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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
07USNATO112 2007-02-23 12:00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

AFGHANISTAN: INFORMAL MEETING OF REGIONAL COMMAND

Tags:   NATO PREL MOPS MASS KPAO AF JA 
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1. (C) SUMMARY:

-Force Generation: RC/S missions agreed that there was a
general lack of clarity on just what CJSOR shortfalls
remained post Seville, and several RC-S allies intend to ask
the SYG for a clear list from SHAPE. Canada and the UK noted
progress on the sensitive issue of bringing the UAE and
Jordan, respectively, into ISAF. Denmark will boost its ISAF
presence.

-Public Diplomacy: The group endorsed NSA Hadley's idea for a
NATO Strategic Communication Task Force, presented earlier in
the day during his coffee meeting with the North Atlantic
Council (Ref A).

-ANSF Train/Equip: RC-S Allies would welcome a NAC briefing
in ISAF format on current CSTC-A efforts.

-Japanese PRT Assistance Offer: Agreement that Embassies in
Japan should encourage the GOJ to spend the $20 million
earmarked for NATO PRT proposals (Ref B) in the south where
development can impact security, or in under funded provinces
elsewhere.

-- COMMENT: After a somewhat slow start, the RC/S grouping is
now beginning to show utility as a forum for generating and
exchanging ideas. END COMMENT.

END SUMMARY.



2. (C) UK Ambassador Eldon hosted the February 21 informal
biweekly meeting of RC-S ambassadors. Charge Olson attended
for USNATO.



3. On force generation, the Netherlands in particular
expressed frustration that Ambassadors have not yet seen a
definitive view of where the Alliance stands on filling CJSOR
shortfalls, and stated this weakens Ambassadors' ability to
support NATO in their capitals. The UK also noted that such
a list needs to be carefully produced, with particular
attention paid to how requirements shortfalls are prioritized
- Ambassadors find the rug taken out from under their feet
when they convey to capital a particular set of information
at one point in time, only to have the information change
unexpectedly shortly thereafter. Several RC-S ambassadors
intend to ask the SYG to obtain a more user-friendly list
from SACEUR. The UK and Canada noted their ongoing talks
with Jordan and the UAE, respectively, to bring forces into
ISAF, and the sensitivity of those discussions; DCM Olson
echoed the need for discretion. The Danish ambassador
informed the that Denmark plans to withdraw from Iraq, and
predicted ISAF deployment would increase by 200, from
approximately 400 to 600 soldiers, by August 2007.



4. (C) Turning to public diplomacy, RC-S allies endorsed NSA
Hadley's call earlier in the day for a NATO Strategic
Communication Task Force to enhance the PD efforts of NATO
and ISAF. The UK noted, though, that all Allies must first
agree on common messages; not all Allies are necessarily in
agreement with many of the themes that the RC-S group views
as important. (Comment: such as NATO's role in
reconstruction and development, and the manner in which NATO
should interact with other international actors such as the
UN and EU. End comment.) The U.S. made the point that
Washington was looking closely at PD models involving a
single, dynamic spokesman, along the lines of the "Jamie Shea
model" that was developed in the Kosovo crisis. Estonia
stressed the need for consistency in media messages from both
NATO HQ and ISAF military spokesmen. The UK Ambassador
summed up, noting the group agreed that moving ahead on the
basis of the three strands outlined by the UK, U.S., and
Estonian representatives would be a good start. COMMENT: If
the U.S. can now quickly present the SYG and Allies with a
clear vision of how the proposed Strategic Communications
Task Force would work, NSA Hadley's NAC briefing and this

USNATO 00000112 002 OF 002


solid RC-S backing provide us some traction to work the
issue. END COMMENT.



5. (C) The UK opened discussion on training and equipping the
ANSF with a readout of a recent discussion between MOD Browne
and Afghan MOD Wardak. Wardak did not support the idea of a
regional ANA training center in the south, and again lobbied
for UK equipment donations to the ANA. The UK believed that
Wardak's request was not part of an integrated approach to
ANSF equipping. DCM Olson suggested that it might be useful
to arrange a NAC briefing by CSTC-A, perhaps in conjunction
with ACO and ACT, on current ANSF training and equipping
efforts, in light on NATO's ongoing equipment support to the
ANA and deliberations on a greater training role. RC-S
allies welcomed this, and suggested a brief should also
include ISAF non-NATO troop contributors. The UK ambassador
also made the point that it was time to start "twisting arms"
at NATO to fill NATO's commitment to staff embedded trainers
(OMLTs) with select ANA units, thus far unmet.



6. (C) RC-S allies agreed that follow-up by NATO SCR in Kabul
Daan Everts to a recent Japanese proposal to funnel $20
million of development assistance to small, humanitarian
projects identified by NATO PRTs would be beneficial. DCM
Olson noted that the U.S. would like to see this money
channeled to projects in RC-S, where development could help
influence the security situation, and to traditionally under
funded provinces such as Ghor. RC-S allies concurred that
asking Embassies in Tokyo to pass this message to the
Japanese could be beneficial. COMMENT: Details on the
Japanese proposal have been passed to the Department in ref
email. Our PRTs stand to have an opportunity to direct
"free" money to worthy local organizations and projects in
their provinces. The NATO stamp on the process - something
explicitly requested by the Japanese - is of great benefit to
our partnership goals at NATO, and NATO's budding
relationship with Japan. An appropriate instruction to
Embassy Tokyo, vetted closely with our PRT officers and
Embassy Kabul, noting USG enthusiasm for the Japanese offer,
and initial thoughts on worthy provinces and PRTs could be
beneficial in continuing to steer the Japanese in the right
direction. Meanwhile, the faster that U.S. PRTs can get
proposals to the Japanese, via the NATO SCR in Kabul, the
greater the chance we have of seeing our proposals funded.
END COMMENT.


OLSON