SCENESETTER FOR 22ND US-TUNISIA JOINT MILITARY

S E C R E T TUNIS 000615 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/MAG (HARRIS AND HOPKINS) DOD FOR OSD (DAS WHELAN, AXELROD, AGUIRRE) E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2017 TAGS: OTRA PREL MARR TS SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR 22ND US-TUNISIA JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION (JMC) Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT F. GODEC FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d) -------------- INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The Embassy welcomes the visit of DASD Whelan and other USG officials for the 22nd US-Tunisia Joint Military Commission (JMC). The Government of Tunisia (GOT) will see your visit and the JMC as an indication of the solid relationship it has with the United States; a relationship it considers very important. Africa Command, reduced foreign military training assistance levels, the Status of Forces Agreement, and President's Freedom Agenda are likely be issues during the JMC meetings. ¶2. (S) As to the newly created United States Africa Command, the host nation is eager to learn more about this initiative and it will likely be a topic of discussions in both formal and informal discussions. For their part, Tunisian officials have indicated that they generally support its establishment but are uncertain how it will affect bilateral activities with the United States as they relate to North Africa, the Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative, NATO, broader European relations, and other regional matters. In fact, one Tunisian official has indicated that Tunisia's interests do not lie in Africa but rather with the Mediterranean, Europe, and the West. ¶3. (S) Foreign Military Financing (FMF) will be cut in 2008 by approximately 400 percent from roughly US $8 million to some US $2 million. Historically, national funding for the Tunisian military has also been inadequate and will likely not improve given the increasing pressures on the government to fund social programs. As a consequence, the Tunisian military's ability to assist the United States military in countering the growing Islamic extremist threat to the region and in other parts of the world will be reduced. ¶4. (U) The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) should be discussed at some point during your meetings. Currently, it is with the Tunisian Government for review, following additional changes made by the US Government. Indications are that the host nation may be uncomfortable with certain sovereignty issues. This could prevent Tunisia from signing the document. Lastly, as laid out in the Mission Strategic Plan, we remain focused on the President's Freedom Agenda. -------------- US-TUNISIAN RELATIONS ARE GOOD -------------- ¶5. (C) Our overall relationship with Tunisia remains solid, and Tunisians recognize that good relations with the United States are important to Tunisia's future. The President's Freedom Agenda constitutes a critical element of our relations with Tunisia, and we continue to promote the pace of political reform. We also seek to increase Tunisia's cooperation in combating terrorism and increase economic prosperity through trade, investment, and economic reforms. For its part, the Government of Tunisia (GOT) is anxious to increase commercial ties with the United States and Tunisian students continue to seek out US universities. Both governments see military assistance programs and joint military exercises involving US military personnel on Tunisian soil as beneficial. On regional issues, the government has allowed the controlled media to harshly and repeatedly criticize US policies. That said, while Tunisians may not like US foreign policy, Tunisians in general still view the American people and their values positively. ¶6. (C) Although we phased out our Peace Corps program and USAID mission here in the mid-1990s (Tunisia has "graduated" from development assistance because of its economic and social progress),Tunisia now receives limited funding through the USG's Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), which supports reform across the Middle East and North Africa. The GOT claims to be on the path of democratic reform, through the rhetoric is much stronger than the reality. The GOT has welcomed MEPI programs in non-sensitive areas, such as trade and economic growth, but opposes programs on political reform or direct outreach to independent Tunisian civil society. It has prevented several US NGOs from implementing programs here and in one case actively discouraged journalists from attending a training session on professional standards. -------------- REGIONAL ISSUES -------------- ¶7. (C) The Government of Tunisia frequently plays a moderating role among the Arab states on Palestinian-Israeli issues. To its credit, the GOT still maintains quiet backchannel relations with Israel and may have held discreet discussions about re-opening the Israeli trade office in Tunis (closed in 2002). The GOT also hosted Israeli Foreign Minister Shalom as head of that country's delegation to the United Nations' World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in November 2005 and arranged a visit by him to his birthplace in southern Tunisia. ¶8. (C) On Iraq, Tunisia has generally followed the Arab League position although they were one of the first to recognize the post-war government and have cooperated on repatriation of Iraqi assets. Historically, they have had strong economic, trade, and human ties with Iraq, but Tunisian government and businesses have been slow to contribute their very limited resources and energy to the reconstruction efforts. Meanwhile, US policy toward Iraq has been played in local media and some intellectual circles as unilateralism and part of a broader oil-driven scheme to remake the Middle East map. Even the Iraqi elections failed to elicit much interest or a positive response on the streets of Tunis. -------------- -------------- SUPPORTS THE WAR ON TERROR BUT SOME DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) The GOT strongly shares our concern over terrorism, although we sometimes differ on the definition of terrorism, whom to label a terrorist, and how to combat it. The GOT unwaveringly condemned the September 11 attacks, cooperated on financial and other anti-terrorist measures, and provided support for our military campaign in Afghanistan. It has also tried several terrorist suspects who were extradited from Libya, Italy, and Algeria. The GOT conducts several active counterterrorism training/exercise programs with a variety of US agencies, but should have been more forthcoming about the thwarted terrorists attacks and operations from late December 2006 to January 2007, and subsequent investigations and arrests. -------------- US-TUNISIA MILITARY COOPERATION -------------- ¶10. (C) Our military cooperation program is one of the most active in the Mediterranean region. Tunisia is still among the top recipients worldwide