TUNISIA - DEMOCRATIC REFORM STRATEGY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TUNIS 001293 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/PI, DRL AND NEA/MAG (HARRIS AND HOPKINS) E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2017 TAGS: PHUM KDEM PGOV PREL TS SUBJECT: TUNISIA - DEMOCRATIC REFORM STRATEGY REF: A. STATE 130991 ¶B. TUNIS 409 ¶C. TUNIS 389 ¶D. 05 TUNIS 1045 Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Even non-French-speaking observers of Tunisian politics use the phrase, "Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose" to describe the country in recent years. As we review our democratic reform strategy, despite some minor achievements, our two main objectives remain promoting increased freedom of speech and freedom of association. Unlike many countries in the region, the GOT has invested heavily in creating economic opportunities, improving education and empowering women. But political progress has been glacial in a country that has only enjoyed two presidents in fifty years of independence. While a benevolent dictatorship may have had a certain value in the early years of independence, the repressive policies of President Ben Ali have created a political stagnation that is threatening the core values that defined post-independence Tunisia: moderation, education and tolerance. The time for engagement is now, as we have seen small indications the GOT may be considering reform. To nurture the possibilities for genuine political reform, the USG must use every opportunity to press the GOT for greater freedom of expression and association. End Summary. -------------- CONTEXT -------------- ¶2. (C) As outlined in Refs B and C, fifty years after independence, Tunisia's freedom deficit is impeding its political, economic and social modernization. For years, Tunisia was a development model for Arab and African countries. However, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who will celebrate twenty years of rule this November, has created a quagmire of control and statist policies that lead many to question whether Tunisia is progressing at all. Tunisia is ready for freedom. But Tunisia today is also a country at risk, near a key crossroad. Tunisia could go further down the road of repression, lack of freedom, and greater instability and extremism; or it could begin to embrace and reap the benefits of political and economic freedom. ¶3. (C) US Government efforts to promote democratic reform over the past two years have meet the same stale GOT response that is recycled ad nauseam for Tunisians: "We have a plan." But the plan is not public, and we have not seen any major efforts to promote increased freedom. The challenge for the United States is to persuade GOT leaders that the plan is failing and that only increased freedom will secure Tunisia's future as a moderate, secular and developed country. Judicious US intervention could help Tunisia realize its potential and become a model in the region. But we must be prepared to use every opportunity to advance our agenda. If USG officials do not raise the freedom agenda, the GOT will be left with the impression that it can rest on its moderate laurels. ¶4. (S) The time for such engagement is now, as we have seen several small indications in the past year that Ben Ali's regime may be considering reform. In 2006, Ben Ali told former SecDef Rumsfeld that he envisioned himself as a retired president. In 2007, he told CODEL Tanner that he recognized the ruling RCD party was too powerful. We recently learned that a senior GOT political strategist has made some discrete inquiries about how to level the elections playing field for opposition candidates. While these quiet signals may not mean free and fair elections are on the horizon, it is clear that Ben Ali and others are thinking seriously about what type of political reform may be possible. Given these indications, and the upcoming 2009 presidential and legislative elections, our democracy strategy takes on new relevance. -------------- DEMOCRACY STRATEGY -------------- ¶5. (C) Post's democracy strategy for Tunisia has two main themes: freedom of expression and freedom of association. Each theme has four main components, the developments of TUNIS 00001293 002 OF 003 which we follow carefully to judge whether or not progress is being made. -- Freedom of Expression a. Increase Media Freedom i. Grant new media licenses (independent newspapers, radio and television) ii. Allow unrestricted distribution b. Increase Media Access for Independent Political Voices and Encourage Public Debate i. Encourage media coverage of opposition party activities ii. Expand opposition party and NGO access to domestic television iii.Review election and campaign laws to improve media access iv. Encourage public debate; convey that self-censorship not required c. Encourage Independent Journalists, Activities and Ensure that Harassment Against Them is Ceased i. Lotfi Hajji ii. Slim Boukhdhir iii.Omar Mestiri d. End Blocking of Internet Websites i. Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org) ii. Reporters without Borders (www.rsf.org) iii.TunisNews (www.tunisnews.net) iv. Kalima (www.kalimatunisie.com) v. Arab Network for Human Rights Information (hrinfo.net) -- Freedom of Association and Assembly a. Allow Establishment of Independent Domestic and International NGOs i. Encourage mediation of Tunisia Human Rights League (LTDH) crisis ii. National Council for Liberties in Tunisia (CNLT) iii.Tunisian Journalists Syndicate (SJT) iv. General Tunisian Labor Confederation (CGTT) v. Fulbright Association b. Register New Parties i. Congress for the Republic (CPR) ii. Tunisian Green Party c. Allow Public and Private Gatherings i. Encourage access to opposition events ii. Encourage civil society meetings and activities in public and private places, including NGO headquarters and branch offices d. Facilitate Domestic and International Funding for NGOs i. Cease freezing of funding of legitimate NGOs ii. Revise NGO laws to liberalize funding regulations and allow foreign funding ¶6. (C) These two freedoms are fundamental to positive and popular democratic change in Tunisia. With truly free media and unfettered access to the Internet, Tunisia's highly educated population would soon spark domestic debate that would erase the current apathy of Tunisians about their political system and spur demands for change. If, in addition to saying and writing whatever they want, Tunisians were free to gather as they please, real opposition political parties headed by genuine and competitive candidates could emerge. ¶7. (C) With the 2009 elections looming, amid a plethora of orchestrated calls for Ben Ali to present his candidacy, now is the time to make the case for an electoral law that will create a more level playing field for opposition parties than has pertained in previous elections. Of course, the degree to which the 2009 elections will be free and fair will depend on a lot of factors beyond the electoral law. For that reason, Post is exploring the possibility of inviting a third-party to conduct an independent assessment of Tunisia's overall framework for carrying out democratic elections. Such an assessment could include recommendations about specific steps that should be taken to improve the prospects of genuinely free and fair elections. -------------- MEPI: MAKE EVERY PROGRAM IMPOSSIBLE -------------- ¶8. (C) While post has identified many current MEPI programs in the region that could support these democratic reform TUNIS 00001293 003 OF 003 strategy goals, the GOT has consistently blocked any effort to organize political reform programs in Tunisia. The Ambassador and other senior USG officials have explained MEPI's goals and pitched less threatening programs on multiple occasions to various GOT officials, but the GOT consistently blocks our efforts to engage government or civil society contacts on political programs. Even the MEPI logo has become taboo, with one of our few grantees recently reporting that unnamed GOT officials had asked that the MEPI logo be removed from MEPI-funded publications. Despite these challenges, we continue to look for ways to promote increased freedom, including using MEPI programs that are conducted outside of Tunisia. -------------- THE NEED FOR WASHINGTON SUPPORT -------------- ¶9. (S) Regardless of the GOT impediments to MEPI, programs alone cannot convince the government of the need for greater freedom of expression and association. Rather, it is diplomatic efforts that could turn the tide. However, when we try to raise political issues, it is not uncommon for Tunisian officials to respond that we simply have bad information about the local environment. They often link this point to their claimed close ties to various Washington officials, suggesting that the US-Tunisian bilateral relationship is blossoming. We must have consistent policy being advocated at all levels if we are going to gain any traction on the political reform message post has been delivering for years. Specifically, the USG approach must be twofold: -- We advocate a frank and direct approach to President Ben Ali, appealing to his sense of leadership and legacy. The opportunities to do so are few and far between, but the President's recent letter to Ben Ali was an excellent opening, as it very clearly stated that "Tunisia is ready for greater democratic freedoms, including freedom of association and expression." Direct engagement with Ben Ali must be followed up with other senior GOT officials. The USG should take advantage of all opportunities, including Foreign Minister Abdallah's upcoming trip to UNGA, to reiterate this point. -- We must press like-minded countries, particularly in the EU, to make the same points. To that end, the Ambassador has already shared our revised reform targets with the French and UK ambassadors in Tunisia, who have indicated their willingness to support our efforts. While working directly with the European Union has been useful, it appears that the consensus needed for EU action has and will continue to stymie our efforts to cooperate on democracy promotion. With the election of a new French president, and Sarkozy's recent visit to Tunisia, cooperation with the French is even more important today. We will need the support of Washington officials to make headway with France and other like-minded nations. -------------- REALITY CHECK -------------- ¶10. (C) Even with full support of this strategy, there are many who believe that the Ben Ali regime is inherently change averse. While one could conclude that therefore USG efforts should be directed elsewhere, we would argue that Tunisia is in fact more ready for democratic change than most other countries in the region. Tunisia has a moderate, secular, educated populace that generally understands the principals of democracy and believes that openness is in its best interest. Its institutional structures, if allowed to function freely, could adapt relatively easily to a broad range of political discourse. Some observers here compare Tunisia to pre-democratic Eastern European regimes. Just as there, we believe an investment in Tunisia's democratic future would yield high returns. GODEC