THE WAY AHEAD IN THE MAGHREB

S E C R E T TUNIS 001345 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA A/S DAVID WELCH AND DAS GORDON GRAY FROM AMBASSADORS FORD, GODEC AND RILEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2032 TAGS: PREL ECON KPAO KMPI PINS PTER SCUL XI SUBJECT: THE WAY AHEAD IN THE MAGHREB Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT F. GODEC; reason 1.4 (b) & (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) On Friday, September 14, we (Ambassadors Ford, Godec and Riley) met in Tunis to review developments in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, assess US policy, and chart a way ahead. While our three countries are different in important ways, they all face a difficult challenge from extremists and need to accelerate progress on democracy. Based on our discussions, we offer three principal recommendations: -- The North African countries represent almost half of the population of the Arab world and high-level Washington engagement, particularly from the most senior State Department officials, is critical to advancing US foreign policy goals. We urge the Secretary to visit the region. -- The threat of extremism is real and growing, particularly from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Nevertheless, we have adequate resources from Washington and from EUCOM for military and counter-terrorism assistance (assuming resumed adequate FMF funding for Tunisia and approval of the Tunis 1206 proposal). -- To reduce extremism, however, and to deepen ties, Tunisia and Algeria need significantly more resources, especially funding, for education programs, greater public affairs outreach, and small but useful levers to secure faster economic reform. We look forward to another Maghreb COM meeting following the NEA COM session in December. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On Friday, September 14, we (Ambassadors Ford, Godec and Riley) met at Embassy Tunis to discuss our three countries, US policy and the way ahead. Members of the Tunis country team participated in many of the sessions. -------------- Countering Extremism -------------- ¶3. (S) Extremism, and particularly the threat from AQIM, is a growing challenge in each of the countries. In Algeria, security has slowly deteriorated over the past year, especially with the appearance of suicide bombers. The GOA's hold on power is not threatened, but the violence will continue. Morocco and Tunisia also face a significant risk of extremist attacks. ¶4. (S) The roots of extremism in the countries vary. In Algeria, AQIM is recruiting young, unemployed men, who move to the mountains for training and attacks while a smaller, more educated cadre (most likely irreconcilable) recruit and maintain an urban support network. Many join for jihad in Iraq but end up involved in terrorism inside Algeria. In Tunisia, the pool is broader, with some educated Tunisians, particularly those living abroad, choosing to join al-Qaeda. In Morocco, there is also a significant challenge from individuals and small groups carrying out independent terrorist acts. ¶5. (S) We agreed that there is excellent cooperation among our political, regional affairs and defense attache offices. Cooperation among the GOT, GOA and GOM, however, has been intermittent. Algeria engages with each of its neighbors carefully and usually at a very operational level, rather than planning broad, joint strategies. Moreover, the three governments have little interest in having the US Government act as a catalyst for cooperation among the three states. This will limit the prospects for the RSI process and TSCTP, although we may find niches in areas like Sahelian cooperation. The combination of counter-intelligence paranoia, limited administrative capacity and protocol sensitivities means that we can only move at a measured pace in expanding regional military and intelligence relationships. Proposing small, practical information exchanges, however, will help build more trust (but it will always be an uphill battle). A focus, for example, on al-Qaeda,s use of the Internet at the upcoming NAS conference would be useful. ¶6. (C) On resources, we agreed that we have sufficient funds, personnel and training on the C/T front from the State and Defense departments. (NB. This assumes a resumption of adequate FMF funding for Tunisia and approval of the Mission,s 1206 proposal.) We do not, however, have the resources or engagement needed on other issues that matter, including educational programs, economic/commercial opportunities and public diplomacy broadly. In particular, Tunisia and Algeria need additional funding for education and other outreach programs. We are missing opportunities to attack the root problem of extremist ideologies. -------------- Pressing for Democratic Progress -------------- ¶7. (S) Our countries continue to face fundamental challenges on the road to democracy. Algeria is stagnant, and there is little sign of a wider democratic opening in prospect. Tunisia is making painfully slow progress on opening up and needs further encouragement and pressure. Morocco is making some headway, with the King recognizing the importance of change, but challenges remain, particularly economic. In Algeria and Tunisia, the word "drift" best captures the current state of affairs. The citizens of the Maghreb are frustrated by this drift and long for progress. Algeria and Tunisia are both led by aging leaders in poor health who appear unwilling to give up power. In the case of both President Ben Ali and President Bouteflika, a clear message delivered by senior Administration officials about the importance of permitting "public debate," allowing the development of a genuine, democratic opposition, and "alternance of power" is important. This message may be best delivered while appealing to the two men's sense of their future legacies. ¶8. (C) In Morocco, thanks to USAID, MEPI and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC),the US Government has many programs to promote democracy. Algeria, largely through MEPI, also has small programs with the Parliament, the Justice Ministry and NGOs to eke out incremental reform and boost reform advocates. The GOT,s tight restrictions makes programs in Tunisia far more problematic, although the Mission continues to seek opportunities. In Tunis, support from the Europeans (particularly the French) for our Freedom Agenda goals is important, and we have made some headway in securing cooperation in recent months. -------------- Economic/Commercial Challenges -------------- ¶9. (C) Each of the countries faces significant economic challenges, albeit with important differences. While creating jobs is the first challenge in each country, the governments are addressing the problem in different ways. In Algeria, with officials sitting on a pile of petro-dollars, the GOA shows little interest in leaping forward on economic reform. Morocco and Tunisia, however, are responsive to business concerns and are working hard to attract investment. Tunisia has had some success in stepping up the real GDP growth rate over the last year, and creating more jobs, but needs to do better yet. Morocco had a good year economically in 2006-07, but 