IAEA/IRAN: UK AND FRANCE LOOK FORWARD, DG TO MEET

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000778 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR IO/T, IO/MNSA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017 TAGS: IAEA KNPP PARM IR SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: UK AND FRANCE LOOK FORWARD, DG TO MEET MILIBAND REF: DOHA 01195 Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b,d and h ¶1. (S) Summary: UK Ambassador Smith discussed DG ElBaradei's forthcoming trip to London with Ambassador Schulte December 21. He expected Foreign Secretary Miliband to underline the central message that international pressure on Iran must be maintained. The UK was leery of the DG's possible travel to Tehran in January and of ElBaradei playing the role of "international savior" rather than that of "international servant" and his supplanting Solana's negotiating role on behalf of the P5 1. Smith believed that the Secretariat should report to the Board prior to March or provide a technical briefing, but agreed that much would depend on UNSC action. In a separate meeting December 20, French Ambassador Deniau suggested, in light of the NIE findings, a new operative para in the next UNSCR that would broaden the IAEA's investigative authority on Iran's past weapons program. Deniau also raised the possibility of a Board resolution in March after the adoption of a new UNSCR. End Summary. -------------- UK Wary of "International Savior" -------------- ¶2. (S) Ambassador Schulte December 21 reviewed next steps on Iran with UK Ambassador Smith, and discussed DG ElBaradei's planned January 7 meeting with Foreign Secretary Miliband as well as the DG's possible travel to Tehran. Ambassador Smith reported EU-2 buy-in and active engagement post-NIE. He welcomed positive signals out of Berlin, but expressed concern that the message had been diluted in some quarters, most notably by the German Ambassador in Tehran (who had served previously in Vienna). Smith had just returned from an annual non-proliferation conference in Wilton Park and was encouraged that there was consensus on the need to keep the pressure on Iran. ¶3. (S) Ambassador Schulte briefed Smith on his discussions on the NIE in Qatar (reftel) and with ElBaradei on December 19. ElBaradei is still focused on the need for a "confession" but was short on specifics and wobbly on suspension. Smith agreed with Ambassador Schulte that confession was not just providing answers to questions posed. On the work plan, Ambassador Schulte reported that the DG was also no longer committed to a December 31 deadline and planned to report in 
February for the March Board. Depending on the outcome of the Secretariat's talks with Iran, the DG had told Ambassador Schulte that he may travel to Tehran to meet with Ayatollah Khamenei in mid-January after his London trip. The DG also indicated that he hoped to carry a message from the P5 1. ¶4. (S) Smith preferred that the DG not travel to Tehran but saw no way to stop him. Such a trip increased the risk of ElBaradei once again assuming the mantle of "international savior" rather than "international servant." He agreed with Ambassador Schulte that we must keep ElBaradei focused on his job and mitigate unhelpful political statements. The UK took particular exception to ElBaradei's post-NIE remark that Iran had been "vindicated," and would convey that in the DG's meeting with Miliband. Ambassador Schulte recommended that the DG be reminded of how the Iranians had exploited his last trip to Iran in the spring. ¶5. (S) According to Smith, the Foreign Secretary's central message to ElBaradei will be the need to maintain international pressure. The "big picture" remained that we are in a "highly unsatisfactory" situation and all options remain on the table. The DG must understand that we cannot get to a more satisfactory level by letting up pressure on Iran. The NIE did not make the Iranian threat less imminent, and the UK agreed the timeline remained the same. Ambassador Schulte did not expect a confession from Iran, and EU diplomats in Tehran also did not believe the regime was ready to negotiate (ref a). For Smith, what mattered was a confession at the "macro-level" and an unequivocal decision not to pursue a weapons' program. Such a decision, like that made by the DPRK or Libya, was more difficult now, he opined. The Iranians were not convinced, were not ready to come clean, and were inclined to keep their options open; in this context, it made sense to keep the pressure on. Smith was unsure how he would recommend the Foreign Secretary address the need for suspension with ElBaradei. ElBaradei was "infuriatingly inconstant" on the issue, and it may be more useful to revert him to his technical role, i.e. leaving the Agency out of the debate on suspension. He acknowledged, however, that ElBaradei's support for UNSCRs on suspension in his last report was useful. ¶6. (S) Ambassador Schulte cautioned that ElBaradei would look to Miliband for a message to carry to Tehran, perhaps some type of amnesty he could offer in exchange for confession. Smith observed that ElBaradei should not usurp Solana's role and doubted there would be any "rabbits out of the hat", sweeteners or tangible inducements Miliband could suggest to ElBaradei. Ambassador Schulte suggested that it might be useful to have the Secretary and Miliband speak in advance of the UK meeting with ElBaradei, and for our governments to formally demarche ElBaradei before any trip to Tehran. -------------- Next Report to the Board -------------- ¶7. (C) Regarding next steps in the Board, Smith was not inclined to allow the Secretariat to sit on its hands until March, and felt that the Board was owed an update on the Secretariat's dealings with Tehran. Ambassador Schulte noted SIPDIS the possibility of piggy-backing on a Special Board meeting on India, if one is held in January; asking for a DG report absent a Board meeting (to which the Secretariat could object); or requesting a technical briefing from the Secretariat. Smith observed that a technical briefing could SIPDIS keep the Secretariat from further backtracking on the work plan deadline. He agreed with Ambassador Schulte that much also depends on UNSC action in January. If a UNSCR were adopted prior to the March Board, there may be an opportunity to consider the French proposal for a Board resolution. -------------- France: Moving Forward in the UNSC -------------- ¶8. (S) Ambassador Schulte also met with French Ambassador Deniau on December 19 to discuss the way forward on Iran, to provide a readout of his trip to the Gulf (ref b),and review discussions with ElBaradei on the Iran NIE. Deniau agreed that we should not accept further "delay" in the year-end work plan deadline but was not sure we had a choice. France's position remained unchanged post-NIE. If the NIE is "true," he observed, it created real concerns that Iran had a nuclear weapons program without the IAEA's knowledge, and we must now verify that those activities no longer exist. Deniau advised we use the new situation created by the NIE to press the IAEA to uncover the pre-2003 weapons program. He proposed that the next UNSCR include an operative Para broadening the IAEA's mandate to conduct a thorough investigation. Asked by Ambassador Schulte about the likelihood that Russia and China would agree, Deniau suggested that this language be "wrapped into" something else, such as calls for greater cooperation and implementation of the Additional Protocol and Code 3.1. He noted that South Africa and Indonesia may pose the greatest obstacles in the Security Council. He agreed that it was important to get a third UNSCR soon in order to show Iran that the Security Council still is engaged and to repeat the requirement for suspension. Deniau also said we should not rule out the idea of a Board resolution in March, especially if the DG's February report is negative. He noted that we now have a good Board and should take advantage of it. ¶9. (C) Deniau reported that the DG is now expected to go to Paris sometime in February to meet FM Kouchner. SCHULTE