NATO/MACEDONIA: PM GRUEVSKI HEARS ALLIES' CONCERNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000101 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2017 TAGS: NATO PREL PGOV MK SUBJECT: NATO/MACEDONIA: PM GRUEVSKI HEARS ALLIES' CONCERNS OVER DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPASSE Classified By: Charge Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Macedonian PM Gruevski told NATO's North Atlantic Council on February 14 that he was committed to implementing the reforms necessary to secure a membership invitation from NATO at its 2008 Summit. Allies offered solid support for Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic course, but expressed serious concerns about the poor state of relations between the government and opposition, in particular the ethnic Albanian DUI party that was boycotting Parliament. Gruevski outlined all the efforts he had made to reach out to DUI and start a dialogue, but said DUI was not reciprocating and was following a strategy of pressuring him to include them in the government. Following the NAC session, Ambassador Nuland warned Gruevski that the conflict with DUI was undermining Macedonia's NATO aspirations and that he needed to improve the political climate soon if Macedonia hoped to earn an invitation in 2008. END SUMMARY. GRUEVSKI: NATO ACCESSION IS TOP PRIORITY ¶2. (C) In a February 14 address to the North Atlantic Council, Macedonian PM Gruevski said that NATO membership was Macedonia's highest priority and his government was committed to completing all the steps necessary to secure an invitation in 2008 to join NATO. He acknowledged difficulties with some parties in the opposition, but said his goal remained to unify all parties around the reform agenda and said he expected a similarly responsible attitude from the opposition. The 90 percent public support for NATO membership gave him confidence Macedonia would succeed. ¶3. (C) Gruevski listed the steps the government had taken to try to accommodate the opposition ethnic Albanian DUI party, noting that it had accepted 40 amendments from the opposition in its first four months in office, whereas the previous government accepted only 13 opposition amendments in 3 years. He stressed that inter-ethnic relations were good among the general population despite the conflict between political parties, as illustrated by a UNDP report from the end of 2006 showing that only a small percentage of ethnic Albanians and Macedonians were dissatisfied with the state of ethnic relations. ¶4. (C) Gruevski outlined Macedonia's efforts to fight corruption and trafficking in persons and to reform the judiciary. He expressed Macedonia's commitment to fulfill the Ohrid Framework Agreement, noting Macedonia had tripled the funds for hiring ethnic Albanians in government institutions and adopted a law on the equitable representation of ethnic groups in government. ¶5. (C) Gruevski highlighted Macedonia's economic reforms and said new tax laws, reductions in bureaucratic obstacles to business, as well as steps to fight corruption and implement the rule of law had led to an increase in foreign direct investment, a key goal of the government. He also highlighted Macedonia's contributions to NATO operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo as evidence of Macedonia's evolution from a security consumer to a security provider. He stressed that Macedonia was committed to maintaining good relations with both Kosovo and Serbia and to supporting international efforts to resolve the status of Kosovo. Demarcation of the border with Kosovo was an important issue for Macedonia, but one that was satisfactorily addressed in UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari's proposals. ALLIES PLEDGE SUPPORT, CITE CONCERNS OVER DOMESTIC POLITICS ¶6. (C) Most Allies offered support for Macedonia's ambitions for Euro-Atlantic aspirations while expressing serious concerns about the ethnic Albania party DUI's boycott of Parliament and the general lack of political dialogue between government and opposition. ¶7. (C) Ambassador Nuland stated that no Ally wanted Macedonia in NATO more than the U.S., but the U.S. was worried. Reforms had slowed, implementation of the Framework Agreement had slowed, and despite 90 percent public support for joining NATO Macedonia was not making a unified effort to implement the necessary reforms. She asked the Prime Minister to lead an inclusive political process that would produce results. She urged constructive cooperation by Athens and Skopje to resolve the issue of Macedonia's name and noted U.S. support for the UN-led negotiations to resolve this issue. ¶8. (C) UK Ambassador Eldon supported Macedonia's movement toward Euro-Atlantic integration but said London was increasingly concerned about the current political crisis, USNATO 00000101 002 OF 002 which risked derailing Macedonia's progress toward the EU and NATO. He urged cautious handling of the four cases that the ICTY intended to return to Macedonian jurisdiction and suggested Macedonia only accept the cases when its judicial system was ready and to take them one at a time with the least controversial first. Italy, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Spain, and The Netherlands reiterated concerns about the opposition's boycott and stressed the need to establish a constructive political dialogue. ¶9. (C) Greek Ambassador Zepos stressed that Greece had consistently supported the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Balkan states, but noted the need to resolve the dispute over Macedonia's name. He emphasized there should be no violations of the 1995 Interim Agreement on this issue. He said Greece had already displayed good will on this issue and hoped Macedonia would take the necessary final steps to resolve the issue. ¶10. (C) Responding to Perm Reps comments, Gruevski stressed that the problem was not with the opposition as a whole, but with one party. He noted his governing coalition included an ethnic Albanian party with only slightly fewer seats in Parliament than DUI. He said he had invested a lot of effort into establishing a political dialogue, but DUI was resisting because it was trying to force its way into the government. While a boycott of Parliament was never a good thing, it was not unusual in the Balkans. Dialogue should not have preconditions, yet DUI had set four conditions for any talks with the government. ¶11. (C) Regarding the transfer of ICTY cases, Gruevski said his government was "not pushing" the ICTY to transfer the cases soon and was aware it would be better if they came at the end of the year, but was also preparing in case the cases came sooner. He thanked Greece for its support and said that after 17 years the name issue should be resolved. Macedonia was committed to the UN process and agreed there should be no violations of the interim agreement. ¶12. (C) In concluding the session, SYG de Hoop Scheffer noted that Macedonia would find itself under increasing scrutiny as a NATO aspirant, which is why Allies had expressed both support and worries. He noted that while Parliamentary boycotts may be the norm in the Balkans, they are not among NATO members. NULAND: YOU ARE NOT ON A PATH TO MAKE IT ¶13. (C) Meeting with Ambassador Nuland and DCM Olson following the NAC session, Gruevski expressed appreciation for U.S. support and reiterated his willingness to do what was necessary to secure an invitation to join the Alliance. Revisiting the issue of DUI, he noted he had originally invited DUI to join his government, but they insisted on being the only ethnic Albanian party in the governing coalition to the exclusion of the traditional ethnic Albanian partner of PM Gruevski's party. DUI was now demanding that four difficult pre-conditions be met before it would even participate in talks. Gruevski said that recent pressure from the EU and other international organizations had emboldened DUI, which felt it had protection from the international community and leverage to force concessions from the government. ¶14. (C) Nuland noted that Macedonia did not have time to waste and the dispute with DUI was damaging Macedonia's membership chances. "DUI is killing you and all of Macedonia," she said, "it was pretty unanimous around that table today that you are not on a path to make it." Macedonia could not afford to allow the deadlock to continue into the spring. If Macedonia could not get the necessary reforms implemented it would not have enough support to win an invitation. By November, at the latest, the U.S would make decisions about which countries to support for NATO membership invitations at the 2008 NATO Summit. Even with U.S. support, Macedonia currently only had the backing of about five other Allies. Nuland said many other Allies were skeptical about further NATO enlargement and so Macedonia should not lose the window of opportunity presented by NATO's plans to offer invitations in 2008. OLSON