NATO WEIGHING NATURE OF POSSIBLE TIES TO QATAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000172 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/RPM, NEA/ARP E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017 TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL NATO QA SUBJECT: NATO WEIGHING NATURE OF POSSIBLE TIES TO QATAR REF: A. USNATO 146 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. SHINAGEL/REID MARCH 15 AND EARLIER 2006 ¶C. BROTZEN/REID MARCH 9 2006 Classified By: A/DCM IAN KELLY;REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 1.(U) This is a request for guidance; see para. 11-13. 2.(C) Summary: NATO is debating whether, and how strong, a security assurance it is prepared to offer Qatar in the ongoing negotiation of a possible NATO-Qatar agreement which would allow NATO liaison personnel to stay at the al Udeid Combined Air operations Center (CAOC) (ref. A). Drawing on a letter then NATO Secretary General Javier Solana sent to (then partner) Bulgaria in 1999 during the Kosovo conflict, in which NATO offered time-limited security assurances against Serbian retaliation in exchange for use of Bulgarian airspace, NATO is proposing Allies Monday discuss a narrow form of possible security assurance for Qatar linked to any threat which Qatar might receive because of hosting NATO personnel (ref. B) Ideally we would have guidance by March 19, but could seek a postponement until March 21. Simmons has said that NATO was not yet at the endgame of these talks, but, out of respect, should be timely about starting the exchange of draft language. NATO Allies debated other aspects of this agreement on Monday, March 12, deciding to eliminate discussion of a transit agreement. NATO staff did not raise jurisdiction issues on March 12, but privately assured the U.S. that it would use U.S.-provided text in their proposal to Qatar (ref.C). NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General (DASG) Robert Simmons plans to go to Doha SIPDIS from March 31 to April 3 to discuss a bracketed text, which he wants Qatar to have adequate time to review ahead of his visit. End Summary. 3.(C) NATO is developing a bracketed text for a possible NATO-Qatar agreement and hopes to send it to Qatar next week. Previous exchanges with Doha have identified three substantive areas for further Allied consideration: transit provisions, jurisdiction and security assurances. On Friday, March 9, NATO staff agreed with representatives of the five nations who currently have or had posted personnel to the liaison group (U.S./UK/NO/CA/FR) that NATO would use U.S.-proposed text to seek a strong carve-out for bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCA) despite several Qatari rejections of this approach. In Monday, March 12, Political Committee discussion, Allies decided to drop mention of transit provisions in the bracketed text since Qatar had not sought them in its earlier submissions, no Allies had encountered transit problems, and there was interest in simplifying a possible agreement. 4.(C) In the absence of sufficient time to receive authoritative instructions from capital, discussion of security assurances still yielded Allied hesitation to offer Doha a general security assurance, or indeed formula, on cooperation linkages which went much beyond agreed language in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). Some Allies also reflected that Qatari interest in hosting a possible future Security Cooperation Center was off the table since the Alliance had yet to decide whether to pursue such a step. Simmons, as chairman, said that Qatar considered itself to be offering a basing contribution through hosting ISAF personnel on its territory - a step which Doha saw as beyond the ICI - and wanted "something from NATO" beyond the ICI format in return. He also drew Allied attention to past Allied extension of temporary security assurances to Bulgaria during Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999. Text follows: BULGARIAN ASSURANCE LETTER, APRIL 20, 1999 -------------- 5.(SBU) In the context of the North Atlantic Council's request to grant unrestricted access to the airspace of Bulgaria for the execution of air operations over the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, I would like to reiterate the assurances provided in my letter dated 24 March 1999 which states that it would be unacceptable if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were to threaten the territorial integrity, political independence and security of your country. USNATO 00000172 002 OF 003 6.(SBU) The Alliance would view with the utmost seriousness any attacks by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on your country, in particular stemming from NATO's use of the airspace of Bulgaria. 7.(SBU) The Alliance has repeatedly made clear that the security of all NATO Member States is inseparably linked to that of all Partner countries. Your security is of a direct and material concern to the Alliance. 8.(SBU) I should like to add my appreciation of the stalwart support Bulgaria has given to NATO throughout the crisis in Kosovo. Your country's valuable assistance will strengthen and deepen the already close cooperation between NATO and Bulgaria. Your sincerely, (Javier Solana) END TEXT 9.(C) While observing that the case with Qatar might be more complex because it possibly would be threatened by a non-state actor perhaps even using domestic-linked terrorists, Allies generally indicated an openness to refer to capitals a more narrowly-worded formulation of the Bulgarian security assurance. Allies also discussed inconclusively whether Allies should consider Qatar's approaches to NATO as fundamentally a partner cooperation issue or a basing arrangement proposal from an operational contributor. France said that the question of whether Qatar should be addressed as a partner or as an operational contributor was an open one, but that Paris likely would be more comfortable if Doha's contribution to ISAF exceeded allowing the ISAF liaison group to operate at al-Udeid. 10.(C) Several Allies and the chairman also reviewed their impression that Qatar attached considerable importance to the personal relationship which NATO Secretary General (SYG) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was developing with the Amir and Heir Apparent. We supported this observation, noting there had emerged a two-track process in which Simmons negotiated a substantive text and the SYG pursued development of a personal relationship with the Qatari leadership. 11.(C) Request for guidance: NATO proposed on March 16 that Allies consider the following text as a starting point on negotiation of limited security assurance language for Qatar linked to their hosting of the ISAF liaison group: TEXT BEGINS NATO will consult with the State of Qatar if that country perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security in the context of the ISAF functions currently being undertaken within the Combined Air Operations Center at al Udeid Airbase and NATO's request to the State of Qatar to allow NATO personnel to function in support of the ISAF mission. The security of the State of Qatar is of concern to the Alliance. END TEXT 12.(C) RFG continued: USNATO recommends that Washington instruct it to propose an alternate formula as follows: NATO will consult with the State of Qatar on security concerns which are mutually perceived as credible threats to the State of Qatar, and which stem from the State of Qatar's hosting of the ISAF functions currently being undertaken within the Combined Air Operations Center at al Udeid Airbase and NATO's request to the State of Qatar to allow NATO personnel to function in support of the ISAF mission. In this context, the security of the State of Qatar is of concern to the Alliance. 13.(C) RFG Continued: Should Washington consider the above outlined approach too extensive, it could consider an alternative approach for NATO to pursue in which it substitutes pursuing a broad agreement with Qatar with a package of considering Qatar an ISAF contributor (and thus adding it to ISAF format meetings - a possible prestigious opportunity for Doha),signing an annual individual USNATO 00000172 003 OF 003 cooperation plan for Qatar, offering mobile training teams from the Middle East Training and Cooperation Initiative (METCI),and asking the SYG to send the para. 11 security assurance language in a letter to the Amir or Heir Apparent, perhaps in conjunction with a personal trip to Doha. This alternative approach could be a fall back plan as well, should Allies not reach agreement on a common approach next week. 14.(C) Comment: Based on Allied internal discussions of how far they are willing to go in striking a bargain with Doha and Simmons' past accounts of his exchanges with Qatar, there would appear to be considerable gaps between NATO and Qatar's positions on this possible agreement. Depending upon the extent to which he is willing to engage personally, SYG de Hoop Scheffer may be able to narrow that gap. Still, it is unclear if the combination of substantive negotiation and SYG personal diplomacy will suffice to bridge the differences between NATO and Qatar. We will know more in early April after Simmons returns from Doha with reactions to the bracketed text NATO plans to offer. End Comment. NULAND