THE TUNISIAN SECULAR STATE: A MODEL FOR THE MUSLIM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TUNIS 001068 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/PI AND NEA/MAG (HARRIS AND HOPKINS) E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2017 TAGS: PGOV SOCI KISL PTER KDEM TS SUBJECT: THE TUNISIAN SECULAR STATE: A MODEL FOR THE MUSLIM WORLD? Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) AND (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Following independence in 1956, Tunisia has witnessed the development of a largely secular system of government that maintains a strict separation of mosque and state. Former President Bourguiba implemented policies that, building on Tunisia's secular leanings, established Tunisia as one of the most secular, and secure, Arab and Muslim societies in the world. President Ben Ali continued these policies, while expanding government control over religious institutions, including mosques, imams and education. Some of these steps taken by the GOT could be considered "secular best practices" for other Arab and Muslim countries, given Tunisia's success in countering religious extremism. Most Tunisians today grew up in this overtly secular system; yet, increasingly Tunisians are turning to religion. At the same time, more and more complain that Ben Ali's focus on regime security over political progress and dialogue could lead to the collapse of the "model" secular system. End Summary. -------------- BOURGUIBA'S SECULAR MIRACLE -------------- ¶2. (C) Tunisia's first President Habib Bourguiba was famous -- or perhaps infamous -- for his liberal interpretations of the Quran and other Islamic texts. In fact, Bourguiba famously drank juice in Ramadan and suggested the veil retarded women's participation in Tunisia's development. Bourguiba's views and policies framed the social progress that defines Tunisia today, including the banning of polygamy and the promotion of women's rights. However, these views were not simply Bourguiba's; in fact, Tunisia has a long history of pre-independence era intellectuals who promoted moderate and secular views. While most Tunisians, like many Arabs in the independence era, supported Bourguiba's political and social changes, some increasingly were turning to Islam for answers to the country's challenges as the Bourguiba era drew to a close. -------------- BEN ALI USES THE CARROT...AND STICK -------------- ¶3. (C) Following his 1987 palace coup, Tunisia's second President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali promised greater democracy and more space for religious groups. For example, in 1992, Ben Ali established the Ministry of Religious Affairs -- notably not Islamic Affairs -- to promote religious tolerance and interfaith relations. According to one former GOT insider, Ben Ali decided to create the Ministry in order to reach out to conservative Tunisians who rejected Bourguiba's strictly secular state. But, perhaps thanks to his security background, Ben Ali took additional steps to solidify state control over religious matters. If Bourguiba's policies firmly entrenched a secular system, Ben Ali went further to ensure religion could never be used to overthrow this system. In 1989, Ben Ali passed a law making imams government employees and, in 1990, reformed religious education in public schools. ¶4. (C) Another key component of the GOT's separation of religion and state is the 1988 law governing political party organization, which bans the formation of parties based on religion. In order to circumvent this law, the existing Islamic Tendency Movement changed its name to an-Nahdha. In 1988 the "National Pact" brought the now banned Islamic party an-Nahdha into the political realm, and the party fielded independents in the 1989 elections although it was never a legal party. But the perceived threat of the Islamist movement, in Tunisia and in neighboring Algeria, brought the end to the GOT tolerance of an-Nahdha and other "Islamists" in the 1990s. Many an-Nahdha members were jailed and others fled to exile in Europe, leading one GOT official to note that countries who accept the political asylum claims of religious extremists endanger all moderate society. -------------- THE SECURITY TREATMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) Following the clashes with Islamists in the 1990s, Ben Ali increasingly applied what many term the "security approach" to conservative and secular Tunisians alike. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) Director of International Cooperation Tahar Fellous told PolOff that the Ministry of TUNIS 00001068 002 OF 003 Religious Affairs (MRA) coordinates all religious issues in Tunisia with the Ministry of Interior. Fellous explained that the GOT has a three-pronged approach to combat religious extremism: controlling religious speech or sermons, employing all imams and maintaining strict supervision over mosques. According to MRA Chief of Staff Belkacem Alioui, there are approximately 4,300 state mosques in Tunisia. Mosques are closed outside of prayer hours, and GOT security services monitor communities to disrupt any suspicious gatherings. Imams, who usually have other full-time employment, are recommended by regional governors and appointed and supervised by the MRA and MOI. Alioui explained that the Minister of Religious Affairs personally suggests the topics of weekly sermons, the text of which are written and then distributed to imams by the Ministry. Like almost all public events in Tunisia, plainclothes