TUNISIA AND FREEDOM: EYES ON THE PRIZE (PART II)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TUNIS 000409 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR P; NEA/FO - WELCH, GRAY; NEA/PPD - FERNANDEZ, SMITH; AND NEA/MAG - HOPKINS, HARRIS NSC FOR ABRAMS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KPAO TS SUBJECT: TUNISIA AND FREEDOM: EYES ON THE PRIZE (PART II) REF: TUNIS 389 Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) Tunisia is ready for freedom. But Tunisia today is also a country at risk, near a key crossroads. As reftel described in detail, Tunisia could go either way -- further down the road of repression, lack of freedom, and greater instability and extremism; or it could begin to embrace -- and reap the benefits of -- political and economic freedom, and better security cooperation. Judicious US intervention could help Tunisia realize its potential and become a model in the region. In so doing, Tunisia could help us win the war on terror. To assist Tunisia in the transition, which will be perceived as threatening by the entrenched interests, we must take several steps. First, we advocate a frank and direct approach to President Ben Ali, appealing to his sense of leadership and legacy. Second, we must continue to cultivate the next generation of leaders, underscoring that the United States is prepared to do its part to ensure Tunisia's success as a democratic, prosperous, and secure partner. Finally, we must reach out to all Tunisians to counteract the negative messages they see in the media regarding the United States and its policies and values. We must work to persuade Tunisians that the war on terror is not a war on Islam, and that the United States is genuinely a friend. We know what needs to be done, but to succeed we need reasonable Washington attention and adequate resources, including public affairs, educational and security funding. We will also need to enlist the aid of potential partners, including the European Union, the private sector, and civil society. The transition to greater freedom in Tunisia will not be fast, but it can happen. Now is the time for US engagement. ¶2. (C) This is the second of a two-part series outlining current challenges in Tunisia and ways the USG can encourage positive change. Reftel provided a tour d'horizon of the Tunisian political and economic landscape. This cable sets out a strategic program to advance US goals, mindful of the many challenges we face. End Summary. -------------- 
Our Key Goals . . . -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) The United States has several, sometimes competing goals in Tunisia. Of course, the USG's primary goal is to protect US citizens and the US Mission. The late December/early January "Salafist" terror threat, in which the US Embassy and specific Mission personnel were reportedly among the targets, underscores the importance of this goal. Beyond that, our objective here is clear: we work to advance the President's Freedom Agenda. Specifically, we promote democratic reform and respect for human rights, while seeking to retain, or improve, Tunisian partnership in the war on terror and on other security issues. The freedom deficit Tunisia faces on the political front is also manifested in a doggedly protectionist and increasingly corrupt economic and commercial climate. These economic realities damage US business interests, but, more importantly, they are also impede job creation and are inconsistent with our long-term goal of advancing Tunisia's economic prosperity. We must also work to persuade Tunisians that the United States is a friend, and that the war on terror is not a war on Islam. ¶4. (S/NF) The key goals of advancing just and democratic governance, improving security cooperation, and promoting economic prosperity are mutually reinforcing. The thread that ties them together is greater freedom and openness, conditions that are lacking on all three fronts. By the same token, the potential negative synergies are also apparent, as we have seen in increasing corruption, which is rooted in both political and economic dysfunction. As in any situation in which the USG faces competing interests, the GOT will try to play US interests (and constituents) off each other. Specifically, we need to resist the temptation to give the GOT a pass on human rights and democracy, in exchange for TUNIS 00000409 002 OF 005 greater counter-terrorism cooperation. The other pitfall to be avoided is collective benign neglect. Tunisia cannot compete with the hot spots of the world for attention. Things appear relatively quiet here, on the surface. However, we must not discount the negative trends in Tunisia, as evidenced by the recent terror threat against the US Embassy and Mission personnel. The continuing flow of Tunisian terrorists to Iraq and the strong popularity of Osama bin Laden and Hassan Nasrallah are further evidence that Tunisia is on the road to becoming an all-too-fertile ground for extremists. The situation calls for a strategic decision to help Tunisia realize its potential, and this strategic decision needs to be backed up by a comprehensive strategy to carry it out. -------------- . . . And How to Achieve Them -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) We believe getting Tunisia on the right path requires targeted and well-coordinated engagement, rather than isolation. We need a comprehensive approach that factors in our policy objectives across the board, ideally through a high-level strategic dialogue. On the political and economic/commercial front, the GOT leadership, and President Ben Ali specifically, needs to be convinced that it is in its/his interests to embrace greater freedom. For too long, Tunisia has gotten away with resting on its laurels. What the leadership has failed to grasp, and what a targeted, high-level US intervention should underscore, is that the political and economic inertia in Tunisia -- on top of the increasingly corrosive culture of corruption, and popular resentment of the First Family's enrichment -- threatens to unravel the accomplishments of Tunisia's glory days under Bourguiba. On the security front, we need to build on the slow progress that we have seen in the past two years on counter-terrorism cooperation, through a combination of incentives and disincentives, conveyed through high-level interactions. As for Tunisia's role in the region, the GOT