OCTOBER 18TH MOVEMENT: FOCUS ON 2009 ELECTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TUNIS 001058 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO (GRAY AND CARPENTER); DRL/FO (BARKS-RUGGLES); NEA/MAG (HOPKINS/HARRIS); NEA/PI LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHER E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2017 TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KDEM KPAO TS SUBJECT: OCTOBER 18TH MOVEMENT: FOCUS ON 2009 ELECTION REF: A. TUNIS 986 ¶B. TUNIS 840 ¶C. 06 TUNIS 2661 Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On July 26, the Ambassador met with five civil society activists involved in the October 18th movement (an alliance of disparate human rights and political activists that includes moderate Islamists). The October 18 group expressed deep concern about the lack of freedom of expression and freedom of association in Tunisia, stressing the GOT needs to ease restrictions now if the Presidential and parliamentary elections in 2009 are to be meaningful. They added the lack of political freedom is discouraging investment and slowing economic growth. ¶2. (C) While the October 18 group includes some of Tunisia's most serious opposition politicians (e.g. Nejib Chebbi),ongoing internal divisions over the role of Islamists threaten its continued existence and hamper its ability to attract a widespread following. While the group welcomes US Government advocacy for greater freedom, they have little interest in other engagement with the United States because of their opposition to USG regional policies. The Embassy is developing an action plan, focusing on freedom of expression and association, leading up to the 2009 elections. End summary. -------------- Who's Who -------------- ¶3. (C) On July 26, the Ambassador met with Nejib Chebbi (former Secretary General of the opposition Progressive Democratic Party and current member of the party's political bureau),Lotfi Hajji (president of the unauthorized Tunisian Journalists Syndicate),Samir Dilou (a member of the International Association for the Support of Political Prisoners),Fethi Jerbi (a member of the unauthorized Congress Party for the Republic or CPR),and Mohamed Nouri (President of the International Association for the Support of Political Prisoners, AISPP). Chebbi, Haji, Dilou, and Nouri were four of the seven individuals who began a hunger strike on October 18, 2005 (Ref C) to protest GOT restrictions on freedom of expression; Jerbi stood in for Abderraouf Ayadi (an original hunger striker from the CPR). The movement subsequently expanded to include a disparate alliance of civil society activists, including additional moderate Islamists. -------------- Obstacles to Political Freedom -------------- ¶4. (C) When asked if they felt the July 24 release of political prisoner Mohamed Abbou (Ref A) was indicative of growing political freedom, the group was unanimous that their answer was, unfortunately, no. Chebbi responded that while civil society applauds Abbou's release, it has no assurances (or confidence) that the GOT will not imprison outspoken activists in the future. A more genuine indicator of increasing political space, he continued, would be specific measures to improve freedom of association and expression (e.g., access to television and radio for political parties, or registering new associations). ¶5. (C) Over the course of the two-and-a-half hour meeting, the group repeatedly expressed concerns regarding freedom of association and freedom of expression. Chebbi opined that in order for there to be meaningful Presidential and parliamentary elections in 2009, the GOT needs to ease restrictions on freedom of the press and allow opposition groups to organize and promote their platforms. He characterized the 2009 elections as a potentially pivotal turning point for Tunisia, but only if preparatory measures are taken in 2007. Opposition groups, he said, are orienting their activities towards the elections, but are hampered by their inability to meet freely and lack of access to local media. Asked about future activities, the group explained that it has no concrete plans, citing problems plaguing freedom of association, ranging from an inability to secure conference venues to the presence of plainclothes policemen outside meetings. TUNIS 00001058 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Chebbi countered the oft-expressed GOT argument that rapid reforms could lead to instability, offering Tunisia's political reforms during the early 1980's as proof that growing political liberty could foster economic prosperity. Jerbi agreed that democracy as a whole fosters economic growth. A strong press and independent judiciary counter corruption, Jerbi said, while political repression simply polarizes society and fosters extremism. Jerbi, an economics professor, voiced concern that continued political repression would discourage continued investment in Tunisia, chasing away both talent and employers. As proof that this phenomenon is potentially already underway, he cited the high unemployment rate in Tunisia, saying the official rate of 14 percent was a dramatic underestimate. ¶7. (C) Aside from the economic question, Jerbi flirted with positions more extreme than the others. More than once, he even alluded to the possibility that some Tunisians are willing to take up arms against the Ben Ali regime. Although he distanced himself -- and the CPR, which advocates only non-violent opposition -- from the notion of armed resistance, some members of the group found the references unsettling. Ambassador stressed that the USG believes that the GOT has made progress in important areas, and that all discussion of violence is completely unacceptable. Jerbi agreed that violence is unacceptable. Chebbi told EmbOffs separately that he considers Jerbi extreme and not representative of the Movement. -------------- A Role for the USG? -------------- ¶8. (C) When the Ambassador solicited the group's thoughts on what the USG should do to support civil society, participants at first avoided the question. Nouri and Chebbi concurred that the democracy movement in Tunisia should be first and foremost a Tunisian-driven enterprise, though they acknowledged it would be useful if the USG lobbied the GOT for more press freedom and freedom of association. There was an uncomfortable pause, followed by some nervous laughter, when the subject of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) was raised; the October 18th group displayed a distinct preference for assistance not associated with the USG. (Note: Many civil society activists in Tunisia have declined to apply for MEPI small grants, because of their opposition to US policies in the region. End note.) Hajji offered the most concrete wish list, noting that a project similar to Freedom House's Blue Umbrella (with international NGOs providing "cover" to local activists) would be useful. Hajji, the president of an organization currently unrecognized by the GOT, also wished for an office where his members could meet freely. His colleagues good-naturedly pointed out that even if he had a door, there would probably be plainclothes policemen blocking it. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Through partnerships such as the October 18th Movement and the Coalition Against the Death Penalty (Ref B), Tunisian civil society has demonstrated a high degree of initiative and the ability to coordinate between sometimes disparate groups. The group's reluctance to receive grants from the USG complicates the issue of assistance. For the most part, the group seemed to be asking the Embassy to do what they cannot without reprisals: advocate for greater freedom of expression and freedom of association with the GOT. The Embassy is exploring non-financial forms of assistance, in addition to greater cooperation with other diplomatic missions to better support human rights and civil society activists. The Embassy is also developing a programming action plan, focusing on freedom of expression and association, leading up to the 2009 elections. End Comment. GODEC