Beywatch: Fortunate Sons Dodging the Draft

UNCLAS TUNIS 001450 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPT FOR NEA/MAG - HARRIS; HR/EL DIVISION E.O. 12958: NA TAGS: PREL PMIL SOCI TS SUBJECT: Beywatch: Fortunate Sons Dodging the Draft -------------- SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION -------------- ¶1. (U) This report is one of a series drafted by Post's entry level officers which have the "Beywatch" title. We believe the perspectives offered in the following vignette will give the reader greater insight into Tunisia. It is not a comprehensive overview of the subject. ¶2. (SBU) The Government of Tunisia requires mandatory military service. For a year men over the age of 20 are to exchange their civilian lives for a chance to serve their country. While the law is clearly on the books, its enforcement appears to be sporadic and selective in nature for reasons that encompass class, culture and politics. Much of the information gathered for this report is based on anecdotes gathered from acquaintances and colleagues of the author. End SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. -------------- SILVER SPOON IN HAND -------------- ¶3. (SBU) According to the Tunisian National Service Law, all Tunisians between the ages of 20 and 35 who are able-bodied, without children and not the sole providers of their families, are expected to serve a year in the military. In reality, the enlisted ranks of the armed forces appear to be disproportionately made up of lower-educated men from the bottom rungs of the socioeconomic ladder. Although such disparities may be found in other nations' militaries, this gap serves to highlight societal divides in Tunisia. If all 108,000 men who become eligible for conscription in Tunisia each year were serving, not only would the military be three times the size it actually is, but it would be a cross-section of the Tunisian public; an egalitarian entity where the sons of bankers cleaned rifles beside the sons of farmers. According to anecdotal evidence this is far from the case. (NOTE: The Ministry of Defense has stated that it does not require an active military force anywhere near 100,000. END NOTE) ¶4. (SBU) While the middle- to upper-middle class younger Tunisian men who work in Tunis offices or patronize better Tunisian restaurants and nightspots can tell stories of military roadblocks set up to catch draft-evaders, or recount stories of someone's cousin's friend being jailed and then heavily fined for avoiding service, they have never been stopped at such a roadblock in their white collar neighborhoods, nor do they seem to fear the same fate. The risk (which they deem minimal) of being caught avoiding the military, is apparently worth avoiding twelve months in uniform. ¶5. (SBU) Tunisian National Service Law (Act no. 89-51 of March 14, 1989) only provides exemption from military service in "medically confirmed cases of disability." Postponement is available for active students, family breadwinners, or Tunisians residing abroad. In addition, two brothers are never required to serve simultaneously. Tunisian men are supposed to report to the Ministry of Defense to register their exemption and obtain a card declaring them excepted, which they can then present to officials if stopped at roadblocks or border crossings. None of the twelve men polled by Conoff who are currently eligible for military service bothered to register for an exemption, even though one could do so based on his role as sole provider for his sister and mother. The other eleven are simply waiting until they marry to claim breadwinner status. Until then they good naturedly shrug off the suggestion that they face up to two years imprisonment or heavy fines for their shirked duties. That does not happen to nice, employed young men from decent families, they claim. And if stopped by military officials looking to fill conscription quotas, it is apparently common knowledge that a little cash slipped into the arresting hand is the simplest solution. -------------- THE TAXMAN COMES -------------- ¶6. (U) There is also a legal route to avoiding service by financial means. The 1975 National Service Law was written so that those who wish to retain their civilian employment instead of completing their military service may do so, as long as they pay the government a percentage of their salary for the year they would have otherwise been completing their service. The percentages are based on the minimum wage in Tunisia: anyone making one or two times the monthly minimum wage of 225 Tunisian Dinar (about 180 USD) must turn over 30 percent of their salary to the Ministry of Defense. Anyone making 3-4 times the minimum wage must turn over 40 percent of their salary, and anyone who makes more than 900 Tunisian Dinar a month (about 720 USD) must give up half their salary to the government. Most who could afford such payments seem to prefer risking the penalties of avoiding service rather than giving up a large portion of their private sector earnings. New college graduates fortunate enough to find work can usually expect a monthly salary that would place them in the 40 percent bracket. Those who do decide to remunerate the government for services never rendered must still perform 21 days of basic training. They may either do this straight through or for 21 consecutive Sundays. Should they fail to pay or fall behind on payments, they may be conscripted immediately. ¶7. (SBU) Like most conscription-based militaries, the GOT does not offer much of a financial incentive to obey conscription regulations. Soldiers performing mandatory military service receiving three meals a day and housing and are given a monthly stipend of only 15 Tunisian Dinar (about 12 USD). Many soldiers just say they are paid "three packs of cigarettes" a month, since that is about all they can afford. Unless one is truly destitute and cannot afford to feed oneself, it is difficult to imagine this would be enough to encourage enlistment. -------------- POINT THE CANNON -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The rumor mill in Tunisia is full of tales of police staging afternoon raids on cafes in blue collar neighborhoods. Such cafes are often frequented by the young and unemployed; thus providing plenty of able bodies to put into uniforms. With an official national unemployment rate of 13.9 percent - and some estimates placing that percentage at almost 40 percent for those between the ages of 20 and 24 - one can see the tempting logic behind providing young Tunisian men with at least a year's worth of work and focus in the form of the strictures of military life. Not only does this decrease actual unemployment and, some may argue, give a sort of structure and chance to learn a skill set to an otherwise disadvantaged part of the population, but it may also be a way for the GOT to further ensure their control over a segment of society of which they are truly wary. As growing numbers of Tunisians are leaving even top-notch universities without job offers, the GOT is all too aware of the perils presented by having an unemployed and discontented youth (septel). They are perhaps equally discomfited by the notion of these jobless or underemployed young men and women turning to religious extremism or demanding a greater political voice. In a country where freedom of assembly is virtually nonexistent, one way to keep the disenchanted from gathering to criticize the state of things is to put them to work for the state. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (SBU) While a lack of transparency makes it unclear whether the GOT is purposefully waging a campaign to target unemployed or poorer young men in the conscription process, the view of the upper middle class Tunisian men who discussed this issue with Conoff was that the result is so, no matter the intention. As part of the research for this report, a consular LES called a friend who is a high ranking colonel in the Tunisian military. After the conversation, the colonel asked worriedly if the LES had a family member who was about to be conscripted, and offered his help in obtaining an exemption. Tunisians often joke (ruefully or bitterly, depending on the context) about the "couscous connection": that elusive yet necessary network of who knows whom that seems to control so much in the country. This "connection" influences everything from liquor licenses distributed to import quotas handed out (or so the rumors go),and it is certainly not hard to imagine that certain families or members of certain professions might find their sons effortlessly evading boots and barracks, while others may have fewer choices in the matter. President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali may have said that "defense of the homeland is sacred work for every citizen," but it appears that a great many have chosen less blessed endeavors. END COMMENT. GODEC