Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TOKYO856
2007-02-28 22:59:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02//07

Tags:  OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 000856 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02//07 INDEX: (1) Japanese version of NSC has clear Abe stamp (2) Staffing JNSC secretariat with able personnel essential; Role of advisor to prime minister vague (3) Japanese version of US National Security Council: NSC that does not included the Finance Ministry among its members will be ineffective (4) Bills to reform government lenders leave privatized entities' shareholder requirements and profitability ambiguous (5) Interview with ASDF's 1st Air Defense Missile Group Commander Kenji Yamauchi on DPRK: We will intercept missiles in instant judgment (6) Advice to Abe administration by Shinichi Kitaoka, former deputy permanent representative to UN: "Moderate, conservative" diplomacy needed; Tough measures can't change North Korea's attitude (7) Armitage Report 2 on getting Asia right ignores burden on Okinawa ARTICLES: (1) Japanese version of NSC has clear Abe stamp ASAHI (Page 3) (Almost Full) February 28, 2007 Prime Minister Abe proudly presented a report incorporating a proposal for establishing a Japanese version (JNSC) of the US National Security Council, saying, "This is exactly in agreement with my concept." The report carries a strong Abe imprint: it notes that the government will aim for a quick response in the diplomacy and security areas and passing secrets-protection legislation at an early date. However, the report, compiled in a hasty manner, has apparently failed to get to the root of bureaucratic sectionalism in each government agency - the original agenda item. Consideration given to US regarding secret protection One member of the Kantei (Prime Minister's Official Residence) Function Reinforcement Council (KFRC) yesterday complained about the inclusion into the report the plan for early passage of secret protection legislation. The contents of the report were based on the draft report presented on Jan. 15 by former Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobuo Ishihara,
chairman of the KFRC. When one participant pointed out, "It is irrelevant for the JNSC to deal with the issue of enacting secrets-protection legislation," Yuriko Koike, Special Assistant to SIPDIS the Prime Minister and the acting chairman of the panel, insisted, "This is the prime minister's wish." Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki also told the importance of intelligence control linking it with the issue of reinforcing the Japan-US alliance. What was the prime minister's aim? In the policy speech delivered last September he said: "I would like to build a framework that will enable the Kantei and the White House to communicate at any time." TOKYO 00000856 002 OF 010 SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02//07 When North Korea launched missiles last July, Abe, who was deputy chief cabinet secretary at the time, worked in close cooperation with US National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, which led him to think that establishing a JNSC would be a means to strengthen the bilateral alliance. He presumably thought that to that end, too, it would be important to give consideration to the US, which is nervous about possible leaks of intelligence on the Japanese side. Revising the Constitution and studies on the right of collective self-defense, policy themes advocated by the prime minister, are directly linked to the further strengthening of the Japan-US alliance. Commenting on reasons why the prime minister has set the timeline for launching the JNSC as early as next April, another panel member said, "The prime minister wanted to pave the way for amending the Constitution during his tenure." As if to endorse this comment, Chair Ishihara yesterday told a news conference that studies on the right of collective self-defense might top the agenda of the JNSC. Prime Minister rules out participation of finance minister: Bureaucratic sectionalism remain intact The prime minister's insistence was also seen in the selection of the membership of the JNSC, which will be small in number of personnel. Former Finance Minister Masajuro Shiokawa in early February sought the participation of the finance minister in the JNSC, saying, "It is a problem if the finance minister does not join the panel. Former Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi was assassinated by the military because he cut military expenses." However, the prime minister rejected the proposal, saying, "The finance minister is not a key official on NSC issues." This stance of the prime minister was also visible at the final panel meeting yesterday. He underscored, "From my experience, I am strongly determined that Kantei (Prime Minister's Official Residence) leadership is necessary." The prime minister dealt with the 9-11 terrorist attacks on the US and the North Korea issue at the Kantei for several years, which has made him strongly believe that it is important to forge security and diplomatic strategies under the leadership of the Kantei eliminating bureaucratic sectionalism. That is the reason why he has proposed a plan to strengthen the authority of the JNSC by appointing a