security officials attend the sermons to ensure imams do not deviate from the text. Independent imams are not allowed, as evidenced by the recent removal of the well-known imam of the Tunis suburb and tourist attraction Sidi Bou Said, who was not a GOT authorized leader. ¶6. (C) In many ways this system of control limits the ability of extremists to spread their ideology and gain support in Tunisia and has, when combined with Ben Ali's economic and social development programs, done much to combat terrorist ideologies. However, because the system does not allow for the development of prominent religious leaders, it does little to promote a culture of moderation and tolerance. When asked about the absence of religious dialogue in Tunisia, the MOI's Fellous opined that fatwas (Islamic legal opinions) and ijtihad (Islamic legal interpretation) are only used for political aims today. The GOT believes that the Quran and Sunna are "clear" -- particularly regarding the need for openness and moderation -- and require no further interpretation. Therefore even though Tunisia's moderate views might be helpful in combating extremism in the region, the official religious establishment is silent, and almost invisible, to Tunisians and, more broadly, the Arab-Islamic community. -------------- SECULAR ELITES VS. RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVES -------------- ¶7. (C) However, the majority of Tunisians were born and educated in this secular system and would still agree with the GOT that religion must be separate from the state. The independent Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (ATFD) even argues that much-needed political liberalization in Tunisia should exclude Islamists, who cannot be trusted to support the secular achievements of the Tunisian regime. Meanwhile, the Movement of 18 October, a disparate group of secular and moderate Islamist opposition figures, continues to face internal friction over the group's open door to Islamists. In mid-2007, a group of intellectuals formed the (as-yet unrecognized) Association for the Defense of Secularism to press the GOT to go even further to solidify a secular system. Among the group's aims would be to amend the first article of the Tunisian constitution, which states, "Tunisia is a free state...whose religion is Islam." While the group's anti-Islamist focus appears on the surface to be in step with GOT interests, members are pessimistic the GOT will authorize a group that seeks to influence government policies, never mind public opinion. ¶8. (C) Perhaps more troubling is the fact that secularism is increasingly associated with the West, which causes some Tunisians to flatly reject the concept. With the advent of pan-Arab television and the spread of the Internet, an increasing number of Tunisians -- particularly among the youth -- are becoming religiously conservative. The pan-Arab and Muslim identity is increasingly attractive to young Tunisians, partly in reaction to US policies in the region that are viewed as attacks on Arab and Muslim brothers, but also due to Ben Ali's own repressive policies. Perhaps cognizant of this shift, the GOT has allowed the moderate, and apolitical, Sufi movement to expand its outreach to Tunisian citizens through local zawiyas (or religious "corners"). While public discourse -- particularly about religious issues -- remains off limits, Sufi leaders have struck an agreement with the GOT that allows their activities to grow. One zawiya leader told EmbOffs that part of this agreement requires the zawiya inform the MOI of all who attend its activities. Further, Sufi communities refuse to engage conservative Tunisians who may have run into trouble with the secular state. Yet, Sufi leaders are quick to clarify their disregard for the GOT's secular (uninformed) speeches on religious issues. While they attend Friday prayers at GOT-operated mosques, one explained "They can say TUNIS 00001068 003 OF 003 anything they want, but their actions show their true faith." -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Tunisia's secular system offers much that is good: religious tolerance, separation of "church" and state, and a liberal approach to women's rights and other important issues. In fact, some Tunisian policies might even be "best practices" for a secular Muslim society. But they come at a price. While President Ben Ali insists on moderate religious views and denies extremists a platform, he goes further and exercises close to total control over freedom of expression and association. For example, despite the intense Tunisian interest in the wearing of the hijab (veil),there is no public debate of the question in the country. In doing so, Ben Ali and his government prevent the public discourse between secular and conservative Tunisians that could effectively combat domestic -- and perhaps international -- extremism. ¶10. (C) So far, Tunisia's secular foundation, control of the religious establishment and strong security forces have largely prevented the emergence of domestic extremist threat. But for how long? Few Tunisians have faith the country's secular leanings can defeat extremism in the long run in the absence of public discourse and the development of a true, secular "center" for Tunisia. Helping Tunisians build that "center," through more political and personal liberty, is at the heart of our Freedom Agenda goals here. If they succeed, then Tunisia may yet merit the moniker many here desire: "a model for the Muslim world." But not yet. End Comment. GODEC