of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. In fact, a high percentage of its officer corps have attended US military schools under this program, including much of its senior military leadership. Our annual combined exercises and other training events have nearly ceased but, when coupled with other programs, are probably sufficient to ensure the potential sea and air access we might require for future US military operations in the region. If Tunisia is to become a more active partner for the United States, it must upgrade and modernize its military hardware as well as force structure and be prepared to engage in multilateral military activities. ¶11. (S/NF) US-Tunisian military intelligence cooperation is strong -- focused primarily on Libya, and more recently on terrorism in neighboring countries. In fact, over the past couple years the exchange has provided timely information on extremist activities in both Libya and Algeria (a matter that is considered very sensitive locally and should not be discussed during the group meetings). It would be helpful to thank Tunisian counterparts for their support in these matters, but to note that GOT counterterrorism cooperation in other channels still needs improvement. ¶12. (C) As mentioned, the need for increasing FMF to support the Tunisian military's counterterrorism efforts will likely come up as a host nation talking point. The Ministry of National Defense refers regularly to the need for annual FMF in the neighborhood of US $30-40 million for the next five to seven years; the Country Team supports this request. -------------- PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS -------------- ¶13. (C) In June 1999 the GOT signed the UN Standby Memorandum of Understanding on Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) in New York, signaling Tunisia's readiness to participate in future PKOs. Given the Ministry of National Defense's (MND) relatively small budget and costly daily surveillance operations along the Algerian border, the Tunisians will probably need help to equip, deploy, and maintain a PKO force. Nonetheless, Tunisia has contributed some two hundred and forty personnel for the MONUC in the DROC. Tunisia has also sent an observer team to participate in UN operations in Ethiopia and Eritrea, and offered to provide facilities in Tunisia for US military trainers to train other African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) participating countries' soldiers. Tunisia has repeatedly said it is unwilling to provide significant military or civilian support in Iraq, Afghanistan or Darfur. -------------- SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS -------------- ¶14. (C) While the GOT will request increased levels of FMF, IMET levels are at their all-time highest (approximately US $1.89 million) and IMET continues to be one of our best mid- to long-range investments in shaping our future relations with the next generation of Tunisian military leaders. ¶15. (U) Humanitarian Assistance. The well-organized, EUCOM-funded Humanitarian Assistance Program has provided the Tunisian people with almost US $5 million in assistance since ¶1999. It has been very well received by the local populace and the projects usually receive positive local press coverage. They also play an important part in the embassy's public affairs and outreach efforts. Past projects have included schools for the physically and mentally handicapped, a shelter for battered women and their children, an AIDS testing clinic, and several other important community efforts. ¶16. (U) Demining. The Tunisian government is a signatory to the Ottawa Convention and is therefore committed to destroying its existing stocks of landmines by 2009. A US Demining Policy Assessment Visit completed an assessment in 23-26 January 2006, subsequent training has been conducted -- including EOD training currently underway for Army Engineering Command that includes lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan -- and future training is slated to take place. -- (C/NF) Reporting indicates that the Tunisian military's existing stocks of mines have been destroyed and work to clear the Ras Jedir field, //GEOCOORD: 330854N/0113303E// is now complete. Tunisia will still have eight other minefields to clear but they are in remote, unpopulated areas in the southern part of the country along the Libyan border. The Canadian, German, and perhaps Spanish governments have provided them with equipment and training while the European Commission is reportedly considering providing the Tunisian government with equipment. Additionally, the United States has provided equipment and training for Tunisian demining units. -------------- MILITARY EXERCISES -------------- ¶17. (C) The United States and Tunisia have a long-established combined exercise program. In the past, exercises have included large-scale command post exercises, maneuvers, and air-to-air activities. Sometimes hundreds of US military personnel were on the ground in Tunisia. However, financial constraints, the closure of Tunisian training areas, and limited force availability have severely impacted a once very dynamic program. Likewise, the Tunisian military's requirements to effectively patrol its borders have significantly reduced the number of Tunisian forces available to exercise with US units. Consequently, they have asked that the size and scope of the exercise program be adjusted accordingly. At present, only small-scale JCETs and a medical exercise are scheduled to take place in the near future. One JCET currently on the ground will enhance Tunisian counterterrorism capabilities and the professional development of host nation forces. ¶18. (C) There are currently no significant US Exercise Related Construction (ERC) projects scheduled. Past, unsupported requests have included Galite port, improvements to the Ben Ghilouf air-to-ground range, and Cape Serrat training area. The Tunisian military airfield at Sidi Ahmed airbase is unfortunately unusable by the United States Air Force due to the condition of the runway and will require a major reconstruction effort. -------------- ACCESS & TRANSIT -------------- ¶19. (S/NF) The Tunisian military facilitates access and transit by high-level US delegations/visitors through Tunisian military and civilian installations. This includes not infrequent fuel stops by high-level US political and military leaders at the Carthage-El Aouina dual-use airfield, along with military aircraft at the Sidi Ahmed military airbase in Bizerte. In the case of humanitarian missions, such as the Darfur crisis, the Tunisian government allowed unrestricted overflight and landing rights to US military aircraft. As explained by one senior Tunisian official, this is an example of the GOT's trust of the United States. (Begin protect) Finally, Tunisia also allows for the overflight of special reconnaissance missions by the United States military, however, this information is very tightly controlled within the Tunisian government and should not be discussed. (End protect) GODEC