lawmaker an assistant to the prime minister and using the KFRC as the core body in dealing with national security affairs. However, bureaucrats, who are sensitive to their ministry's interests, are alarmed about the prospect of politics making stronger intervention in administrative activities with one senior Cabinet Secretariat official noting, "There is a problem in terms of the separation of three powers." Another senior government official complained, "Under the parliamentary cabinet system, the areas of responsibility of the cabinet and each government agency are fixed." In the end, the report noted, "The JNSC is an advisory organ reporting to the prime minister as is the case of the existing Security Council." The panel has therefore approved bureaucratic sectionalism will remain intact. Some officials at Kasumigaseki, Japan's bureaucratic center, said, "It is possible to carry out what has been proposed in the report issued today, just by changing the application of existing systems." TOKYO 00000856 003 OF 010 SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02//07 US Deputy National Security Adviser Crouch give advice to Kyuma Defense Minister Kyuma yesterday met with visiting Deputy National Security Adviser Crouch at the Defense Ministry. They exchanged views on the JNSC and the Iraq policy. Crouch gave Kyuma this advice: "It is important for cabinet-minister members of the JNSC to make sure their staff members coordinate views on a constant basis. Unless the panel has a system in which the staff members can present policy options immediately at a time of crisis, it will be the cabinet ministers who will find themselves in trouble." (2) Staffing JNSC secretariat with able personnel essential; Role of advisor to prime minister vague NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Abridged slightly) February 28, 2007 Many challenges lie ahead for the envisaged Japanese National Security Council (JNSC) to function as the nation's control tower of foreign and security affairs. The definition of the post of national security advisor to the prime minister, mentioned in the report released by the council to strengthen the Kantei's (Prime Minister's Official Residence) functions, is vague. Securing national security exerts for the secretariat's office is also essential. How to collect necessary intelligence for decision-making is unclear, as well. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe last night explained the significance of the report to reporters this way: "It proposes a system enabling the JNSC to speedily discuss and draw up strategies to meet changes of the times and various issues." The prime ministerial advisor who will head the secretariat is required to attend every JNSC meeting to offer his or her view. But this person's lack of authority to control and issue orders to the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry has raised concern that those offices would hesitate to provide the JNSC with intelligence. Effective policy planning depends on how speedily and effectively the JNSC can collect and analyze vital intelligence. The report reads: "Government agencies concerned shall constantly provide the JNSC with necessary and appropriate intelligence." There is apparently a need for the system to ensure close cooperation between government offices. The JNSC will handle a broad range of themes from the right to collective self-defense, to the North Korean situation, to resources and energy. The report calls for staffing the secretariat with 10 to 20 experts, which is insufficient in the eyes of some observers. In a press conference yesterday, council chair Nobuo Ishihara described this number as the "minimum level" required for supporting essential functions. For the sake of the flexible operation of the JNSC, the experts' council has decided not to give the finance minister a permanent seat on the JNSC. "The finance minister's presence will be asked for whenever budgetary measures are required," Ishihara explained. Discontent in offices other than the Foreign and Defense Ministries might grow depending on how the council is run. Determining the priority order of the Abe administration's other TOKYO 00000856 004 OF 010 SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02//07 important policies would also be a challenge. In his meeting yesterday with Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma, visiting US Deputy National Security Advisor Jack Crouch offered this advice on running the JNSC: "It is important to thoroughly coordinate matters with the secretariat members for issuing demands and orders. The cabinet ministers who will be the NSC members will be in trouble if there are no options in time of a national emergency." After his meeting with Advisor to the Prime Minister on National Security Yuriko Koike, Crouch also said to the press: "I hope to see close cooperation between the NSC of the United States and Japan." Experts' views on the JNSC Military commentator Kensuke Ebata: I expected to see a body similar to the US National Security Council that has the authority to decide on policies. My impression of the report is that given the parliamentary system, the group had to make compromises with reality. Although the report plays up the Kantei's leadership, it is basically designed to