NATO/MACEDONIA: PM GRUEVSKI HEARS ALLIES' CONCERNS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL PGOV MK
SUBJECT: NATO/MACEDONIA: PM GRUEVSKI HEARS ALLIES' CONCERNS
OVER DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPASSE


Classified By: Charge Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Macedonian PM Gruevski told NATO's North
Atlantic Council on February 14 that he was committed to
implementing the reforms necessary to secure a membership
invitation from NATO at its 2008 Summit. Allies offered solid
support for Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic course, but expressed
serious concerns about the poor state of relations between
the government and opposition, in particular the ethnic
Albanian DUI party that was boycotting Parliament. Gruevski
outlined all the efforts he had made to reach out to DUI and
start a dialogue, but said DUI was not reciprocating and was
following a strategy of pressuring him to include them in the
government. Following the NAC session, Ambassador Nuland
warned Gruevski that the conflict with DUI was undermining
Macedonia's NATO aspirations and that he needed to improve
the political climate soon if Macedonia hoped to earn an
invitation in 2008. END SUMMARY.

GRUEVSKI: NATO ACCESSION IS TOP PRIORITY


2. (C) In a February 14 address to the North Atlantic
Council, Macedonian PM Gruevski said that NATO membership was
Macedonia's highest priority and his government was committed
to completing all the steps necessary to secure an invitation
in 2008 to join NATO. He acknowledged difficulties with some
parties in the opposition, but said his goal remained to
unify all parties around the reform agenda and said he
expected a similarly responsible attitude from the
opposition. The 90 percent public support for NATO
membership gave him confidence Macedonia would succeed.


3. (C) Gruevski listed the steps the government had taken
to try to accommodate the opposition ethnic Albanian DUI
party, noting that it had accepted 40 amendments from the
opposition in its first four months in office, whereas the
previous government accepted only 13 opposition amendments in
3 years. He stressed that inter-ethnic relations were good
among the general population despite the conflict between
political parties, as illustrated by a UNDP report from the
end of 2006 showing that only a small percentage of ethnic
Albanians and Macedonians were dissatisfied with the state of
ethnic relations.


4. (C) Gruevski outlined Macedonia's efforts to fight
corruption and trafficking in persons and to reform the
judiciary. He expressed Macedonia's commitment to fulfill
the Ohrid Framework Agreement, noting Macedonia had tripled
the funds for hiring ethnic Albanians in government
institutions and adopted a law on the equitable
representation of ethnic groups in government.


5. (C) Gruevski highlighted Macedonia's economic reforms
and said new tax laws, reductions in bureaucratic obstacles
to business, as well as steps to fight corruption and
implement the rule of law had led to an increase in foreign
direct investment, a key goal of the government. He also
highlighted Macedonia's contributions to NATO operations in
Afghanistan and Kosovo as evidence of Macedonia's evolution
from a security consumer to a security provider. He stressed
that Macedonia was committed to maintaining good relations
with both Kosovo and Serbia and to supporting international
efforts to resolve the status of Kosovo. Demarcation of the
border with Kosovo was an important issue for Macedonia, but
one that was satisfactorily addressed in UN Special Envoy
Ahtisaari's proposals.

ALLIES PLEDGE SUPPORT, CITE CONCERNS OVER DOMESTIC POLITICS


6. (C) Most Allies offered support for Macedonia's
ambitions for Euro-Atlantic aspirations while expressing
serious concerns about the ethnic Albania party DUI's boycott
of Parliament and the general lack of political dialogue
between government and opposition.


7. (C) Ambassador Nuland stated that no Ally wanted
Macedonia in NATO more than the U.S., but the U.S. was
worried. Reforms had slowed, implementation of the Framework
Agreement had slowed, and despite 90 percent public support
for joining NATO Macedonia was not making a unified effort to
implement the necessary reforms. She asked the Prime
Minister to lead an inclusive political process that would
produce results. She urged constructive cooperation by
Athens and Skopje to resolve the issue of Macedonia's name
and noted U.S. support for the UN-led negotiations to resolve
this issue.


8. (C) UK Ambassador Eldon supported Macedonia's movement
toward Euro-Atlantic integration but said London was
increasingly concerned about the current political crisis,

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which risked derailing Macedonia's progress toward the EU and
NATO. He urged cautious handling of the four cases that the
ICTY intended to return to Macedonian jurisdiction and
suggested Macedonia only accept the cases when its judicial
system was ready and to take them one at a time with the
least controversial first. Italy, Czech Republic, Bulgaria,
Spain, and The Netherlands reiterated concerns about the
opposition's boycott and stressed the need to establish a
constructive political dialogue.


9. (C) Greek Ambassador Zepos stressed that Greece had
consistently supported the Euro-Atlantic integration of the
Balkan states, but noted the need to resolve the dispute over
Macedonia's name. He emphasized there should be no
violations of the 1995 Interim Agreement on this issue. He
said Greece had already displayed good will on this issue and
hoped Macedonia would take the necessary final steps to
resolve the issue.


10. (C) Responding to Perm Reps comments, Gruevski stressed
that the problem was not with the opposition as a whole, but
with one party. He noted his governing coalition included an
ethnic Albanian party with only slightly fewer seats in
Parliament than DUI. He said he had invested a lot of effort
into establishing a political dialogue, but DUI was resisting
because it was trying to force its way into the government.
While a boycott of Parliament was never a good thing, it was
not unusual in the Balkans. Dialogue should not have
preconditions, yet DUI had set four conditions for any talks
with the government.


11. (C) Regarding the transfer of ICTY cases, Gruevski said
his government was "not pushing" the ICTY to transfer the
cases soon and was aware it would be better if they came at
the end of the year, but was also preparing in case the cases
came sooner. He thanked Greece for its support and said that
after 17 years the name issue should be resolved. Macedonia
was committed to the UN process and agreed there should be no
violations of the interim agreement.


12. (C) In concluding the session, SYG de Hoop Scheffer
noted that Macedonia would find itself under increasing
scrutiny as a NATO aspirant, which is why Allies had
expressed both support and worries. He noted that while
Parliamentary boycotts may be the norm in the Balkans, they
are not among NATO members.

NULAND: YOU ARE NOT ON A PATH TO MAKE IT


13. (C) Meeting with Ambassador Nuland and DCM Olson
following the NAC session, Gruevski expressed appreciation
for U.S. support and reiterated his willingness to do what
was necessary to secure an invitation to join the Alliance.
Revisiting the issue of DUI, he noted he had originally
invited DUI to join his government, but they insisted on
being the only ethnic Albanian party in the governing
coalition to the exclusion of the traditional ethnic Albanian
partner of PM Gruevski's party. DUI was now demanding that
four difficult pre-conditions be met before it would even
participate in talks. Gruevski said that recent pressure
from the EU and other international organizations had
emboldened DUI, which felt it had protection from the
international community and leverage to force concessions
from the government.


14. (C) Nuland noted that Macedonia did not have time to
waste and the dispute with DUI was damaging Macedonia's
membership chances. "DUI is killing you and all of
Macedonia," she said, "it was pretty unanimous around that
table today that you are not on a path to make it."
Macedonia could not afford to allow the deadlock to continue
into the spring. If Macedonia could not get the necessary
reforms implemented it would not have enough support to win
an invitation. By November, at the latest, the U.S would
make decisions about which countries to support for NATO
membership invitations at the 2008 NATO Summit. Even with
U.S. support, Macedonia currently only had the backing of
about five other Allies. Nuland said many other Allies were
skeptical about further NATO enlargement and so Macedonia
should not lose the window of opportunity presented by NATO's
plans to offer invitations in 2008.
OLSON