2007-08 promises to be very challenging. -------------- MCC and FTAs -------------- ¶10. (C) Although there are differences in the numbers, the US-Morocco FTA may not have increased Moroccan exports as much as expected. Nevertheless, GOM officials acknowledge and welcome the increase in US investment. The MCC has made an important difference there. While Tunisia technically qualifies for the MCC, the GOT has so far demonstrated little interest. Embassy Tunis has, however, provided a wealth of information to the GOT on the MCC, highlighting that Morocco and Jordan now have programs, and underscoring the extraordinary opportunity Tunisia is missing. ¶11. (C) The visit by EEB P/DAS Dibble to Tunisia and Algeria was welcomed by the two governments and underscores the importance of an economic policy dialogue. In Tunisia, the GOT appears ready to reinvigorate our TIFA with a view to possible FTA discussions. Follow up discussions in Algeria indicate the GOA would also welcome a TIFA Council meeting but the agenda would need to be defined carefully in advance to maximize its utility. There are areas where the Algerians are willing to work on reform, such as the dilapidated financial sector. The US Treasury Department has an expert team engaged and we need to make sure it has the resources needed to help Algerian reformers advance their agenda. With the Algerians we should also pursue a determined discussion at a technical level about WTO membership. The Algerians haven't yet made the political decision to implement the necessary reforms, and they are stuck in the mode of thinking that they can somehow escape. They need to hear repeatedly that there is no other way. ¶12. (C) The Arab Maghreb Union has just established a private employers organization which might prove a good vehicle to encourage further progress on Maghreb-wide integration and reform. Nevertheless, regional integration will remain slow. -------------- Securing Help on Our Regional Issues -------------- ¶13. (C) The Maghreb countries can provide valuable support to the United States on a range of regional challenges, including Iraq, Iran, and the Palestinians. We must engage with the three countries, however, on each issue and in different ways. Morocco is likely to remain the most forward leaning on assisting the United States, as the result of closer ties generally and in an effort to secure our support on the Western Sahara. Tunisia will continue to provide quiet support, but is unlikely to lead. Algeria's leadership, stuck in their 1970s world view, will rarely be forward leaning, although we might occasionally secure quiet help on individual issues. ¶14. (C) The continuing struggle between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara will hang over all we try to do with them. Even if solved, however, Algeria and Morocco are unlikely to be close anytime soon. The animosity between the two has historical roots that will continue to impede regional integration. -------------- Public Affairs: Winning Hearts and Minds -------------- ¶15. (C) We agreed that public affairs engagement is critical to progress on US foreign policy objectives in the region. The missions in Algeria and Tunisia, in particular, need more resources to support education programs, including: -- ACCESS for underprivileged high-school students to study English, a means by which they themselves believe they can advance economically; -- English language programs through Amideast in cities such as Sfax, Tunisia; -- e-math type programs that introduce IT skills to primary school students; -- High-school linkage programs which teach relevant computer and English-language skills as well as reach out to the most important target group in terms of limiting extremism; -- University partnership programs that again teach highly marketable computer and English language skills in addition to more technical subjects via long-distance learning. Despite a clear and important opening in this area, and requests from both posts, we do not have adequate funding for these programs. It is reasonable to ask host governments to contribute resources to expanded programming, but we need to put resources on the table ourselves to extract movement from these Jurassic bureaucracies. ¶16. (C) Making better use of the media is essential. In each of the countries, television is the key, but it is the regional satellite channels that are the most important. We need to pay the most attention possible to the al-Jazeera station in Rabat, and there are other Maghreb-oriented satellite networks being established, often in France. (Ford appeared on the Rabat al-Jazeerah newsbroadcast in a live interview on September 23 and got plenty of subsequent media coverage in Algeria September 25.) We must seek new ways to get our message on to these channels. To influence local elites, we could do more with other regional media, notably Jeune Afrique, which is widely read by influential officials in each of the countries. Better use of the Internet offers another avenue of access, especially to younger people. IIP has started doing this, but our posts should start ensuring that our messages get published on locally generated web and blog-sites (without having to check with Washington first). -------------- High-Level Engagement Too -------------- ¶17. (C) Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya together have a population of roughly 85 million people, nearly half of the Arab world. Its proximity to our NATO allies and its energy resources make it strategically very important. Since the diminution of the Algerian civil war, however, it has not garnered great US Government attention. The relative stability, as we have outlined above, is not pre-destined to endure. In these protocol-conscious countries, high-level engagement is essential to getting messages across effectively. In that regard, we welcome the decision by Under Secretary Burns to meet with the Arab Maghreb Union Foreign SIPDIS Ministers in New York. ¶18. (S) We also urge other high-level engagement. The single, best step we could take would be a visit by the Secretary of State. In each country, the Secretary would SIPDIS find ample ground to encourage greater cooperation on regional issues and on domestic challenges, notably to advance democracy and to combat extremism. While a visit by the Secretary would not be a &magic bullet8, it would underscore for the leaders in each country the deep US commitment to the region and it would advance our most important, and most difficult, goals for the region. Beyond a visit by the Secretary, it will be important to find additional ways to engage with the region in a sustained way at a high level. ¶19. (C) In the end, we are struck as much by the differences among Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco as by the similarities. While they share a common religion and language, they are in many ways more different than alike. In addressing the challenges of the region, we must tailor country-specific responses. If we do so effectively, we can help each of them emerge stronger, more stable, more democratic and more prosperous. A successful Maghreb would help us across the entire broader Middle East. GODEC