MONGOLIA NONCOMMITTAL ON 8TH ROTATION IN IRAQ

S E C R E T ULAANBAATAR 000056 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017 TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV MG IZ PL SUBJECT: MONGOLIA NONCOMMITTAL ON 8TH ROTATION IN IRAQ REF: STATE 10550 (NOTAL) Classified By: Ambassador Mark C. Minton, for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) ¶1. (S) Summary: In meetings this week, visiting EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary Thomas Christensen urged that Mongolia send a full 8th rotation of soldiers to provide force protection to Polish troops in Iraq. In response, Foreign Minister Enkhbold noted the government's earlier decision to reduce the deployment to a few staff officers, opined that the government would need a good reason to show the public for reconsidering this, and was noncommittal about changes. Vice Defense Minister Erdenebat responded that the U.S. should adjust its planning to a reduced deployment, citing a more complex domestic political environment, and complaining that past U.S. promises of military and civilian assistance had been slow to be fulfilled. The President's Foreign Policy Advisor noted that the size of the 7th rotation had been hotly debated last summer, but said that the President remains supportive of deployments to Iraq. There is a reasonable chance Mongolia will send a full deployment -- but it likely will be slow in deciding, partially because of the government's political distraction. End summary. ¶2. (S) In a January 29 meeting with Foreign Minister Enkhbold, DAS Christensen drew on reftel points to urge that Mongolia reconsider its preliminary decision to reduce its 8th rotation of soldiers in Iraq to a small number of staff officers. Mongolia's role in providing force protection for Polish soldiers at Camp Echo is greatly appreciated, DAS Christensen said. One of the reasons for the very positive views of Mongolia in Washington is the image of Mongolia and Poland, two young democracies, cooperating to protect the new democracy in Iraq. ¶3. (S) Enkhbold responded that Mongolia had taken on board the position of U.S. and other Coalition partners on its role in the process. Mongolia earlier had decided not to send a full eighth rotation to Iraq. Mongolia would take U.S. and Polish views into account, but that remained Mongolia's position at the moment. The Foreign Minister said he did not know how the issue would come out. However, he said, Mongolia would need a good "excuse" for reconsidering its decision to show the public. As a democratic country, public opinion means a lot. This is not something decided by MFA alone, but rather by MFA and MoD first, then the Cabinet and the National Security Council (note: the President, Speaker and Prime Minister),as well as public opinion and views in Parliament. One thing is very clear: Mongolia wants to develop relations with the U.S. further, and MFA works toward that goal. ¶4. (S) During a January 30 meeting with Vice Defense Minister Erdenebat, DAS Christensen also urged that Mongolia send a full eighth rotation to Iraq. Erdenebat responded that Mongolia's support for OIF and OEF had been consistent through three Cabinets. However, in making its decision on the 7th rotation, Erdenebat said, the NSC had suggested that the 8th rotation should consist of a few staff officers. The Ministry of Defense, he said, must follow the NSC. Erdenebat asserted that Mongolia's Democratic Party (DP) had taken issue with the decision to deploy to Iraq, while the MPRP had pushed the issue. President Enkhbayar had been Prime Minister when the decision was made and remained supportive. Erdenebat noted that he had been Vice Defense Minister from Enkhbayar's Cabinet until now. Speaker Nyamdorj, he continued, had also been a member of the Cabinet in 2003 when the OIF deployment decision was made. The Ministry of Defense remained supportive. However, the political situation currently is complex, Erdenebat commented, with pressures from civil society and a diversity of views in the current "unity" Cabinet. MPRP poll ratings are down, and there is concern that a casualty in Iraq would inflame the street and provide a tool for the DP to try to bring the Cabinet down. Even with a reduced deployment, Erdenebat commented, Mongolia's flag would remain in Iraq, possibly its greatest contribution. The Vice Defense Minister suggested that the U.S. adjust its planning to take into account a reduced Mongolian deployment. ¶5. (S) Erdenebat commented that, before each rotation, a senior U.S. official comes to Mongolia and makes promises of assistance. Once the rotation goes, however, fulfillment of these promises is slow. This has been true, he said, of promised U.S. equipment for Mongolia's increased number of peacekeeping troops, as well as for Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) assistance, which has been promised for several years but only now seemed to be approaching. Erdenebat quoted a Mongolian adage about enticing a child with candy which is tantalizingly visible, but is behind glass. He commented that he was firmly convinced that the original decision in 2004 to include Mongolia as an MCA-eligible country had been linked to the OIF deployment. Erdenebat noted that long range MoD budgetary studies indicated that more resources will be needed to support defense reform needs for "Vision 2018" (note: as well as peacekeeping troop needs, this vision almost certainly includes some aircraft). Would the U.S. help cover these needs? ¶6. (S) DAS Christensen responded that U.S. assistance to Mongolia, military and civilian, is rooted in U.S. commitment to Mongolia's democratic transformation, and is not linked to specific Mongolian policies related to OIF. MCA eligibility was based on a variety of factors related to governance and transparency, not to OIF. It is true that OIF is a key factor in the positive image of Mongolia in Washington, and that image makes advocating support for Mongolia easier within the USG, but this is an abstract link. ¶7. (S) In a January 31 meeting with the Foreign Policy Advisors to the Prime Minister and to the President, DAS Christensen also urged that Mongolia send a full 8th rotation to Iraq. In response, presidential FPA Tsogtbaatar noted that the size of the 7th rotation had been hotly debated within the National Security Council last summer, and said that personalities had not changed. He added that one important factor last summer had been the recognition that Mongolia had not signalled far enough in advance that it intended to downsize its deployment; this factor would not be present during discussion of the 8th rotation. Nevertheless, Tsogtbaatar said, President Enkhbayar remained supportive of SIPDIS Mongolian deployments to Iraq. ¶8. (S) On January 31, Ambassador asked the Polish ambassador whether he had been in contact with the GOM to urge a full 8th rotation. The Pole replied that he had not, and had not received instructions on the matter from Warsaw, nor information on whether the issue had been raised in Warsaw with the Mongolian embassy there. The Polish ambassador undertook to check with Warsaw on the issue and to get back to the Ambassador. ¶9. (S) Comment: We have some optimism that Mongolia will in the end decide to send a full 8th rotation, although this is not a certain outcome. Poland's decision to stay on at Camp Echo changed the situation from that when Mongolia made its preliminary decision last September for a reduced follow-on rotation, and withdrawal now would disappoint the Poles as well as the U.S. However, the GOM likely will officially make any decision to send a full 8th rotation only shortly before the 7th rotation is due to leave in April, akin to the cliffhanger verdict last September. As with the 7th rotation, if MoD starts training troops, this will be a promising sign of the direction of the eventual official decision. While the Vice Defense Minister exaggerated the domestic politics a bit, the current coalition government is not a decisive one, has a dysfunctional Cabinet which is divided on Iraq deployments, and is distracted by ongoing Cabinet turbulence. ¶10. (U) DAS Christensen has cleared this cable. MINTON