MAKING SENSE OF THE RECENT THREAT IN TUNISIA

S E C R E T TUNIS 000059 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS FOR NEA/FO - GRAY; NEA/MAG - HOPKINS AND HARRIS NSC FOR ABRAMS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2017 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV TS SUBJECT: MAKING SENSE OF THE RECENT THREAT IN TUNISIA REF: A. TUNIS 54 ¶B. TUNIS 53 ¶C. TUNIS 44 ¶D. TUNIS 31 AND PREVIOUS ¶E. TUNIS 29 Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: In the absence of credible, publicly available information, the rumor mills will continue to crank out speculative blather about the true nature of recent security threats. While person-on-the-street reactions will be reported septel, this cable will summarize what we have learned to date from GOT sources. Conflicting details suggest there is much more to this case than meets the eye, including a possible role for the First Lady's relatives. Meanwhile, there is clearly a strong need to stress our desire for increased GOT information sharing and an opportunity to capitalize on the events to further bilateral cooperation. END SUMMARY. -------------- What We Know -------------- ¶2. (S) To date, and despite Ambassador's meetings with those ministers most likely to be directly involved with this security incident (at the MOI, MFA and the Presidency,) the GOT has provided few details. Worse, those details that have been shared offer contradictory information about the most pertinent threat information. For example, while Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdallah told Ambassador (Ref C) that US diplomatic residences were apparent targets, Presidential Advisor Ben Dhia (Ref B) said the armed group was preparing to attack US and UK missions. Minister of Interior Bel Haj Kacem, who is at least titularly responsible for domestic security matter, offered almost no specifics of the threat against US interests in Tunisia, even when pressed (Ref A). This series of meetings make it clear that information about the group, and GOT security operations to take it down, has been and will continue to be tightly controlled. Judging by the body language in the Bel Haj Kacem meeting, we do not expect to receive any more detailed information any time soon. ¶3. (S) We have received the following information from GOT sources: -- An armed group of "Salafists" was preparing end of year attacks against the US and British embassies. -- A list of US and British diplomats allegedly found among the group's belongings suggests that it may also have been targeting specific members of those diplomatic missions. -- The group, comprised of 27 men, was armed with locally manufactured explosives. -- The group was operating out of multiple locations in the Hammam Lif/Hammam Chatt/Grombalia/Soliman areas. ¶4. (S) However, press reports and involved contacts offer differing accounts, which raise serious concerns about the group's actual intent and the credibility of GOT information provided directly to us. For example, the MOI official statement on the December 23 event suggests the initial shoot out was a chance encounter. However, Minister Ben Dhia subsequently told Ambassador the GOT had initiated the attack when it became clear the group was ramping up its planning. ¶5. (S/NF) The shroud of secrecy hanging over the ongoing investigation and what has been revealed to date also raises questions about the GOT's intent in sharing the information. Given the long-standing official line that rapid political reform offers a space for non-democratic Islamists and terrorists to seize control of the political realm, there is a self-serving nature in telling the USG "Salafi terrorists" are threatening US interests in Tunisia. Always seeking to play the counterterrorism card against the democratization argument, the sudden and vague assertion that the USG is a target is somewhat suspicious. As one EU Ambassador joked to Ambassador to lament GOT recalcitrance, "If an Arab told me my red chair was red, I'd go to an optometrist." -------------- What It Means -------------- ¶6. (S) Ben Ali has historically demonstrated that he is very adept at compartmentalizing information and power to ensure no single individual can threaten his rule. Despite this reputation, many believe that First Lady Leila Ben Ali's Trabelsi relatives have an inordinate amount of influence over the most important decisions. The inability of three senior ministers to share an appropriate level of details lends credibility to one report that the entire operation was run out of the Presidential Palace in Carthage, perhaps by officials -- or individuals -- hidden from the public eye. One credible report suggests that the First Lady has brought back former MOI Secretary of State for National Security Mohamed Ali Ganzoui to retake control of the domestic security situation -- perhaps as a special presidential advisor. ¶7. (S/NF) The use of what have been reported to be sophisticated weapons in a country largely devoid of simple rifles quickly added fuel to what were already widespread rumors of the Ben Ali clan's corruption. A local barber remarked, in hushed tones, that it was certain that the First Lady's Trabelsi clan was involved, as they are the only ones who can circumvent customs inspection procedures. Post has confirmed that the head of customs was summarily sacked following the incident, supporting a rumor that he had told Ben Ali directly that he had "no authority" to search some containers. Another Tunisian noted that "every Tunisian" wants to believe that the Trabelsis are involved, given widespread dislike for the family's alleged corruption. ¶8. (S) At the same time, the event and the Ambassador's meetings shed some light on inter-ministerial relations. As the USG, and the GOT, have historically limited security cooperation to intelligence channels, it was unusual that Foreign Minister Abdallah was the first to notify Ambassador of the threat. While Abdallah noted that he had to "get Ben Ali's permission" to share the information, Ambassador's subsequent ministerial-level meetings indicate there are no official GOT talking points for the USG on the matter. Ben Dhia's information contradicted some items Abdallah said, while Bel Haj Kacem treated his pre-arranged courtesy call with Ambassador as just that, offering little in the way of additional information. ¶9. (S/NF) Despite initial information indicating that US and UK interests were the intended target of the group's activities, we see no indication that the GOT intends to put an end to official and media anti-American rhetoric. Throughout 2006, senior Cabinet officials denounced those who cooperated with the USG as traitors. As recently as January 9, a press editorial was repeating this theme, noting that "we don't need the opinions of those...who contact embassies...go to conferences in America...(and) sell political positions for dollars." Such statements, combined with the GOT's apparent decision not to make this threat information public, suggest that the highest levels of the GOT have no intention of publicly denouncing anti-USG rhetoric. In fact, the nominally independent press continues to publish accounts of Saddam's martyrdom, perhaps fueling anti-US sentiments. -------------- What Should we Do About It? -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) The extent of information being shared, and the speed with which the GOT has been sharing it, is unacceptable, particularly in light of direct USG monetary and substantive assistance to GOT security services. Ambassador has repeatedly made this point, and post will utilize the January 11 visit of NEA DAS Carpenter to press for more details. However, in the absence of a substantive GOT response in the coming days, Washington officials may need to engage on this issue. In the meantime, all levels of the USG should, using the strongest possible language, press GOT interlocutors for an immediate, detailed response. ¶11. (S) As we pursue details of the threat, we should not lose sight of the fact that these incidents open the door for improved bilateral cooperation on a range of security matters. We have long pressed for improved information sharing and liaison and can offer additional assistance to facilitate GOT cooperation in these areas. As recently as December, Minister of Defense Morjane told Ambassador he needed additional bilateral military support to improve his Ministry's supervision of Tunisia's borders (Ref E). The infiltration by six members of the armed groups underscores this point. If the GOT can provide sufficient details about the threat, our support could -- and should -- be further tailored to respond to needs voiced by the GOT. ¶12. (S) Even as we do so, this incident has also highlighted a gap in our bilateral relationship. While we clearly have a shared interest in preventing terrorism, and have done much to reinforce cooperation, the GOT's response to this incident and our demands for greater information sharing suggests our partnership may be largely one-sided. As we look at the long-term bilateral relationship, we should remember that in one of the most serious bilateral matters to occur in years, potentially relating directly to the security of our mission and personnel, the GOT once again failed to step up to the plate. GODEC