FORMER CANADIAN KANDAHAR COMMANDER MAKES CASE FOR AFGHAN

UNCLAS TORONTO 000439 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CAN, SCA/A, and EUR/RPM E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREL PTER CA AF SUBJECT: FORMER CANADIAN KANDAHAR COMMANDER MAKES CASE FOR AFGHAN MISSION Sensitive but Unclassified - please protect accordingly. ¶1. (SBU) Speaking before the Toronto-based Canadian Institute for International Affairs on November 2, Major General Tim Grant, recently returned from a stint as commander of Canadian Forces troops in Afghanistan, encouraged patience and highlighted progress in Canada's mission in Afghanistan. Grant, while refusing to comment directly on when the Canadian troops could be withdrawn, encouraged a long-term view of the Afghanistan mission. ¶2. (SBU) Grant compared the Canadian-led "Operation Medusa" in the fall of 2006, with recent fighting in areas to the north of Kandahar as a measure of progress. During "Medusa," Canadian troops fought without Afghan assistance against nearly 2,000 well armed and motivated Taliban fighters. In the last few months, many combat engagements have been led by Afghan National Army (ANA) troops against far fewer and less enthusiastic Taliban. Grant attributed this success to Canadian programs which paid potential Taliban fighters a living wage to engage in manual labor and restore irrigation infrastructure in the Kandahar area. Grant also highlighted the important role of civilian agencies such as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in building civilian governance capacity in the region. ¶3. (SBU) Though generally positive in his assessment of the Afghan military, Grant termed Afghan police a "basket case." He pointed to efforts by Corrections Canada in improving prison conditions (a controversial issue in the Canadian press) and measures to bring police salaries in line with ANA compensation as indicators that Canada and coalition forces were beginning to get a firmer handle on policing issues. Grant highlighted RCMP "in-service" refresher training to Afghan police as critical to longer-term success. ¶4. (SBU) Grant deflected questions about timelines for an eventual Canadian withdrawal but predicted that the ANA would be able to function independently on a tactical level by 2009. Strategic components of the Afghan military, such as airlift capability and command and staff training, will likely require outside assistance for the foreseeable future, he said. ¶5. (SBU) COMMENT: Grant's presentation to a largely friendly audience was designed to highlight the progress Canada has made in the Kandahar region. Beyond oblique suggestions that much Canadian media coverage was not appropriately positive, Grant wisely refused to engage on the controversial questions such as withdrawal timelines, NATO burden-sharing, or human rights abuses in Afghan prisons. END COMMENT. NAY