QADHAFI'S CALLS FOR AFRICAN AND MUSLIM UNITY RESONATE IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000421 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/30/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM LY SUBJECT: QADHAFI'S CALLS FOR AFRICAN AND MUSLIM UNITY RESONATE IN LIBYA TRIPOLI 00000421 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In two recent public appearances -- a March 27 Al Jazeera interview and a March 31 speech to Tuareg tribal leaders in Agadez, Niger -- Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi continued his long drift away from the Arab world and worked to portray himself as a distinctly African leader. Speaking just after his decision not to attend the Arab League summit in Riyadh, Qadhafi dismissed Arab leaders as "headed for extinction," declaimed divisions in the Muslim world between Sunni and Shia camps, and called for the resurrection of the tenth century Fatimid Caliphate in North Africa. While better-educated Libyans dismiss Qadhafi's ramblings, many Libyans take the "brother Leader's" calls for Muslim unity seriously and link Qadhafi's comments to sectarian violence in Iraq. Qadhafi's latest remarks should been seen as ongoing efforts to position himself as an African leader, while at the same time framing himself as a "pure" Muslim leader relentlessly criticizing other Arab governments. END SUMMARY. QADHAFI LASHES OUT AGAINST ARABS AND CALLS FOR A NEW FATIMID STATE ¶2. (C) Qadhafi's recent public remarks -- a March 27 Al Jazeera interview and a March 31 speech to Tuareg tribal leaders in Agadez, Niger (commemorating the Prophet Muhammad's birthday) -- strongly criticized the Arab League for allowing the United States' to set its agenda and attempting to pit "Arabs against Persians." In addition, Qadhafi spoke out against the division of Muslims into Sunnis and Shiites as a "colonialist plot" to weaken Muslims' political power. Trying to set himself apart as a unifier, when other Muslim leaders focused on divisions, "the Caliphate has nothing to do with religion, and this is a worldly struggle for rule." At the same time, Qadhafi's comments served his continuing interest in trying to counter Saudi influence in Islamic affairs. ¶3. (C) The Agadez speech elaborated on Qadhafi's criticism of the "conspiracy of mobilizing Arabs against Persians" with a convoluted argument that African Muslims are really Shiites and that Africa, not Iran, is the true center of Shia power. Qadhafi claimed many Libyans have Shiite names (they do not) and celebrate Shia holidays, including Ashoura. (NOTE: Ashura is observed in Libya, but as a minor holiday focusing not, as in Iran on the martyrdom of Hussein, but rather on the Prophet Musa's parting of the Red Sea. Children wear costumes and carry effigees. Libyans with whom we have spoken are universally scornful of self-flagellation and other Shiite Ashura practices associated with the seventh century martyrdom of Hussein.) In addition, Qadhafi spoke nostalgically of the 260-year Fatimid reign in North Africa from the tenth to the thirteenth century, describing it as a halcyon period of African Muslim political unity. "The Shiites are North Africa. We will build the modern, second Fatimid state... on the condition that it be free of all the sectarian conflicts and the debate about the Imamate and religious rule" said Qadhafi. QADHAFI'S CALLS FOR MUSLIM UNITY RESONATE WITH LIBYANS CONCERNED ABOUT IRAQ ¶4. (C) While it is difficult to find a chain of logic in any Qadhafi speech, and there are invariably inaccuracies or unique interpretations, there are always segments that strike a chord with his audience and the broader Libyan population. Though Qadhafi's remarks are easily dismissed in most parts of the Arab world and among most better-educated Libyans, his calls for Muslim and African unity strongly resonate among certain, less worldly segments of Libyan society. Describing the Al Jazeera interview, one Libyan (and LES mission employee) praised Qadhafi as a strong leader willing to stand up to imperialist powers and their Arab puppets. In contrast, an LES who spent much of his life outside Libya rolled his eyes and dismissed Qadhafi as a lunatic. A number of Libyans echoed Qadhafi's sentiment that Sunni-Shia divisions reduce the Muslim world's