enhance the Security Council of Japan, which has been a coordination body between government agencies. The report specifies that there will be no change to the authority of the Foreign Ministry and other government offices concerned. If the JNSC can function effectively even with that, a certain level of results can be achieved. Some points remain unclear, such as how to ensure cooperation with the intelligence department, what authority will be given to the advisor to the prime minister, whether or not the JNSC will make public its reports, and so on. Former assistant to the prime minister Yukio Okamoto: I can give a positive assessment to the report calling for a process allowing the full-time secretariat members to present the prime minister with a number of options for flexible decisions instead of policies automatically coming from bureaucratic organizations. It is also necessary to create a system allowing the government to swiftly change policies, unfettered by traditional policies and continuity, in order to meet changes in the international situation. The secretariat must do more than serve the prime minister. It has to have the ability to effectively collect intelligence and even come up with policies out of step with the prime minister's sentiment, as necessary. The JNSC must also send information to the public so as not to fall into secrecy. (3) Japanese version of US National Security Council: NSC that does not included the Finance Ministry among its members will be ineffective YOMIURI (Page 12) (Full) February 16, 2007 By Tomohito Shinoda, professor of international and Japanese politics at International University; author of books, Japanese Diplomacy in Postwar and Diplomacy led by the Prime Minister's Official Residence; age 46. It has been reported that a group of experts to consider the creation of a Japanese version of the US National Security Council (NSC) have drafted a final plan. The Japanese-style NSC is reportedly modeled after Britain's NSC and composed of a small number of cabinet ministers -- the prime minister, chief cabinet TOKYO 00000856 005 OF 010 SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02//07 minister, foreign minister and defense minister -- like the NSC in America. I wonder whether the new security body will be created based on the full recognition of differences in the political systems of the United States and Britain. Like Britain, Japan has a parliamentary cabinet system under which the cabinet bears joint responsibility toward the Diet. Japan, however, interprets joint responsibility as meaning that unanimous approval is required for cabinet decisions. This interpretation limits the prime minister's leadership. Since prior consultations are actually carried out, cabinet meetings have lost significance. The British prime minister has the right to decide agenda of cabinet meetings as chair, the right to speak freely and the right to call on speakers; as a result, the premier can control cabinet meetings. The prime minister also can summarize the discussion and make cabinet decisions without taking a vote. Since this kind of prime minister-led cabinet management system has been established, there have been about 30 committees set up under the British cabinet. Committee decisions are treated as cabinet decisions. The Japanese prime minister's right to initiate new policy at cabinet meetings was made clear through functional enhancement by the Hashimoto cabinet's administrative reform drive. However, the principle of adopting cabinet decisions in a unanimous way has been upheld. As long as this principle is maintained, there remains a possibility that opposition from other ministries and agencies will prevent NSC decisions. Given that situation, there would be doubt about the effectiveness of an NSC decision. Modeling on the US' National Security Council, the statutory members of which are the president (chairman of the body),the vice president, the secretary of state and the secretary of defense, the Japanese version of the NSC is unlikely to include the finance minister among its members. However since the US Constitution writes that the Congress has the right to decide the state budget, the White House negotiates with the Congress on budgetary affairs. Therefore, the State Department and the Defense Department hope for the involvement of the White House, which has influence over the budget, and the NSC in major policies. Since the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),which is equivalent to the Finance Ministry's Budget Bureau in Japan, and the Department of the Treasury do not have budget-drafting authority, the treasury secretary and OMB chief do not take part in the NSC. SIPDIS The Japanese prime minister exercises influence in drafting basic policies for state budgets through the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, but the prime minister cannot assign a budget allocation to specific policies without the help of the Finance Ministry. Although the Finance Ministry's authorities have weakened, the Budget Bureau still controls the compilation of state budgets. Given that, the Finance Ministry may oppose NSC decisions. If the Finance Ministry is included in the NSC membership, it would be difficult for the NSC to formulate foreign and security policies that require