can be expected to continue to play a quiet, moderate role, but the extent of the GOT's influence will remain limited, absent dramatic changes in inter-Arab affairs. ¶6. (S/NF) Post recommends applying a finely tuned, strategic approach to advancing our policy objectives in Tunisia, taking full advantage of the following tools, with the first three focusing on our private message, and the latter three intended for both public and private audiences: -- High-Level Visits: Given the highly centralized, top-down decision-making process that pervades the GOT, a core element of our strategy must involve high-level interactions with the GOT leadership. One key opportunity will be the Spring 2007 trip by Foreign Minister Abdallah to Washington. This visit, which has been in the works for some time, marks an important opportunity to lay the groundwork for this strategy. In addition, we anticipate hosting a high-level inter-agency economic delegation in Tunisia in late April. Taking up issues related to trade, investment, and intellectual property rights protection, this delegation will help underscore that the strategic dialogue we seek with the GOT is not limited to the political realm. -- A Personal Appeal to Ben Ali: To the extent that any political, economic, or security reforms -- let alone serious, sustainable ones -- hinge on President Ben Ali and a small coterie of advisors, we need to target high-level interventions to them. The message to Ben Ali must be frank and persuasive, appealing to him to allow greater freedom in all spheres of life. In carefully measured language, we should also discourage Ben Ali from presenting his candidacy for president yet again in 2009 when his current term expires (despite the sycophantic calls for him to do so). Rather, he should announce that he will step down, opening the field for other credible candidates to come forward. During his remaining three years in office, he should be encouraged to strengthen the existing institutions of democracy to ensure that Tunisia has the foundation to keep moving in the right direction. For starters, Ben Ali could institute direct elections (also scheduled for 2009) for all seats in both houses of Parliament. Beyond that, we should seek a series of concrete steps to level the playing field between the TUNIS 00000409 003 OF 005 ruling party and the heretofore unempowered opposition, allowing for genuine political competition. One such step would be introducing a complete separation between the government and the ruling party apparatus. To be effective, Ben Ali himself would have to announce this delineation and the means of enforcement. To make all of this more palatable to Ben Ali and company, we would have to put on the table such assistance and incentives we could provide (see section on "Resources and Leverage," below). Given the sensitivity of such a message, and for it to have a chance of success, it would need to come first directly from the Secretary. -- Cultivating the Next Generation of Leaders: Regardless of when Ben Ali leaves office, we need to strengthen our existing relationships with those who are most likely to ascend to key leadership positions in the next several years. There is no obvious frontrunner to succeed Ben Ali. Rumors have pointed to Defense Minister Morjane as the USG's preferred candidate, given his background as an international civil servant and his university studies in the United States. The truth is that, while we enjoy good relations with the Defense Minister, it is not clear that he harbors the ambition to lead the country. Moreover, an endorsement from the United States would undermine any potential successor. Thus, the Ambassador will work quietly to build up relations with contacts from among the pool of possible candidates to succeed Ben Ali, including Morjane. At the same time, the Embassy will continue its outreach in broader circles of key "influencers" -- both inside and outside of government. We will focus these efforts on a range of individuals with the potential to serve as agents of change in the medium to long terms. -- Public Diplomacy: Concurrent with the high-level interactions described above, we also have considerable work to do to improve America's image and to get our message out among the local population. To this end, Ambassador and Embassy Officers will continue to pursue the full range of transformational diplomacy opportunities, with a particular focus on youth and other non-traditional audiences. Specifically, we will continue, increasing where possible, in-country travel and outreach programs, PA exchanges, cultural events, and other PA program tools, as well as MEPI-sponsored programs, including the Student Leaders Program, the Leaders for Democracy Fellowship and targeted small grants. We will also continue to look for opportunities to work cooperatively with local groups and organizations with shared interests. The goal will be to cultivate a network of moderate Muslim future leaders. A key public diplomacy message will be that the United States respects Islam and Muslims and that the war on terror is not a war on Islam. We will also emphasize that the United State is a friend that wants to help to build Tunisian democracy, prosperity and security. -- Media: In Tunisia, even private media outlets are effectively controlled by the GOT. Coverage is generally but not uniformly hostile to US interests, though some private media do present a more balanced tone. The Embassy will continue to follow a multi-pronged approach with the media, whereby we correct the record publicly in the case of those assertions that are most egregious and would do the most damage if left unchallenged. At the same time, we will continue to work behind the scenes with writers and editors to improve professionalism and accountability. We will also continue to cultivate independent "influencers" to help get our message out. Finally, we will try to capitalize on renewed media interest in US Embassy activities stimulated by the arrival of a new Ambassador. Ultimately, however, the editorial line of the Tunisian media is set by the Presidency, so we will also have to use our high-level interactions to press for change. In the meantime, aware that many Tunisians rely on non-local media to get their news, we should seek opportunities to circumvent the local press, including by better exploiting pan-Arab satellite TV