capacity to respond to foreign powers. However, we have also heard highly educated Libyans expressing visceral hatred for Shiism and recent efforts to project Iranian power into Iraq. Qadhafi's reminder that all Muslims share a single Qu'ran and should return to the text to find the true faith also falls on receptive ears. ¶5. (C) While most Libyans were confused by Qadhafi's comments that all African Arabs are really Shiites, none would criticize "the Leader" to Poloff, instead redirecting the conversation to a defense of Qadhafi's calls for Muslim unity. "Libyans did not know from Sunni and Shia before the U.S. killed Saddam Hussein," one bookstore owner told Poloff. While all Libyans TRIPOLI 00000421 002.2 OF 002 are (by Libyan government definition) Sunni, Saddam's death and continuing sectarian turmoil in Iraq have created a new awareness in Libya about sectarian division. One taxi driver told Poloff that he had never met a Shiite before Iraqi refugees began to arrive in Libya following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. IMAM MUSA AL-SADR CASE STILL AN OBSTACLE FOR QADHAFI TO OVERCOME ¶6. (C) Libyan thoughts, official and un-official, about Muslim unity are further complicated by the case of Imam Musa al-Sadr, a Lebanese Shia cleric who disappeared in 1978 after traveling from Lebanon to Libya to seek funding from Qadhafi. Sadr's disappearance continues to cast a cloud over Libyan-Lebanese relations that has only slightly dissipated over time. Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri claimed publicly that the Libyan regime is responsible. The Lebanese Charge in Tripoli regularly bemoans being in the Libyan backwater with nothing to do since most Lebanese can not travel here unless they have Libyan sponsors using "wasta" to get exceptional visa issuances. U.S. government officials have inquired about the background and status of the case on numerous occasions and are given the standard response that Sadr departed Libya and disappeared in Italy. We understand that an Italian investigation of Sadr's disappearance was closed without any conclusive results. The Libyans also consider the Sadr issue "case closed" as long as the Lebanese or the Arab League don't put it on the agenda. The cold Libyan relationship warmed slightly during the summer 2006 war in Lebanon, when the Libyan public responded enthusiastically to Hizballah's "resistance" against Israel and the Government jumped on the bandwagon by trying to send humanitarian aid to the Lebanese people. COMMENT: THE LATEST STEP IN A LONG DRIFT FROM THE MIDDLE EAST TO AFRICA ¶7. (C) Qadhafi's latest remarks should be seen in the context of his long drift away from the Arab world and ongoing efforts to position himself as an African leader. His speeches were riddled with anti-Saudi rhetoric, ranging from thinly-veiled criticism of state-sponsored extremism (Wahhabism) to a line that the two holiest places in Islam are actually Mecca and Jerusalem rather than Mecca and Medina. While anti-Saudi sentiment has long been central to Qadhafi's worldview, King Abdullah ibn Abdulaziz's recent successes brokering a Hamas-Fatah power-sharing agreement in Palestine and hosting a productive Arab League summit have clearly rankled. While King Abdullah -- Qadhafi's self-styled nemesis -- has seen his star rise, Qadhafi's own efforts to unite Africans under his leadership are struggling. Qadhafi has been unable to implement a Chad-Sudan ceasefire signed in Tripoli in February 2006; promises to unite Darfur rebels as a step towards a political settlement have stalled, and Qadhafi's "Cen-Sad" organization continues to play a distant second fiddle to the African Union as a coordination mechanism for African foreign policy. ¶8. (C) Qadhafi's seeming defense of Iran in the wake of Arab League attempts to retool the Iraqi constitution in favor of Iraqi Sunnis may have more to do with personal antipathy towards Arab leaders than any great support for Iran. Though GOL interlocutors frequently claim that the United States did not appropriately reward Libya for renouncing WMD and terrorism, and therefore Iran has no incentive to dismantle its own nuclear program, Qadhafi's latest ramblings are more contemptuous of the Arab League than supportive of Iran's nuclear ambitions. END COMMENT. CECIL