Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USNATO139
2007-03-02 17:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

NATO-QATAR TALKS FAIL, ALLIES PACKING BAGS TO LEAVE

Tags:  MARR PREL MOPS QA 
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VZCZCXRO3844
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHNO #0139 0611758
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021758Z MAR 07
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0569
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 0093
RHIPAAA/USCINCCENT FWD IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000139 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2017
TAGS: MARR PREL MOPS QA
SUBJECT: NATO-QATAR TALKS FAIL, ALLIES PACKING BAGS TO LEAVE

REF: STATE 25984

Classified By: Political Advisor Stuart Seldowitz; reasons 1.4 (B) AND
(D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000139 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2017 TAGS: MARR PREL MOPS QA SUBJECT: NATO-QATAR TALKS FAIL, ALLIES PACKING BAGS TO LEAVE REF: STATE 25984 Classified By: Political Advisor Stuart Seldowitz; reasons 1.4 (B) AND (D). 1.(C)Summary: On March 2 NATO-Qatar talks remained deadlocked and NATO Deputy Secretary General Robert Simmons concluded his talks with Qatari BGEN Abdullah. Simmons said to the five affected Allies (U.S., UK, Netherlands, Canada and France) that NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer is considering calling the Amir on Sunday to express his regret that the talks have come to this outcome. Neither Allies nor Simmons are predicting a change in the outcome from the SYG,s call, but assess it might mitigate damage to the personal relationship between the NATO SYG and the Amir and further could signal to Qatar that NATO retains an interest in a normal partner relationship and respects the wishes of a sovereign Qatari government. Allies are preparing to have all personnel depart the Combined Air Operations Cell (CAOC) liaison group by March 4 or sooner if transport/logistics allow. End Summary. 2.(C) Per reftel, Allies pre-coordinated the desired message to Simmons in advance of his March 2 talks with BGEN Abdullah. Simmons undertook to pass the reftel message. In his meeting with affected Allies early on March 2, Simmons also reported that, at BGEN Abdullah's request, there also had been an evening meeting on March 1 between NATO Deputy Secretary General Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, Simmons and SIPDIS Abdullah. Simmons reported that it covered no new ground and had been inconclusive. Simmons also had recounted this state of play to all Allied Permanent Representatives during the midday, March 2 North Atlantic Council (NAC). 3.(C) Late on March 2, Simmons reconvened the affected Allies and said that his talks with BGEN Abdullah had concluded with no change from the previous day' s outcome. In discussing departure details with Simmons the Qatari BGEN said that Qatar would be reasonable about the &few days to pack up, which can be worked out locally(8 Simmons said that he had conveyed both U.S. and UK requests that they consider their military personnel in Qatar to be covered by bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCA). The affected Allies agreed that they would consult with NATO military authorities to start moving NATO personnel out of Qatar as soon as travel could be arranged. Arrangements for the remote communications circuit to constitute new liaison connections are being made between NATO and CAOC personnel, per NATO military staff. 4.(C) NATO authorities do not anticipate that Qatar will publicize this outcome. We would not recommend any public comment on the matter. On a contingency basis, the UK said that it plans to use the following "if asked" guidance: -- The U.S. Combined Air Operations Center based at al Udeid air base in Qatar provides C3 functions to air operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. -- Following negotiations the NATO ISAF contribution to the CAOC is being relocated to Kabul. -- This relocation will not impede the functions of the CAOC. -- This is a matter for NATO. The UK relationship with Qatar remains unaffected by these developments. 5.(C) Comment: USNATO recommends a similar public diplomacy posture to that in para. 4. This is an unfortunate outcome for NATO's ISAF equities and the immediate NATO-Qatar political relationship, but we understand that alternate measures now being put in place should address NATO's minimum military requirements for liaison from ISAF headquarters in Afghanistan to the CAOC. We are encouraging the NATO SYG to reach out to the Amir. We do not recommend consideration of further U.S. involvement in this NATO matter unless and until the NATO SYG and the Amir discuss the matter. End Comment. NULAND

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