TERROR THREAT IN TUNISIA: WHAT HAPPENED, WHY AND

S E C R E T TUNIS 000067

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR NEA/FO - GRAY; NEA/MAG - HOPKINS AND HARRIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS
LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER TS
SUBJECT: TERROR THREAT IN TUNISIA: WHAT HAPPENED, WHY AND
HOW WE SHOULD REACT

REF: A. TUNIS 54 (NOTALS)

B. TUNIS 53

C. TUNIS 49

D. TUNIS 44

E. TUNIS 31 AND PREVIOUS

F. TUNIS 29

Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (S) Over a two-week period in late 2006 and early 2007,
the Government of Tunisia conducted operations against a
significant terrorist group, killing 12 and arresting 15. At
least two GOT security personnel were killed and three
wounded in the operations. The "Salafi" terror group,
according to senior GOT representatives, intended to attack
the US and UK Embassies and/or specific USG and UK officials.
The terrorists had assembled an arsenal of weapons,
including explosives, at several locations and were trained
to use them. While the GOT deserves congratulations for its
success (and condolences for the Tunisian officers who died),
it still has not shared with us critical information on the
group and its plans. While little consolation, the GOT has
shared even less information with other foreign missions and
virtually nothing with the Tunisian public. As a result,
rumors are rampant and include reports that the terrorists
intended to kill President Ben Ali or (more credibly) attack
tourist sites. In the absence of information from the GOT,
we believe there is more to this case and that it is likely
to take quite some time to secure a full account.


2. (S) Tunisians have been shaken by these events. Ben Ali
was shaken too, and reportedly reacted by replacing the head
of Customs. We expect further personnel changes, including
possibly in the cabinet. In light of the threat and the
disturbing failure of the GOT to cooperate fully, senior USG
officials should stress the urgent need for further GOT
information sharing and press for better bilateral engagement
generally. With the GOT operations against the "Salafi"
terror group representing the latest of a series of events
across North Africa, we may be in the middle of a terror push
across the region, possibly coordinated by the GSPC and/or
under the umbrella of al Qaeda. END SUMMARY.

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What We Know
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3. (S) To date, our principal information on the terror
network from the GOT has come from the Ambassador's meetings
with three key Ministers (at the MOI, the Presidency, and the
MFA, see refs A, B, and D). In those meetings, the GOT has
provided important, but very limited details and there has
been some variation in what has been presented. Most
importantly, the GOT has yet to provide some key information,
including, notably, a reported list of US officials targeted
by the terrorists. Minister of Interior Belhaj Kacem, who is
titularly responsible for domestic security matters, offered
almost no specifics on the threat against US interests in
Tunisia, even when pressed (ref A). This series of meetings
make it clear that information about the group, and GOT
security operations to take it down, has been and will
continue to be tightly controlled. Judging by the body
language in the Belhaj Kacem meeting, we do not expect to
receive more detailed information any time soon, despite
promises from the Foreign Minister.


4. (S) To summarize, we have received the following
information from GOT sources:

-- GOT security forces conducted operations against an armed
group of "Salafists" between December 23 and January 3 to
disrupt attacks reportedly planned to coincide with the end
of the year.

-- At least two Tunisian security personnel were killed and
three wounded; 12 members of the armed group were killed and
15 arrested.

-- The group had been preparing attacks against the US and
British embassies. The group had detailed plans of both
Embassies, including images of the facilities obtained from
Google-earth.

-- A list of US and British diplomats was allegedly found
among the group's belongings, suggesting the group may also
have been targeting specific members of those diplomatic
missions.

-- The group, comprised of 27 men, was armed with locally
manufactured explosives and had other significant weapons.
The group was well trained, with some members possibly
trained in Afghanistan.

-- The group was operating out of multiple locations in the
Hammam Lif/Hammam Chatt/Grombalia/Soliman areas.

-- At least six of the group had come out of Algeria and had
originally been identified for the GOT by a friendly
intelligence service.

-- Most of the group was Tunisian. The leader may have been
Mauritanian (or, perhaps, was a Tunisian using a false
Mauritanian passport).


5. (S) However, press reports and contacts offer differing
accounts, which raise concerns about the group's actual
intent and the credibility of GOT information provided to us.
For example, the MOI official statement on the December 23
event suggested the initial shoot out was a chance encounter.
However, Minister Ben Dhia subsequently told Ambassador the
GOT had initiated the attack when it appeared the group had
fully assembled and was ramping up its planning. There are
also many reports the group intended to target tourist sites,
large French department stores (e.g., Carrefour),and the
Sheraton hotel. In addition, in a statement posted on an
Islamic web site, a group calling itself "The Youth of Tawhid
and Jihad in Tunisia" (Monotheism and Holy War in Tunisia)
claimed responsibility for the incidents. Subsequent
reporting on an official GOT web site (infotunisie.com)
denied that a group by this name is active in Tunisia. This
report attributed the allegedly false claim of responsibility
to two individuals resident in Tunisia who have since been
arrested. None of these reports have been officially
confirmed.


6. (S/NF) The shroud of secrecy hanging around the
investigation and what has been revealed to date also raises
questions about the GOT's intent in sharing the information.
Given the long-standing official line that rapid political
reform offers a space for non-democratic Islamists and
terrorists to seize control of the political realm, there is
a self-serving nature in telling the USG "Salafi terrorists"
are threatening US interests in Tunisia. Always seeking to
play the counterterrorism card against the democratization
argument, the assertion that the USG is a target, while
certainly plausible, raises questions. We consider it
possible that, to protect its important tourism industry, the
GOT has downplayed the possibility the terrorists intended to
attack tourists. (Note: Regardless, the Embassy has taken
the reported threat as very serious and has taken a number of
steps to enhance our security and warn American citizens.
These are reported in ref C. An additional, lengthy EAC
meeting has been held and will be reported septel.)