the endorsement of budget allocations. I assume, therefore, there will be no reasons for the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry to entrust policy-making to the NSC. If the NSC does not include the finance ministry, it will likely be necessary to strengthen the prime minister's authority over the compilation of state budgets or review the principle of making cabinet decisions in a unanimous way. However, the possibility of TOKYO 00000856 006 OF 010 SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02//07 such is slim. In order to avoid negotiations on budgets with the Finance Ministry after the NSC decides something, the finance minister should be included as one of the NSC members. I highly value the establishment of a deputy chief cabinet secretary-level position above the assistant deputy chief cabinet SIPDIS secretary in order to cooperate with the Cabinet Secretariat. The SIPDIS question is how the NSC will gather necessary overseas intelligence. There seems to be an idea that the NSC should get such intelligence through the cabinet intelligence director. If so, the NSC will be able to get only limited intelligence. The NSC should be given the right to get information from various government offices, and should be able to obtain intelligence from the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry. (4) Bills to reform government lenders leave privatized entities' shareholder requirements and profitability ambiguous YOMIURI (Page 9) (Full) February 28, 2007 A bill to merge four public financial institutions into a single entity in October 2008 was adopted in a cabinet meeting yesterday. All the planned bills related to reforming the government lenders are now on the agenda. Although Diet deliberations will soon start on these bills, many details about privatized entities have been left undecided. Integration The four bills are designed to streamline bloated government-backed financial institutions and to leave what can be done by the private sector in its hands. The Development Bank of Japan, which provides long-term funds for social infrastructure projects, and the Shoko Chukin Bank, which offers loans to small businesses, will be privatized. Under the plan, a 100% state-owned stock company will be established in October 2008, and over the following five to seven years, the government will sell all its shares in the company to make it completely privatized. The government will continue small-lot lending to small companies and international financing, because private companies find it difficult to undertake such services. Four entities, including the National Life Finance Corporation, will be merged into Japan Policy Finance Corporation, a 100% state-owned new stock company, in October 2008. The Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal Enterprises, which provide loans for local governments' sewerage and other projects, will be dismantled, and corporations for municipal enterprises financed by the local governments concerned will undertake its business. Future vision Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki said in a press conference yesterday, "No decision has been made about what requirements will be set for shareholder status in a privatized Shoko Chukin Bank." Concerning the Development Bank of Japan, he remarked, "A business model in the process of pushing ahead with privatization has yet to be determined." The related bills stipulate that the shares in the Shoko Chukin Bank TOKYO 00000856 007 OF 010 SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02//07 will be transferred to organizations linked to small companies. The government plans to sell all its shares in the bank between 2013 and 2015, but as noted in the bills, "necessary steps will be taken" in order to continue the financing function for small businesses, such regulations as restrictions on shareholder status might be maintained. The Development Bank of Japan, after privatized, intends to actively engage in the long-term financing business, in which the bank has its own know-how. Nonetheless, once it loses its government backing, interest rates on raising funds will inevitably rise. In this case, its profitability will be negatively affected. Given this, the possibility is being discussed of the bank joining hands with another financial group or becoming a subsidiary of such a group. Effect of integration Taking over 30 trillion yen worth of the four lenders' outstanding loan claims, the new Japan Policy Finance Corporation will be a huge financial institution, on par with the nation's leading bank Resona Group. In the new integrated company, though, an account will be set for each different policy, so the functions of the four companies will be left separate. One analyst commented, "It might be difficult to try to cut personnel and improve business efficiency." In appointing the new president of the Finance Corporation for Small Businesses this January, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry recommended a person who retired from the ministry, but the Prime Minister's Office rejected the idea and instead picked a person unrelated to government agencies. In selecting the top posts in the Development Bank of Japan, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, and the National Life Finance