channels, as well as French media outlets, as mediums for our message. Outreach by Washington policymakers to such regional media outlets is essential if our message is to be heard by the Tunisian public, and should be a key component of any Tunisia-related visits or high-profile events. -- Cultural Outreach: By the same token, we should also take TUNIS 00000409 004 OF 005 full advantage of culture to reinforce Tunisian-American relations. Over the past two years, we have successfully programmed a musical group bringing together Tunisian and American musicians who have created an extraordinary, contagious fusion of Arab and Appalachian music. Their work is a brilliant synthesis of two musical traditions, which has universal appeal; its rhythms could resonate across the Arab world and the United States, bringing with it a message about our common heritage, the power of cultural cooperation and the strength of diversity. The group, known as "Kantara," which means "bridge" in Arabic, has in many ways been our most effective transformational diplomacy tool. The group is scheduled to perform at the Kennedy Center on May 31, followed by an appearance at the residence of the Tunisian Ambassador in Washington. -------------- Resources and Leverage -------------- ¶7. (C) This approach will go nowhere if it is not matched with commensurate resources. We are aware of the current budget climate in Washington that is necessitating painful choices in funding. At the same time, we believe that funding cuts in two areas undermine our ability to achieve our objectives. -- First, making further cuts to our "bare minimum" request for FMF of $8.5 million undermines the ability of the Tunisian military to maintain its fleet of aging US helicopters, and thus its capacity to patrol its borders. The fact that members of the "Salafist" terror group recently taken down by GOT security forces entered Tunis via the Algerian border underscores this point. Moreover, dramatic cuts to our already modest FMF assistance would alienate the one institution in Tunisia that boasts a pervasive US culture. Nearly every flag-level officer in the Tunisian armed forces has participated in some kind of IMET training. We should capitalize on our potential influence within the Tunisian military, not squander it. Frankly, we need to increase FMF funding in Tunisia, not cut it. -- Meanwhile, Embassy Tunis' Public Affairs budget baseline has steadily eroded in recent years. Salaries and benefits have increased, thus leaving fewer funds for programming. Five years ago, salaries and benefits constituted 55 percent of PA's budget; currently they equal 75 percent. We have been inventive in our efforts to cut costs and maximize efficiencies, but PA cannot do more with less indefinitely. Indeed, the current climate dictates that we should be conducting more programs, specifically targeted at non-traditional audiences. We have a number of excellent possibilities for such non-traditional programs, but they cannot happen without funds. Some examples include working with the Ministry of Higher Education on the English language summer camp program, and the Embassy speaker's program -- including traveling outside the capital. The GOT is also clamoring for more exchange programs. In a series of about a dozen courtesy calls between the Ambassador and Tunisian ministerial counterparts, not a single meeting passed without a pitch for increased funding for educational programs. There is fertile ground here for influencing future change agents, but we need more resources if we are to make a dent in increasingly prevalent anti-Western sensibilities found in Tunisia. ¶8. (C/NF) To increase the prospects for success, we need to enlist the support of the European Union, business, and civil society. The EU offers positive recognition, engagement, and financial support to the GOT in excess of US $100 million annually, but they have not chosen to press for meaningful reform. There are different factors influencing the EU's lack of willingness to use it leverage, principal among them is French and Italian reticence over pressuring Ben Ali to reform. We are beginning to see some cracks among our Tunisia-based EU colleagues, however. The Spanish, for example, have recently distanced themselves from the pro-GOT clique and have begun to preach an aggressive reform message. Even the French have predicted that the upcoming elections, whatever their outcome, will diminish French support for the Ben Ali regime. We will continue to work on the ground in an effort to bring our EU colleagues around to active promotion TUNIS 00000409 005 OF 005 of political reform and greater respect for human rights. We also recommend that Washington continue to make Tunisia an agenda item for coordination with the EU. ¶9. (C) We will also seek to leverage the potential interest of US companies in advancing economic reforms. In addition, civil society actors can and should be natural allies in this effort. Unfortunately, however, the GOT has long dismissed independent civil society organizations and its oppressive control tactics have hamstrung many credible Tunisian civil society organizations. Thus, part of our strategy will have to focus on helping to sustain and enable key civil society partners. -------------- The Stakes -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) Tunisians have good reason to be proud of their post-independence accomplishments in the social, economic, and political spheres. But instead of seeing continued advances in political and economic freedoms, we hear platitudes that belie a developing pattern of one step forward, three-quarters' step back. It would be naive to believe that this dynamic will change under Ben Ali's leadership. Thus, left unchecked, the situation in Tunisia may well deteriorate. The stakes are too high, however, to let that happen. We can and should expect more of Tunisia, because it has more to offer and easily qualifies as "most likely to succeed" in the region. With its well-educated and Western-oriented, moderate population, coupled with its strong middle class, Tunisia boasts a solid base on which to build. The United States needs a strong, stable, and prosperous Tunisia that respects the freedoms of its people. It is in our interest and in the interests of the Tunisian people that we vigorously pursue a comprehensive strategy to help them realize that potential. GODEC