7. (S) GOT officials have said, repeatedly, that the threat
is "over," while acknowledging that they are continuing
investigations into possible support networks. We have no
basis on which to judge the accuracy of the claim that this
particular group has been "rounded up," but we consider it
unlikely. Even if true, we believe there are almost
certainly other Salafis and sympathizers in Tunisia who may
pose a threat to the United States.


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What It Means
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8. (S) Ben Ali has historically demonstrated that he is very
adept at compartmentalizing information and power to ensure
no single individual can threaten his rule. Despite this
reputation, many believe that First Lady Leila Ben Ali's
Trabelsi relatives have an inordinate amount of influence
over the most important decisions. The inability of three
senior ministers to share an appropriate level of details
lends credibility to one report that the entire operation was
run out of the Presidential Palace in Carthage, perhaps by
officials -- or individuals -- hidden from the public eye.
One credible report suggests that the First Lady has brought
back former MOI Secretary of State for National Security
Mohamed Ali Ganzoui to retake control of the domestic
security situation -- perhaps as a special presidential
advisor.


9. (S/NF) The use of what have been reported to be
sophisticated weapons in a country largely devoid of simple
rifles quickly added fuel to what were already widespread
rumors of the Ben Ali clan's corruption. We have heard
rumors, often in hushed tones, that it was certain that the
First Lady's Trabelsi clan was involved, as they are the only
ones who can circumvent Customs inspection procedures.
Another Tunisian noted that "every Tunisian" wants to believe
that the Trabelsis are involved, given widespread dislike for
the family's alleged corruption. Post has heard unconfirmed
reports that the head of Customs was summarily sacked
following the incident, supporting a rumor that he had told
Ben Ali directly that he had "no authority" to search some
containers. There are reports that there may be other
personnel changes by the President as he seeks to shore up
his security apparatus.


10. (S) At the same time, the event and the Ambassador's
meetings shed some light on inter-ministerial relations. As
the USG, and the GOT, have historically limited security
cooperation to intelligence channels, it was unusual that
Foreign Minister Abdallah was the first to notify Ambassador
of the threat. While Abdallah noted that he had to "get Ben
Ali's permission" to share the information, Ambassador's
subsequent ministerial-level meetings indicate there are no
official GOT talking points for the USG on the matter. Ben
Dhia's information contradicted some items Abdallah said,
while Belhaj Kacem treated his pre-arranged courtesy call
with Ambassador as just that, offering little in the way of
additional information.


11. (S/NF) Despite initial information indicating that US and
UK interests were the intended target of the group's
activities, we see no indication that the GOT intends to put
an end to official and media anti-American rhetoric.
Throughout 2006, senior Cabinet officials denounced those who
cooperated with the USG as traitors. As recently as January
9, a press editorial was repeating this theme, noting that
"we don't need the opinions of those...who contact
embassies...go to conferences in America...(and) sell
political positions for dollars." Such statements, combined
with the GOT's apparent decision not to make this threat
information public, suggest that the highest levels of the
GOT have no intention of publicly denouncing anti-USG
rhetoric. In fact, the nominally independent press continues
to publish accounts of Saddam's "martyrdom," fueling anti-US
sentiments.

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What Should We Do About It?
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12. (S/NF) The extent of information being shared, and the
speed with which the GOT has been sharing it, is
unacceptable, particularly in light of direct USG monetary
and substantive assistance to GOT security services.
Ambassador has repeatedly made this point, and Post used the

January 11 visit of NEA DAS Carpenter to press again for more
details (see septels). However, in the absence of a
substantive GOT response in the coming days, Washington
officials should engage on this issue. We ask that the
Department call in Ambassador Hachana at a high level to make
the point that we need better cooperation. We urge the
Department to include a specific request for the reported
target list. In addition, all levels of the USG should,
using the strongest possible language, use available
opportunities to press GOT interlocutors for an immediate,
detailed response.


13. (S) As we pursue details of the threat, we should not
lose sight of the fact that these incidents may open the door
to seek improved bilateral cooperation on a range of security
matters. We have long pressed for improved information
sharing and liaison and can offer additional assistance to
facilitate GOT cooperation in these areas. As recently as
December, Minister of Defense Morjane told Ambassador he
needed additional bilateral military support to improve his
Ministry's supervision of Tunisia's borders (ref E). The
infiltration by six members of the armed groups underscores
this point. If the GOT can provide sufficient details about
the threat, our support could -- and should -- be further
tailored to respond to needs voiced by the GOT.


14. (S) We note that the take down of this Tunisian
terrorist cell is just one of several troubling incidents
across the region. We may well be in the middle of a GSPC or
possibly al Qaeda push across the Mahgreb. In light of this,
we should press forward with efforts underway to strengthen
regional cooperation on counter-terrorism by both countries
and our missions. As one step, we should look to hold the
planned Mahgreb Ambassador's meeting at a very early date.


15. (S) Finally, while the GOT should be congratulated for
successfully rolling up a terrorist group, this incident has
highlighted a gap in the US-Tunisian bilateral relationship.
While we clearly have a shared interest in preventing
terrorism, and have done much to reinforce cooperation, the
GOT's response to this incident and our demands for greater
information sharing suggests our partnership remains too
one-sided. As we look at the long-term bilateral
relationship, we should remember that in one of the most
serious bilateral matters to occur in years, potentially
relating directly to the security of our Mission and
personnel, the GOT once again failed to step up to the plate.

GODEC