LIBYA, FRANCE CONCLUDE "VERY GENERAL" CIVILIAN NUCLEAR DEAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000664 DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG; NSC FOR RAMCHAND E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/2/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP ENRG MNUC ECIN EINV ETRD KPWR FR LY SUBJECT: LIBYA, FRANCE CONCLUDE "VERY GENERAL" CIVILIAN NUCLEAR DEAL REF: TRIPOLI 641 TRIPOLI 00000664 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: John Godfrey, POL/ECON Counselor, AmEmbassy Tripoli, State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (S) Summary: According to French diplomats, a civilian nuclear deal concluded between Libya and France during President Sarkozy's visit to Tripoli constitutes only a "very general" framework for future cooperation, with no clear financial commitment from the French side and little expectation from either the French or Libyan side that it will be completed soon. President Nicholas Sarkozy is sensitive to and fully engaged on non-proliferation concerns surrounding a nuclear desalinization project discussed within the framework of the MOU. Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi focused on plans for a 2008 "Mediterranean Union" head of state conference during two private meetings with Sarkozy, and only briefly raised the case of the Bulgarian medics. High-level Libya-France consultations on Darfur will be reported septel. End summary. CIVILIAN NUCLEAR MOU: A "VERY GENERAL" FRAMEWORK ¶2. (C) French PolCouns Pierre-Antoine Molina described a civilian nuclear MOU August 1, signed by FMs Kouchner and Shalgham July 25, as only a "very general" framework for future cooperation on civilian nuclear power programs. He stressed that the MOU is in line with previous French policies and emphasized that the impetus for the agreement came directly from President Sarkozy's office, with only marginal involvement by the French MFA. MFA Americas Desk Office Director Muhammad Matari echoed Molina's characterization in a meeting with Pol/Econ Chief August 1, saying the deal was "not very detailed" and provided only a "general roadmap" for cooperation on nuclear programs, to include a nuclear-fueled water desalinization plant. ¶3. (S) Molina described Sarkozy as actively engaged on non-proliferation concerns and recounted steps the French President took to ensure any French involvement in a nuclear-powered water desalinization plant could not be used to help reconstitute Libya's WMD program. Molina said no dual-use technology was under discussion and that the reactor France envisions powering the desalinization plant would include safeguards that prevent it from being reconfigured to produce plutonium. In addition, Sarkozy reportedly insisted on and received assurances that the reactor could be shut down remotely from France. ¶4. (S) Contrary to Libyan press reporting, Molina said the July 25 MOU does not/not commit France to fund construction of the nuclear desalinization facility. Details of France's financial commitment will be resolved during upcoming negotiations involving (on the French side) the MFA, energy officials, and the Areva company, the majority of which is French-owned. The French team does not yet know who will negotiate modalities on behalf of the GOL, although the MFA's Muhammad Matari said it would be MFA Secretary for European Affairs Abdulati Obeidi. The GOL expressed interest in completing the facility and initiating operations by 2009, but France views this timeline as unrealistic. (Note: 2009 will be the 40th anniversary of the 1969 revolution that brought Qadhafi to power. A slew of high profile infrastructure projects, including new power plants and a major overhaul of the Tripoli International Airport, are underway to help augment the visible benefits of the revolution. End note.) Privately, some GOL officials also acknowledge that completion by 2009 is overly ambitious. Matari conceded to Pol/Econ Chief that "no one realistically expects this to move very quickly." He noted that the deal is "a very complicated subject" that requires "much study" by both sides, and added that the GOL is aware that there are serious European sensitivities involved that could limit France's ability to deliver on the project. ¶5. (C) Molina acknowledged European concerns, chiefly German, about the nuclear agreement, but noted that France's understanding is that Siemens, a 28% stakeholder in Areva, does not have the authority to stop the investment from moving forward. He dismissed publicly-reported calls by German parliamentarians for Siemens to move to block the deal as "grandstanding," but conceded that the nuclear MOU had become a political issue for France and Germany that goes beyond the mechanics of the July 25 Libya-France deal. QADHAFI, SARKOZY DISCUSS MEDITERRANEAN UNION, IGNORE BULGARIAN MEDICS TRIPOLI 00000664 002.2 OF 002 ¶6. (C) According to Molina, Qadhafi and Sarkozy spent much of their time together discussing Sarkozy's plans to convene a Mediterranean head of state conference in spring 2008 to discuss migration and water management concerns (Reftel contains further details on Sarkozy's visit). The French delegation described Qadhafi as very interested in the Mediterranean Union proposal, but said he voiced serious reservations about inviting Israel's head of state to participate in the proposed conference. Beyond an opening line expressing "anger" at Bulgaria's decision to immediately pardon the six medics upon their return to Sofia July 24, Qadhafi did not discuss the case with Sarkozy. Claiming that the GOL considers the case of the medics to be closed, the MFA's Matari said the GOL tried to focus "exclusively on the positive" during Sarkozy's visit. ¶7. (C) Qadhafi and Sarkozy held two, separate meetings on the night of July 25-26 -- one at Qadhafi's Bab Azizia compound in Tripoli attended by Tripoli's diplomatic corps and a second, more private meeting the same evening at the Corinthia Hotel. According to French diplomats, Sarkozy decided on July 20 to visit Libya. Initially, the Libyans planned to host the visit in Sirt, Qadhafi's desert home about 400km east of Tripoli. The GOL changed the venue four times in five days between Tripoli and Sirt, greatly frustrating Sarkozy's 20-person security advance team. ¶8. (C) Comment: GOL interlocutors at all levels have routinely stressed that "average Libyans" need to see tangible rewards from the U.S. and Europe in response to Libya's 2003 decision to renounce WMD and terrorism. Most have focused on two infrastructure projects -- a nuclear-powered water desalinization plant and a regional nuclear medicine center. Last week's Libya-France agreement to move forward with the water desalinization project will allow the GOL to boast to its domestic audience that it has finally secured one of these long-sought "tangible rewards." Apart from a well-timed public relations coup, though, it remains unclear how much tangible benefit the GOL will actually garner from the agreement. End comment. STEVENS