Corporation in late September, priority is likely to be given to appointments from the private sector. (5) Interview with ASDF's 1st Air Defense Missile Group Commander Kenji Yamauchi on DPRK: We will intercept missiles in instant judgment YOMIURI (Page 4) (Full) February 28, 2007 Interviewer: Tatsuya Fukumoto In order to counter ballistic missiles, a Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 system will be installed by the end of March in the Air Self-Defense Force's (ASDF) 1st Air Defense Missile Group (assigned to the Iruma Base),the unit that is in charge of the Tokyo metropolitan zone. This will be the first installation of that system in the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). North Korea's ballistic missiles can reach Tokyo in 10 or so minutes. So, we must instantly make a decision to intercept them once we gather information about missile launches. We are required to get highly accurate information and make a quick response. I have now stepped up my efforts to train my unit led by some 20 SDF personnel who learned how to use the PAC-3 system at a US Army base in Texas. I have told them: "You must not do three things: 'not shoot,' 'be unable to shoot,' and 'fail to shoot down.'" Unit members are required to shoot. It is unacceptable for them not to shoot out of TOKYO 00000856 008 OF 010 SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02//07 hesitation or for them to be unable to launch missiles because the device is broken. Computers handle the job of shooting down ballistic missiles. What is important on our part is to create a system for the PAC-3 unit that would always be ready to intercept missiles. I have prioritized training for the unit so that it is prepared to depart from the base and ready to shoot upon arrival at the location of the deployment. When the PAC-3 unit moves from one place to another, if the five launchers are transferred together to one location, a total of 30 vehicles will move together. In order to intercept missiles in the Tokyo metropolitan zone, we need to study a number of simulations about where to deploy the PAC-3 unit in the center of Tokyo. We are confident that we can demonstrate our combat strength to the full and shoot down missiles, once we are ordered, "Go there until such and such a date and a time" and, "When it comes, shoot." (6) Advice to Abe administration by Shinichi Kitaoka, former deputy permanent representative to UN: "Moderate, conservative" diplomacy needed; Tough measures can't change North Korea's attitude MAINICHI (Page 5) (Slightly abridged) February 28, 2007 Chiyako Sato According to the recent six-party agreement on the North Korean nuclear issue, energy aid to be offered to North Korea in exchange for disabling its nuclear facilities will be a mere one million tons of heavy fuel oil. Meanwhile, the United States will begin the process of removing North Korea from its list of states that sponsor or support terrorism. This point is a problem. Former US Ambassador to the United Nations Bolton, who played a leading part when the UN Security Council adopted a resolution condemning Pyongyang's missile launches and nuclear test, criticized the agreement. It is unavoidable that President Bush is seen as shifting his North Korea policy. Although Japan should not be afraid of being isolated in the international community, complete isolation as a result of clinging to its principles must also be avoided. Even if Japan becomes even more hard-lined toward the North, that country will not change its attitude. The important thing is to convince North Korea first to abandon its nuclear programs and next to induce it to resolve the abduction issue. It should not be our country's goal to continue attacking North with an increasingly rigid stance. Such a tactic has not produced good results. I appreciated Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visits to China and South Korea last fall. However, I do not want him to simply revert to the old political style. Instead, I hope to see him follow a moderate, middle-of-the-road, conservative course. So far he has performed as I expected. It is unwise to create reasons to fight with China in addition to the areas of discord already lying between the two countries. It is a clever approach not to make Yasukuni Shrine an issue. Favorable relations between Japan and the US owed too much to the personal ties between then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and President Bush. As a result, there were few chances for dialogue at other levels. It is not healthy to think that everything would go TOKYO 00000856 009 OF 010 SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02//07 smoothly if only the Koizumi-Bush connection was in good shape. Now is time to do our best by employing various approaches. Some people may feel strong nostalgia for the Koizumi era, but I do not think everything then went along well. He would skip important issues and focus instead solely on one issue. He might have been a genius in playing the power game, but when it came to whether his way of carrying out politics was good for Japan, future historians may find faults with his style of doing things. I think Abe should demonstrate his leadership in his own way. In the 2005 Lower House election, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party