to NATO if A/CFE were already in force. He also cited NATO's deliberate decision in 1997 not to define substantial military forces, and said that we would not support reopening that discussion. Noting that Presidents Bush and Putin had spoken on March 28 about missile defense, amongst other subjects, Olson stressed that NATO would like to work with Russia in a positive USNATO 00000227 002 OF 002 manner, including fulfillment of Istanbul commitments, making the NRC's 10th Anniversary a NATO-Russia success story. ¶7. (C) UK Deputy PermRep Kidd rounded out the discussion, reinforcing many of the points already made. He specifically responded to Russia's request for a list for ratification, noting that the required steps have been clear for years and have not changed. With regard to the Russian CSBMs proposals in Vienna, he welcomed the effort to address the new security situation, noting that proposals should not only meet the Madrid mandate, but must also take us forward in some way. He suggested that the proposal on information exchange for rapid reaction forces appeared to do this and merited careful study. NULAND