AFGHANISTAN: INFORMAL MEETING OF REGIONAL COMMAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000112 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2017 TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MASS KPAO AF JA SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: INFORMAL MEETING OF REGIONAL COMMAND SOUTH MISSIONS YIELDS IDEAS REF: A. USNATO 109 ¶B. 22FEB07 COCKRELL/MOELLER/JOHNSON/SHEA EMAIL Classified By: Charge Richard G. Olson, For Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: -Force Generation: RC/S missions agreed that there was a general lack of clarity on just what CJSOR shortfalls remained post Seville, and several RC-S allies intend to ask the SYG for a clear list from SHAPE. Canada and the UK noted progress on the sensitive issue of bringing the UAE and Jordan, respectively, into ISAF. Denmark will boost its ISAF presence. -Public Diplomacy: The group endorsed NSA Hadley's idea for a NATO Strategic Communication Task Force, presented earlier in the day during his coffee meeting with the North Atlantic Council (Ref A). -ANSF Train/Equip: RC-S Allies would welcome a NAC briefing in ISAF format on current CSTC-A efforts. -Japanese PRT Assistance Offer: Agreement that Embassies in Japan should encourage the GOJ to spend the $20 million earmarked for NATO PRT proposals (Ref B) in the south where development can impact security, or in under funded provinces elsewhere. -- COMMENT: After a somewhat slow start, the RC/S grouping is now beginning to show utility as a forum for generating and exchanging ideas. END COMMENT. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) UK Ambassador Eldon hosted the February 21 informal biweekly meeting of RC-S ambassadors. Charge Olson attended for USNATO. ¶3. On force generation, the Netherlands in particular expressed frustration that Ambassadors have not yet seen a definitive view of where the Alliance stands on filling CJSOR shortfalls, and stated this weakens Ambassadors' ability to support NATO in their capitals. The UK also noted that such a list needs to be carefully produced, with particular attention paid to how requirements shortfalls are prioritized - Ambassadors find the rug taken out from under their feet when they convey to capital a particular set of information at one point in time, only to have the information change unexpectedly shortly thereafter. Several RC-S ambassadors intend to ask the SYG to obtain a more user-friendly list from SACEUR. The UK and Canada noted their ongoing talks with Jordan and the UAE, respectively, to bring forces into ISAF, and the sensitivity of those discussions; DCM Olson echoed the need for discretion. The Danish ambassador informed the that Denmark plans to withdraw from Iraq, and predicted ISAF deployment would increase by 200, from approximately 400 to 600 soldiers, by August 2007. ¶4. (C) Turning to public diplomacy, RC-S allies endorsed NSA Hadley's call earlier in the day for a NATO Strategic Communication Task Force to enhance the PD efforts of NATO and ISAF. The UK noted, though, that all Allies must first agree on common messages; not all Allies are necessarily in agreement with many of the themes that the RC-S group views as important. (Comment: such as NATO's role in reconstruction and development, and the manner in which NATO should interact with other international actors such as the UN and EU. End comment.) The U.S. made the point that Washington was looking closely at PD models involving a single, dynamic spokesman, along the lines of the "Jamie Shea model" that was developed in the Kosovo crisis. Estonia stressed the need for consistency in media messages from both NATO HQ and ISAF military spokesmen. The UK Ambassador summed up, noting the group agreed that moving ahead on the basis of the three strands outlined by the UK, U.S., and Estonian representatives would be a good start. COMMENT: If the U.S. can now quickly present the SYG and Allies with a clear vision of how the proposed Strategic Communications Task Force would work, NSA Hadley's NAC briefing and this USNATO 00000112 002 OF 002 solid RC-S backing provide us some traction to work the issue. END COMMENT. ¶5. (C) The UK opened discussion on training and equipping the ANSF with a readout of a recent discussion between MOD Browne and Afghan MOD Wardak. Wardak did not support the idea of a regional ANA training center in the south, and again lobbied for UK equipment donations to the ANA. The UK believed that Wardak's request was not part of an integrated approach to ANSF equipping. DCM Olson suggested that it might be useful to arrange a NAC briefing by CSTC-A, perhaps in conjunction with ACO and ACT, on current ANSF training and equipping efforts, in light on NATO's ongoing equipment support to the ANA and deliberations on a greater training role. RC-S allies welcomed this, and suggested a brief should also include ISAF non-NATO troop contributors. The UK ambassador also made the point that it was time to start "twisting arms" at NATO to fill NATO's commitment to staff embedded trainers (OMLTs) with select ANA units, thus far unmet. ¶6. (C) RC-S allies agreed that follow-up by NATO SCR in Kabul Daan Everts to a recent Japanese proposal to funnel $20 million of development assistance to small, humanitarian projects identified by NATO PRTs would be beneficial. DCM Olson noted that the U.S. would like to see this money channeled to projects in RC-S, where development could help influence the security situation, and to traditionally under funded provinces such as Ghor. RC-S allies concurred that asking Embassies in Tokyo to pass this message to the Japanese could be beneficial. COMMENT: Details on the Japanese proposal have been passed to the Department in ref email. Our PRTs stand to have an opportunity to direct "free" money to worthy local organizations and projects in their provinces. The NATO stamp on the process - something explicitly requested by the Japanese - is of great benefit to our partnership goals at NATO, and NATO's budding relationship with Japan. An appropriate instruction to Embassy Tokyo, vetted closely with our PRT officers and Embassy Kabul, noting USG enthusiasm for the Japanese offer, and initial thoughts on worthy provinces and PRTs could be beneficial in continuing to steer the Japanese in the right direction. Meanwhile, the faster that U.S. PRTs can get proposals to the Japanese, via the NATO SCR in Kabul, the greater the chance we have of seeing our proposals funded. END COMMENT. OLSON