won a landslide victory. As a result, the prime minister cannot easily decide to exercise his right to dissolve the Lower House. Instead, he should make better use of the right of appointment. What Prime Minister Abe should do is to shuffle his cabinet before the Upper House election in July and bring in a powerful lineup to help him achieve long-term policy goals. (7) Armitage Report 2 on getting Asia right ignores burden on Okinawa OKINAWA TIMES (Page 2) (Full) February 25, 2007 A group of American bipartisan Japan policy experts, led by former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, has recently released a report SIPDIS (Armitage Report 2) titled, "The US-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020." The previous report produced in 2000 served as key guidelines for the Bush administration's Asia policy. The new report is attracting much attention. We asked University of the Ryukyus Professor Masaaki Gabe for his view on the report's possible impact on Okinawa and other areas. The report with its set of policy proposals came out in Washington on Feb. 16. It carries an exciting and contentious subtitle: "Getting Asia Right," which can be translated into "how to guide Asia in the right direction," or "for a right Asia," or "a desirable Asia." As can easily be imagined, the title is likely to prompt readers to ask: "Who would determine what is right and based on what?" and, "Why should the United States be the one to get Asia right?" Some people might even argue that Asian affairs should be left to Asia. The Japanese media have reported on such possible reactions. But as far as I know, the report has not created a stir in the United States or in Asia. A study group comprising bipartisan experts on Japan produced the report. In October 2000, the same group of experts released the first Armitage Report that urged Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense. Richard Armitage, who served as deputy secretary of state under the Bush administration, and Joseph Nye, who served as assistant secretary of defense under the Clinton administration, played SIPDIS central roles in producing the report. Armitage, a former Marine officer who entered the US government during the Reagan administration, is a major advocate in Washington for a strong Japan-US alliance. He is the one who urged Japan to send Self-Defense Force troops to the Indian Ocean and Iraq by using TOKYO 00000856 010 OF 010 SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02//07 such expressions as "show the flag" and "boots on the ground." Joseph Nye, currently the dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, is an expert on international politics. He has indicated that the United States would be able to remain as a world leader as long as it possesses "soft power," meaning that the US has the technological edge that can make the US the engine of the world. He has brushed aside the projection that the US' hegemony would decline after the end of the Cold War. In February 1995, Nye released a report highlighting the need to keep 100,000 US troops in East Asia and stressing the role of US bases in Okinawa. He urged Washington to think twice before reducing US troops in Japan. The latest report fundamentally urges policy-makers in Washington to keep the US-Japan alliance at the center of America's Asia policy at least until 2020. In conclusion, the report underlines the need to deftly manage bilateral Japan-US relations and multilateral relations. It puts high priority on US action for maintaining the world order, which may change with the rise of China. The report specifically focuses on the "quality" of relations among Japan, the United States, and China. In other words, it seeks the management of issues in such areas as politics, military, economics, energy, trade, and history. In addition, paying special attention to India, the report calls for enhanced relations among Japan, the United States, and India, as if to constrain China. Dividing the Asia-Pacific into two geographical areas, the report points out the importance for the United States to forge trilateral relations with Japan and Australia, which encompass both Pacific relations and Pan-Asianism, apparently with the aim of checking China. The direction as outlined points to a US policy shift toward Asia, which belongs in both areas, by laying a series of bilateral relations with individual countries, (such as South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, China, and Japan) on top of the US-centered trilateral relationship. The report expects Japan to play an active role in the international community, including exercising the use of military power. It specifically calls for removing trade barriers between Japan and the United States to better enable the two countries to conduct joint military operations. That means virtually turning Japan into a country like the United States and integrating it into the United States. The privileged US military conducts daily activities in Okinawa on the back of Tokyo, which glorifies such "Americanization steps." Is Washington not aware of the danger of basing the Japan-US alliance on the burden placed on Okinawa? Or has it decided to turn a blind eye to it? DONOVAN

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