IAEA/IRAN: IRAN INFORMS OF INTENT TO STOP CODE 3.1 EARLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000204 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2017 TAGS: IAEA AORC IR KNPP SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: IRAN INFORMS OF INTENT TO STOP CODE 3.1 EARLY NOTIFICATION, IAEA URGES IRAN TO RECONSIDER Classified By: Classified by Amb. Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 (d) and (f) ¶1. (SBU) Iran on March 29 submitted a letter (text at para 5) to the IAEA informing of its intent to halt implementation of Code 3.1 of its Subsidiary Arrangement, requiring early notification of decisions to construct new nuclear facilities or modify existing ones. As justification, the letter cited the "illegal" UNSC resolutions. It also noted that, given Israeli and U.S. threats against Iranian nuclear facilities, Iran would no longer provide information to the IAEA that could jeopardize its security, while citing the IAEA's inability to maintain the confidentiality of sensitive information. ¶2. (SBU) The IAEA sent a reply (text at para 6) on March 30 citing the 1992 Board decision "concerning the modalities for the provision of design information pursuant to Article 42 of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements as an important measure to strengthen the effective implementation of safeguards." It notes that Iran's decision is "regrettable" and asked Iran to reconsider its decision. ¶3. (C) We discussed the legal implications of the letter with the head of IAEA's legal Department, Johann Rautenbach. He said that while the IAEA could not agree to the Iranian move because of the 1992 Board decision, it does not appear that Iran has yet violated its safeguards agreement concerning the provision of design information. The agreemen calls on Iran to provide design information as early as possible prior to the introduction of nuclear material. Article 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements under the 1992 decision defines "as early as possible" as "at the time of the decision to construct." We note that the IAEA has already found Iran in non-compliance in part for this very reason, i.e. the DG in his November 2003 report noted that Iran had introduced nuclear material into the Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plant without declaring or providing design notification of the plant to the IAEA. ¶4. (C) At this point, however, the political and practical implications of Iran's move seem more significant than the legal. In our initial consultations with like-minded missions, all agreed that Iran is moving in the wrong direction: less transparency and less cooperation, leading to more questions and suspicion. We will wait to see if the Iranians are able to satisfy the Secretariat on the issue of monitoring at Natanz before making a recommendation on the advisability of a special Board meeting. ¶5. (SBU) Letter from the Permanent Mission of Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General, Internationa Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna. BEGIN TEXT: No. 034/2007, 29 March 2007 Excellency, Upon the instruction of my Government I have the honor to convey the followings: ¶1. The nuclear issue of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been referred to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in contravention with the provisions of the Statute of the IAEA and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In accordance with Article 12 of the Agency's Statute, recognition of non-compliance (diversion to nuclear weapons) is entrusted to the inspections, where the inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the Director General who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors. Not only the inspectors have not reached or concluded any "non- compliance" but instead, they have confirmed non-diversion of nuclear activities to prohibited purposes. ¶2. Whereas resolution of the Board of Governors had consistently addressed the request for suspension of enrichment related activities as a "voluntary and non-legally binding measure", the request has since been abruptly and unilaterally displaced by "requirement". The Agency in accordance with the letter and spirit of its bilateral agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, can in no way justify a demand to suspend a field of activity which not only is permitted, but should indeed be subject of Agency's assistance. The Board of Governor's unlawful reference to suspension as a "requirement" has, in turn, served as the basis for UNSC resolutions. As such, the Board of Governors has failed its obligations towards the Islamic Republic of Iran and unduly paved the way for UNSC's forceful measures. ¶3. The nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been peaceful with no diversion to military purposes, and all have been in consent with Iran's legal obligations under the NPT, with no threat to international peace and security, therefore, the resolutions of the UNSC against Iran are contrary to the UN Charter and does not have any legal and lawful basis. ¶4. The highest authorities of the United States and Israeli Regime, in absolute breach of Para 4 of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, are threatening the use of force and attack against the Islamic Republic of Iran and have repeatedly stressed that military action is an option on the table. This endangers the international peace and security and directly threats Iran's national security. ¶5. In accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Article 3 of the Agency's General Conference Resolution 533, any threat of attack or attack against safeguarded nuclear facilities of Iran constitutes a violation of principles of the United Nations Charter, and therefore, the United Nations Security Council has to act immediately. Certainly, continuation of non-action by the UNSC in this respect further endangers the national security of Iran. ¶6. So as long as such threats of military action persist, Iran has no option but protect its security through all means possible, including protection of information which can facilitate openly- stated and aggressive military objectives of the war mongers. This is particularly significant as the Agency has failed systematically and repeatedly to maintain confidentiality of sensitive information despite its firm obligations. At this stage, therefore, such dangerous dissemination of sensitive information will have to be curtailed through steps which limit their scope and availability. Considering the aforementioned facts, the continuation of adoption of resolutions by the UNSC against Iran, shall only complicate the situation, and in no way helps the resolution of the issue undermining the efforts and initiatives to restart negotiations. In view of the above, according to the bill passed by the parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2006, and considering the illegal and unlawful United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747 on 14 March 2007, against Iranian Nation and its peaceful nuclear activities, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has decided that: As long a the full implemention of the provisions on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),specifically achieving the inalienable rights stipulated in Article IV of the Treaty and the cessation of perusing Iran's nuclear dossier with the United Nations Security Council, its full disengagement, and thus the return of the dossier to the framework of the IAEA, in full, is not realized; and as long as potential military adventures are not removed from the table and threats to Iran's securit are not eliminated, further implementation of the modified code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Safeguards Agreement, accepted in 2003, but not yet ratified by the parliament, aimed at enhancing Iran's cooperation with the IAEA, shall be suspended and Iran reverts to implement the codes 3.1 as reflected in the Subsidiary Arrangements on 12 February 1976. Therefore, considering above, the implementaiton of the content of letter 90/95265 dated 26 February 2003, as of date of this letter, is suspended. Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration. Ali Asghar Soltanieh Ambassador, Resident Representative END TEXT. ¶6. (SBU) Text of IAEA response from Expo Director Vilmos Cserveny: BEGIN TEXT 2007-03-30 Sir, I have the honour to refer to your letter of 29 March 2007 to the Director General in which you informed the Agency that Iran has decided to suspend further implementation of the modified Code 3.1 as reflected in the Subsidiary Arrangements in effect since 26 February 2003, and that it would revert to the implementation of Code 3.1 as reflected in the Subsidiary Arrangements of 12 February 1976. I would like to note that this is contrary to the Board's decision reproduced in GOV/2554/Attachment 2/Rev. 2 (1 April 1992), concerning the modalities for the provision of design information pursuant to Article 42 of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements as an important measure to strengthen the effective implementation of safeguards. In this context, I should note that in accordance with this Board decision, the modified text of Code 3.1 is now included in all Subsidiary Arrangements General Parts in force with States that have Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. Iran's decision there is regrettable. I would urge your authorities to reconsider their decision, and to continue to implement the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part that is in effect since 26 February 2003. Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration. Letter from the Permanent Mission of Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna. 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